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Abstract
The growing lack of confidence in public companies arises from the recent accounting
scandals and corporate collapses, which have been attributed to the consequences of
separation of ownership and control in modern firms. Agency theory predicts a conflict of
interest between managers and shareholders that leads to agency costs and weak
performance. This study used agency, stakeholders’, and stewardship theories as the
theoretical framework and multiple regression analysis to examine the relationship
between corporate governance mechanisms and organizational performance in
nonfinancial firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The results of the study could
help clarify understanding of corporate governance to managers, investors, and regulators
who seek to understand how corporate governance impact firms’ performance. In this
study, corporate governance mechanisms included board independence, audit committee
independence, board size, number of board meetings, and executive compensation. The
data were collected from the firms’ published accounts on their websites and on the
archives of the Nigerian Stock Exchange for a period starting from January 1, 2011 to
December 31, 2015. The measures of financial performance in the study were return on
assets, return on capital employed, and Tobin’s Q. The study found a positive but not
statistically significant relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and
financial performance. This study has implications for positive social change by showing
managers and other stakeholders of firms how a good corporate governance system
assures investor confidence, employee loyalty and commitment, the reduction in conflict
of interest and agency costs, and a strong financial performance.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
The need for effective corporate governance mechanisms in joint-stock
companies arises from the separation of ownership from control. The owners of
the company, the shareholders, employ managers as their agents to manage the
business and take strategic and operational decisions in the interest of the firm and
shareholders. Because the agents and owners are separate individuals and groups,
the relationship between them often bring conflicts of interest. Whereas the
managers are employed to maximize returns to shareholders and also look after
the interests of all other stakeholders, they often pursue self-interest to the
detriment of the financial interest of their principals (Haji, 2014; Smith, 2003). By
using insider knowledge, managers of corporations could hide and use pricesensitive information to benefit themselves (Appuhami & Bhuyan, 2015; Liu,
Valenti, & Chen, 2016).
Although the principal-agent problems in corporations have existed since
the time of the industrial revolution, the attention of the business and political
leaders around the world was drawn afresh to the insidious nature of this
challenge facing business enterprises when the former energy giant, Enron, Inc.,
collapsed. Enron’s bankruptcy destroyed shareholders’ value and put many
employees out of jobs (Liu, Miletkov, Wei, & Yang, 2015). Other high-profile

2

financial scandals and corporate collapses followed that of Enron with Waste
Management, Parmalat, Lehman Brothers, and Global Crossing being a few of
those that made headlines (Burnsed, 2009CITE). Researchers have suggested that
the common thread that runs through the financial scandals and corporate
dysfunctional behavior has its roots in weak corporate governance systems
(Conyon & He, 2016; Ueng, 2016). The problem is also a result of incompetence,
poor organizational culture, and leadership styles that are excessively focused on
the short-term profit, excessive risk-taking, and the pursuit of self-interest by
managers (Zona, 2016). O’Connor and Byrne (2015) and Rashid (2015) traced the
problems in corporations to poor corporate governance systems and weak and
ineffective enforcement of corporate governance standards by the board of
directors
To ensure company directors are more transparent, adhere strictly to
corporate governance standards, and are more accountable to shareholders, the
U.S. government enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002, following the
collapse of Enron, Inc (Malthotra, Poteau, & Fritz, 2013). The objective of SOX
is to protect present and potential investors and creditors of corporations by
regulating the content, accuracy, and reliability of corporate disclosures in the
financial statements (Dah, 2016). One of the most profound changes brought by
the SOX is the establishment of the Public Companies Accounting Oversight
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Board (PCAOB). The PCAOB has the mandate to (a) register all public
accounting firms that audit public companies; (b) establish auditing, quality
control, ethical, and independence attestation standards required of external
auditors; (c) periodically assess the degree to which audit firms comply with the
rules of the PCAOB and professional standards; and (d) establish procedures for
investigating and disciplining registered firms and persons associated with them
(SOX, 2002).
The SOX (2002) also requires public companies to ensure independent
directors are in a majority on the boards of directors and to have audit committees
composed entirely of independent directors. These provisions should ensure that
governance mechanisms have the potential to reduce agency problems and enable
the firms to function effectively (Baran & Forst, 2015). In line with the SOX,
many countries have developed corporate governance codes and standards that
aim to reduce agency costs, minimize corporate risk, improve firm performance,
and reduce the incidences of corporate collapses (Bhagat & Bolton, 2013).
While laws like SOX and corporate governance codes developed by major
stock exchanges may reduce managers’ excesses, I will argue in this study that
these mechanisms are necessary but not sufficient to eliminate agency problems
in corporations. Regulators, the board of directors, and all stakeholders must be
vigilant and continuously monitor the performance of their companies. Managers’
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greed, self-dealing, and incompetence in managing other peoples’ money are not
new. According to James (2011), financial frauds have been occurring since 193
A.D. An example was the purported sale of the Roman Empire by the guard of the
Emperor to an unsuspecting purchaser (James, 2013). James also documented
many other financial hoaxes, like the Mississippi Scheme in 1719, when the
Scottish financier, John Law, sold shares in a company that promised tremendous
gains in gold and silver in what was, and remains, a swampy backwater. Then
there was the original Ponzi scheme of 1920 by Charles Ponzi, in which investors
lost money by engaging in purchases and sales of postal coupons while relying on
Ponzi’s exaggerated and unfounded claims of profit from the transaction (James,
201).
It would appear that investors did not learn any lessons from the original
Ponzi scheme of 1920, or from any of the financial scandals before that case. In
1986, Barry Minkow swindled investors by selling shares in ZZZZ Best for a
stock valuation of $200 million in a company worth only a fraction of that sum
(James, 2011). Then in 2008, a bigger, modern-day Ponzi scheme took place in
the United States: Bernard Madoff was accused and convicted by the federal
authorities of running a Ponzi scheme and was also charged with money
laundering (James, 2013). For his crimes, Madoff was sentenced to 150 years in
prison (Burnsed, 2009).
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As Burnsed (2009) also reported, many other corporate frauds and
irregularities have been discovered after the passage of the SOX. Samuel Israel III
led the Bayou group, a Stamford (CT)-based hedge fund that took $450 million
from investors and diverted the money to private uses (James, 2013). The courts
have also convicted many top management employees of insider trading and for
hiding information on the losses they were making. Jerome Kerviel was a futures
trader in Societe Generale Bank who incurred $8 billion loss without any express
permission from his bosses (James, 2011). The case of Ivan Boesky and Michael
Milken in 1986 is similar to that of Kerviel; the two traders were convicted and
jailed for insider trading (James, 2011).
Tom Petters, who ran the Petters Group Worldwide in Minnesota, was
indicted in 2008 for money laundering, conspiracy, and wire and mail fraud
(James, 2011). Petters’ scheme ran from 1995 to 2008 and involved false reports
to investors that their money was being put to good use to buy and resell
wholesale consumer goods (James, 2011). Investors of Petters Group Worldwide
lost $1 billion (James, 2011). The incidences cited above indicate that the solution
to financial scandals, especially the problem caused by the separation of
ownership from control, require several tools and corporate systems to prevent,
detect, and punish perpetrators of corporate crime. The individual leadership
styles of the managers involved in the cases, the corporate governance
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mechanisms in place, and the particular organizational culture existing in the
corporations at the time, mostly predicted these outcomes.
In this study, I examined the impact of corporate governance mechanisms
on the performance of nonfinancial firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange.
In the study, I covered all nonfinancial firms and excluded banks and other
finance companies, such as hedge funds and unit trusts. The exclusion of firms in
the financial industry wasimportant because these companies are highly regulated
by the Central Bank of Nigeria and other government agencies. Firms in the
financial industry follow the rules of the regulators, which are different from the
rules and accounting procedures of nonfinancial corporations. In this study, I
focused on 116 nonfinancial firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange, and the
data spanned 5 years from 2011 to 2015. Although several researchers have found
a positive and significant association between organizational performance and
corporate governance mechanisms, the results of the degree of impact of board
characteristics and other corporate governance mechanisms on organizational
performance have been mixed (Al-Saidi & Al-Shammari, 2015; Rashid, 2015).
My objective in this study was to contribute to the present body of research by
examining how firm size and age moderate the relationship between corporate
governance and company performance generally, and particularly in Nigeria.
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Background of the Problem
The industrial revolution, which began in England and then spread to the
whole of Europe and North America, took place between the 18th and 19th
centuries (Montagna, 1981). The revolution transformed a mainly agrarian, rural,
and feudal society in Europe and America into cosmopolitan, industrial, and
urban communities (Montagna, 1981). The owners of capital, the capitalists,
replaced landowners and feudal lords as the primary source of wealth creation in
the economy (Lewis, 1992). The proprietors of the new businesses employed the
majority of the population to work in factories, mines, railroads, communications,
and shipping industries, rather than farms (Lewis, 1992). The companies and
businesses required enormous capital to finance them, which one inventor or
entrepreneur may not have been able to supply. Without money to fund the new
ventures, the industrial revolution would not have achieved the spectacular
progress that has transformed peoples’ life, conditions of living, and made
available goods and services that are now ubiquitous all over the world.
The real revolution came when the English government introduced the
concept of limited liability as a way to finance the new ventures. Individuals
could invest in a company or venture without being involved in the day-to-day
management of the business, and the only liability they have, should the business
fail, is the obligation to pay any unpaid allotment on their shares (Smith, 2003).
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For investing in the venture, the firms pay the investors dividends, and they are
assured of capital growth if the venture succeeds (Smith, 2003). Although
businesspeople could exploit the concept of limited liability to their advantage,
such as the cases of the South Sea Company and the Mississippi Company that
collapsed in 1720, the idea revolutionized corporate finance and gave both
investors and business people the means to achieve their financial objectives
(James, 2013).
Sadly, one of the unintended consequences of limited liability of a jointstock company is the conflict of interest that arises between shareholders, who
own the business, and managers, who are the agents that manage the enterprise.
The conflict of interest is present in large firms due to the separation of ownership
from control. The managers, who are expected to represent the interests of the
shareholders, often engage in the pursuit of self-interest that hurt the owners. The
managers can do this because they are in control of the firm’s assets and
resources, and they possess insider knowledge that the shareholders do not have.
They often use the information to benefit themselves financially, or conceal
value-destroying information from the shareholders to retain their employment
and status, or to deliberately manipulate the firms’ state of affairs to deceive the
stockholders (Larcker & Tayan, 2013). The latter acts are the classic principalagent problems that result in agency costs, the cost being borne entirely by the
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equity owners, and by extension, all the other stakeholders such as bondholders,
creditors, employees, the government, and the general public (Larcker & Tayan,
2013).
All things being equal, the shareholders should be better off if they
formulate the corporate strategy, take all the critical decisions in the firm, and run
the company on a daily basis (Smith, 2003). But in practice, especially for the
large, publicly traded multinational corporations, it is neither possible,
practicable, nor convenient for stockholders to run their own firms. As Larcker
and Tayan (2013) stated, a business owner or a group of shareholders may add
some control systems to deal with the principal-agent problems and reduce the
agency costs that result from the conflict of interest between the managers and
owners. Since the mid-1970s, this system of controls has come to be known as
corporate governance (Larcker & Tayan, 2013). The controls might include
inventory and risk management systems, internal auditing, independent external
auditing, and the board of directors as a monitoring system (Lenard, Yu, & York,
2014). The board is the organ of the business and the representative of the
shareholders in the company whose duties are to monitor the executive directors,
offer counsel and advice to the managers of the firm, and determine the broad
vision and strategies to guide the company to achieve its objectives (Adewuyi &
Olowookere, 2013).
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The term “corporate governance” formally entered the Federal Register,
the official journal of the U.S. federal government, in 1976 (Cheffins, 2015).
Before 1976, the America’s Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had
begun to enforce corporate governance codes and bring erring managers to
account (Cheffins, 2015). In 1974, the SEC sued three nonexecutive directors of
Penn Central for misrepresentation of the firm’s financial condition and for
inadequate oversight and failure to uncover various misconduct of the company’s
top management (Cheffins, 2015).
In 1991 in the United Kingdom, the Financial Reporting Council, the
London Stock Exchange, and the U.K. accountancy profession set up the Cadbury
Committee, following numerous financial scandals and corporate failures
(Cybinski & Windsor, 2013). The Committee was charged, among other things,
to: (a) review the structure and the responsibilities of the board and recommend
the code of best practice, (a) consider the role of auditors and make
recommendations to the accountancy profession, and (c) highlight the rights and
responsibilities of the shareholders (Badi, 2013). Many researchers and corporate
executives see the recommendations of the committee as a landmark in corporate
governance and company management.
Some of the most important recommendations of the Cadbury Committee
are: (a) all quoted companies should comply with code of best practice in
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corporate governance, and stock exchanges should get annual financial statements
of listed companies with a statement of compliance with the standard; (b) the
position of the chairman should be separated from that of the Chief Executive
Officer (CEO), and if combined, there should be present in the company a
powerful and independent nonexecutive director to serve as a counterweight to
the power and influence of the CEO/board chair; (c) nonexecutive directors
should be independent and of high caliber, with appropriate qualifications and
industry experience to advice and monitor other directors without any conflict of
interest; and (d) all the members of the nomination, audit, and remuneration
subcommittees of the board should be composed of nonexecutive directors (The
Cadbury Report, 1991). These recommendations have serious implications for
company management. The recommendations have also been adopted by many
company regulators across the world.
The Cadbury Committee also recommended the following: (a) the
directors’ total emoluments, the chairman’s emoluments, and the remuneration of
the highest paid director should be disclosed in the financial statements; (b) the
audit report should state that the directors are responsible for the financial
statements; (c) the financial statements should disclose the audit fees and other
charges from nonaudit services rendered by the eternal auditors; (d) audit partners
should be rotated at regular intervals; and (e) institutional investors should take

12

active part in company management (The Cadbury Report, 1991). By being
active, investors could prevent abuses by the directors. Rotating audit partners
periodically would ensure accountability and consistency in audit opinion.
The Cadbury Committee’s report on the financial aspects of corporate
governance has been publicly endorsed in the United Kingdom and incorporated
in the listing rules of many stock exchanges around the world (Sun, Lan, & Ma,
2014). The recommendations are also the basis of several research and journal
articles on corporate governance (Cybinski & Windsor, 2013). But corporate
governance even predated the groundbreaking work on the subject by Berle and
Means (1932). Legal scholars and economists have written about the problem that
arises when ownership is separated from control. The problem and costs of
agency existed at the time of the East Indian Company, the Hudson Bay
Company, the Levant Company, and many of the companies chartered by the
British government in the 16th and 17th centuries (Cheffins, 2015).
Concerns about managerial accountability, information asymmetry, equity
in the distribution of a company’s wealth, shareholders’ rights, board structure,
and many other matters concerning the internal governance of a large firm can be
traced to the time of industrial revolution. Nevertheless, despite the recognition of
the problems caused by the separation of ownership from control, management
experts have not found a definitive solution to the problem, nor have they found a
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better alternative to the corporate form of limited liability through joint-stock
ownership. Years of research, legislation, and implementation of codes of
corporate governance have not prevented serious corporate misdemeanor and
financial recklessness (Muller-Kahle, 2015).
According to The Economist, the last known American corporate disaster
was that of Lehman Brothers in 2008, which caused severe financial problems
around the world and also led to the passage of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010(The Economist, 2016). But that was before
the case of Valeant, a Canadian drug company listed on the New York Stock
Exchange, which has all the ills that plagued Lehman: A huge debt burden, poor
corporate governance practices, a weak board, managers with an entitlement
mentality, bad acquisitions, bad corporate information management and a culture
of evasiveness, and severe accounting problems (The Economist, 2016). The
Economist estimated that the loss to shareholders will be up to $75 billion, and the
company may default on its $31 billion debt (The Economist, 2016. The lessons
from the company’s problems are that boards matter in corporate management,
the influence of institutional investors may have been overrated, and the
importance of monitoring professional managers is ever present in any
corporation.
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The emission scandals in Volkswagen (VW), a German carmaker, is
another case that indicates agency problems are deep-rooted in firms and that
there is a need to monitor and supervise the top management of companies by an
active and independent board. According to Hans-Dieter Potsch, VW’s
Chairperson of the Supervisory Board, the decision to cheat on emission standards
was made over 10 years before U.S. regulators detected the fraud (Ewing, 2015).
That decision has dented VW’s image as a reliable carmaker and has resulted in
the recall of 11 million vehicles (Ewing, 2015). According to the chairperson,
some top managers in the company made the decision that VW should be the
dominant carmaker in the world, but they set out to achieve this objective by
cheating on emission standards (Ewing, 2015). There was a tolerance for breaking
rules in VW, a culture of poor communication among employees, and a prevailing
climate of fear (Ewing, 2015).
VW’s scandal and the reasons adduced for them show the complexity of
corporate governance and how challenging it is to achieve effective internal
management in many corporations. As Larcker and Tayan (2013) stated, the
board of directors needs to experiment with several tools and focus on the best
that achieve the desired objectives. In aligning the interests of shareholders and
managers, directors could use incentive-based motivations, such as remuneration
that include performance bonuses, or lay more emphasis on a corporate culture of
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fairness, ethical behavior, and doing the right things at all times. Another
emphasis could be on leadership styles that encourage openness, transparency,
moral uprightness, and truthfulness. What works sometimes depends on firmspecific contexts. Nevertheless, the board must actively monitor and supervise
managers. Board structure, the independence of the audit committees, regular
attendance at meetings, the power and effectiveness of other committees, and
independent and competent external directors are the key ingredients in corporate
governance practices (Annuar & Rashid, 2015).
In this study, I examined board characteristics and the role of audit
committees and executive compensation on corporate performance. But as I
argued above, fraud and financial scandals still take place despite implementation
of corporate governance codes and even after the passage of SOX. I examined the
association between five corporate governance characteristics and organizational
performance. The characteristics of the board and other corporate governance
mechanisms that were hypothesized to impact corporate performance in this
study are board independence, audit committee independence, executive
compensation, number of board meetings, and the size of the board. The
performance metrics were return on assets (ROA), return on capital employed
(ROCE), and Tobin’s Q. There were two mediators, and these were the age and
size of the firm.
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Statement of the Problem
Company stakeholders are concerned about firm governance due to recent
financial distress in many large corporations (Lin, Hutchinson, & Percy, 2015).
Researchers have argued that the high rate of collapses in firms is an outcome of
weak corporate governance practices (Palmrose, 2013). Management scholars
continue to examine the association between corporate governance and long-term
financial performance (Conyon & He, 2016). The general problem was that there
is no agreement among researchers on the extent of the relationship between
corporate governance and organizational performance (O’Connor & Byrne,
2015). The consequence of the inconsistency in the research findings is that
corporate managers do not know, and may not be able to implement, best
practices in corporate governance (El-Faitouri, 2014). The specific problem was
that in Nigeria, company leaders have insufficient knowledge of how corporate
governance practices affect organizational performance and the benefits of
improving corporate governance systems.
Purpose
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the
statistical relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm
performance in 116 nonfinancial companies listed on the Nigeria Stock Exchange.
The independent variables were corporate governance mechanisms, defined as (a)
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independence of the board, (b) independence of the audit committee, (c) executive
compensation, (d) number of board meetings, and (e) board size. The dependent
variable was firm performance, defined as the ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s Q. There
were two mediators. The first was the size of the corporation and the second was
the age of the firm. The size of the firm was measured by the natural logarithm of
total assets and age was the number of years since incorporation. I tested the
relationships between these variables with the quantitative paradigm approach,
using multiple regression analysis methods to analyze the data.
Significance of the Study
This study has the potential to make a positive social change in company
management by clarifying the importance of corporate governance practices in
corporations’ organizational performance. The insights gained from this study
may provide investors, financial analysts, and regulators with early warning
signals of potential problems in an organization and aid stakeholders in assessing
corporate performance. The results of this study could also help corporate
managers to use organizational resources more effectively by understanding the
important variables that affect their firms’ long-term financial performance.
Regulators in Nigeria may also benefit from the findings of this study by
recognizing important corporate governance mechanisms that promote
organizational effectiveness and the country’s economic growth.
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Significance to Theory
The results of this inquiry can provide insights into the factors that are decisive in
predicting organizational performance from a combination of corporate governance
mechanisms that affect a firm’s efficiency and the effectiveness of resource utilization.
Many research studies have been conducted with a view to finding the correlation
between corporate governance components and firm performance. The results of this
study will contribute to the body of research by examining whether the size and age of
the firm mediates the relationship between each of the corporate governance mechanisms
and firm performance.
Significance to Practice
The insights gained from this study may provide investors, financial analysts, and
regulators with early warning signals of potential problems in an organization and also
help stakeholders in their assessment of corporate performance. The study could also help
corporate managers to use organizational resources more effectively by devoting more
resources to the most important factors that are critical to financial performance. Business
organizations are important engines of growth in many communities, and their continued
growth is essential for the growth of the national economy. Companies are important
forces for social change and improvement in their performance will ensure better
employment prospects and increase in the welfare and wellbeing of individuals and the
whole society.
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The results of this study may also be of benefit to present and potential
investors and top managers of firms in Nigeria by showing the impact of board
characteristics on the performance of their companies. The findings may help
these stakeholders to restructure their board and audit committees to become a
more focused and efficient monitoring tool. By applying the study’s
recommendations, the board of directors of listed companies in Nigeria may
institute better strategies to monitor the top management of their firms and
thereby lower the company’s agency costs, reduce investment risk, and enhance
corporate value.
Significance to Social Change
With improved corporate governance structure, the board, on behalf of
shareholders, should be able to monitor the business in a way that makes it more
efficient and effective. A more proactive strategy of monitoring top executives by
the board of directors would ensure that members of the board have adequate
information to counsel managers and prevent risky, self-destructive behavior. Top
managers will be reluctant to engage in transactions that could put the company at
the risk when they know members of the board will ask questions. In Nigeria,
rules are rarely obeyed and company failure and lackluster performance common.
This happens because of the prevalence of crony capitalism and an informal way
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of running business organizations where family connections sometimes trump
meritocracy.
By showing the long-term benefits of a strong corporate governance
structure on the firm’s financial performance, the findings of the study may
persuade both the board and top management to focus on merit and competency
in recruiting top managers and on factors that align shareholders’ interests with
those of the agents. Also, by highlighting the positive outcomes of obeying rules
and regulations, the board of directors and managers may be persuaded of the
importance of effective corporate governance practices, the implementation of
which would send a positive message to the market and improve firm value.
Implementation of good corporate governance systems may also reduce staff
turnover and lower the cost of funds, thereby improving organizational
performance. Improvement in firm performance increases employment
opportunities, returns to investors, and increased tax revenue for the government.
Background
In the following list are the selected articles relating to corporate
governance and its impact on corporate performance:
Haβ, Johan, and Schweizer (2016) found that firms with effective
corporate governance performed better than firms with weak corporate
governance. Peng, Mutlu, Sauerwald, and Wang (2015) stated that a firm’s good
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performance in an earlier accounting period draws competent, independent
directors into the firm. The presence of independent directors on the board of
directors is one of the mechanisms of good corporate governance practices that
could improve organizational effectiveness.
O’Connor and Byrne (2015) stated that what matters in corporate
governance is not universal, and it is inappropriate to prescribe the same rules for
all companies regardless of organizational culture and institutional setting in each
country. They also found differences in corporate value resulted from differences
in resource and governance functions.
Wu and Li (2014) found that in China, increases in board independence
reduce the incidences of connected transactions and fraud, insider trading, and
misuse of corporate assets by executives. The researchers also noted that
uncertainties in a firm act as impediments to the effectiveness of board
independence.
Shin, Sung, Choi, and Kim (2014) studied the impact of top management
ethical contribution to firm-level ethical and procedural justice and firm
performance, using the type of industry and size of the firm as mediating
variables. This study also used the size and age of the firm as mediating variables.
Ioana and Mariana (2014) examined the relationship between corporate
governance and firm performance, using multiple regression analysis to analyze
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the data. The research found no significant relationship between the independence
of the members of the audit committee and firm performance.
Mishra and Mohanty (2014) and Erkens and Matos (2012) investigated the
impact of corporate governance on company performance and defined firm
performance as ROA and ROCE. Mishra and Mohanty found that the better the
corporate governance practices in firms in India, the better the firms’
performance. Mishra and Mohantyalso found legal compliance has no effect on
ROA but broad effectiveness and a proactive disclosure improves corporate
performance.
Wahba (2015) found that where the CEO is also the chair of the board,
increasing the number and proportion of nonexecutive directors to the total
number of directors has a significant negative impact on firms’ financial
performance.
Muller-Kahle (2015) found that although ownership ought to provide an
incentive to shareholders to monitor their investments in the firm, in practice this
may not be so because large shareholders may not have the same objectives as the
company. Muller-Kahle also found that firm performance is negatively and
significantly influenced by CEO-dominant owners. Dominant owners with
conflict of interest negatively affect firm performance than those who had no
business ties with the firm before purchasing their investment.
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Jermias and Gani (2014) found a negative and significant association
between the number of board and audit committee meetings and firm performance
in the listed companies in Standards and Poors ( S&P ) 500 databases between
1997 and 2004.
O’Connor and Byrne (2015) stated that what matters in corporate
governance is not universal, and it is wrong to prescribe the same rules for all
companies to follow regardless of history, size, and organizational culture and
institutional setting in each country.
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework of this study was based on three theories of
corporate governance: (a) agency theory, (b) stakeholder theory, and (c)
stewardship theory. Agency problems arise due to the separation of ownership
from control in large corporations. The separation leads to imperfect alignment
between the interests of the principal, who are the shareholders, and the managers,
who are the agents that manage the business on a daily basis (Fama, 1980). As
Smith (2003) observed, managers should not be expected to devote as much
attention and dedication to the objectives of the firm as shareholders. A conflict of
interests between the shareholders and managers leads to suboptimal performance
of the firm (Xie & Fukumoto, 2013).
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Some of the self-interested attitudes of managers that are manifestations of
the conflict of interest include compensation that is not commensurate with
performance and the practice of taking excessive risks because of short-term gains
at the expense of future growth (Sila, Gonzalez, & Hagendioff, 2016). Other selfinterest actions of managers are a pay-for-performance compensation that
motivates managers to focus on the short-term and the use of the firms’ resources
to fend off takeover battles that may be in the interest of the shareholders (Hiebl,
2015). It is reasonable to expect that better pay and commensurate compensation
to top executives may lead to better alignment of the interests of the shareholders
and managers, but this may not be so in many corporations. Baulkaran (2014)
stated that adequate compensation to executives leads to a much closer alignment
between the interest of the shareholders and the top management. The company
must also find a way to compensate top management for the value they have
added to the company through devices such as share ownership, profit sharing,
and stock options.
According to the agency theory, the aim of corporate governance
mechanisms is to ensure that managers are monitored and controlled by the board
(Ueng, 2016). To be effective, the board would establish those corporate
governance mechanisms that align the interests of shareholders and managers.
Other theories beside the agency theory are part of the theoretical underpinnings
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of corporate governance. By merging both the stewardship and stakeholder
theories with the agency theory, it is possible for a researcher to have a complete
theoretical justification for corporate governance as a basis for evaluating
organizational performance (Almadi, 2015; Isidro & Sobral, 2015; Poutziouris,
Savva, & Hadjielias, 2014).
The agency model is based on a narrow view of contractual relationships,
whose underlying philosophy is internally driven (Francis, Hassan, & Wu, 2013;
Kraftt, Ou, Quatraro, & Ravix, 2013). The stakeholder theory’s worldview is a
much broader and based on an externally-focused model as it considers the
interests of shareholders, employees, clients, suppliers, strategic partners, and
other groups that have connections with the firm (Rashid & Islam, 2013). Some
researchers have stated that the notion of considering the interests of all
stakeholders might have been extended to an impracticable extent, and it is
important for corporate managers and practitioners to know where to draw the
line (Arenas & Rodrigo, 2016). Managers must have an idea of the persons or
groups who will be affected by their decisions
One argument of stakeholder theory is that a firm draws resources from
the environment and ought to be responsible for the preservation of it for the
present, incoming, and future generations. But the question is whether future
generations can be considered as stakeholders (Arenas & Rodrigo, 2016).
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Whether or not future generations are so considered, the question of fairness and
equity in the use of resources is a fundamental one. It is difficult to determine the
identity of future generations and what is a fair allocation to them out of a firm’s
resources. The solution offered by Arenas and Rodrigo (2016) was to consider
future generations as the direct descendants of the present stakeholders, out of
whom the firm will get future employees, customers, and managers.
Research has shown the benefits to businesses of having a broader view of
participants in the corporate entity. Mande and Rahman (2013) found a positive
and significant association between a good relationship with stakeholders and
firm performance. To gain the benefits that come with looking after the interests
of all stakeholders in a company, managers need to keep them informed about the
affairs of the company by giving timely and accurate information (Sendjaya,
Pekerti, Hartel, Hirst, & Butarbutar, 2016). All employees and, most importantly,
managers must at all times think how their actions and decisions affect every
stakeholder in the organization (Sendjaya et al., 2016). If the board and
management consider the interests of all stakeholders in the firm in their policies,
the conflict of interest between the shareholders and managers is likely to reduce.
The third theory of corporate governance that forms the theoretical
framework for this study is the stewardship theory. The stewardship theory
emphasizes that the manager is committed to the long-term goals of the
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organization instead of the steward’s self-interests (El-Faitouri, 2014). There are
thus little mechanisms that need to be put in place to ensure corporate objectives
are achieved (Hiebl, 2013). The savings in agency costs when managers imbibe
the philosophy of a steward instead of that of an agent should improve
organizational performance. Perhaps the best test of the differences between the
attitudes of agents and stewards is the actions of managers during takeover battles
(Mishra & Mohanty, 2014). Agents tend to frustrate merger talks using strategies
like poison pills and issuing of new shares (Mishra & Mohanty). The new shares
may be issued to the managers’ favored bidder at considerably lower price than
what the hostile bidders are offering (Mishra & Mohanty). Stewards will not only
present truthful information to the decision-makers but work also in the overall
interests of the organization (Dah, 2016).
Many researchers have concluded that the stewardship theory is yet to be
accepted as a basis for analyzing organizational dynamics. There are various
benefits for using the theory to methodically examine organizations:
The adoption of the theory is likely to ensure a mutually beneficial
relationship between managers and shareholders, based on trust and cooperation
(Dah).
As stewards are motivated by a higher order of needs, such as self-esteem
and self-actualization, they are likely to work for the long-term interests, survival,
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and sustainable performance of the organization. The benefits of the stewardship
model will also accrue to all stakeholders (Mishra & Mohanty).
By emphasizing a different model of the economic person who is
motivated only by self-interest, imbibing the stewardship theory ensures a
corporate atmosphere where decision-making is simplified and easier than in a
pure agency relationship. Information asymmetry and moral hazard that make
decision-making difficult are not present when the central philosophy of
management is to serve as stewards of the organization (Pouziouris, Savva, &
Hedjielias, 2014).
In this study, I developed a theoretical framework that predicts the
relationships between corporate governance mechanisms and organizational
performance in nonfinancial companies in Nigeria. The framework was based on
the relationship between board independence, audit committee independence,
executive compensation, number of board meetings, and board size and
organizational performance, using size and age of the firm as mediators.
Organizational performance was measured using three variables: ROA, ROCE,
and Tobin’s Q. The age of the firm was the number of years since incorporation
and size was the natural logarithm of total assets. The theoretical framework is
shown in Figure 1.
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The proposed theoretical framework is shown in figure 1.
Independent
Variables

Mediators

Dependent
Variables

Board Independence
Firm Age

Audit Committee

Return on Assets
(ROA)

Independence

Return on Capital

Executive Compensation
Firm Size

Employed

Number of Board
(ROCE)
Meetings
Tobin’s Q
Board Size

Figure1.The proposed theoretical framework for testing the relationship between corporate governance
mechanisms and organizational performance in Nigerian companies

Research Questions
Researchers frequently ask questions to understand and interpret observed
phenomenon (Babbie, 2013). To examine the relationship between corporate
governance and organizational performance, the research questions (RQs) that
guided this study were as follows:
RQ1: Is there a statistically significant association between corporate
governance and financial performance of publicly quoted companies in Nigeria?
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RQ2: Is there a statistically significant association between board
independence and financial performance of publicly quoted companies in
Nigeria?
RQ3: Is there a statistically significant association between audit
committee and financial performance of publicly quoted companies in Nigeria?
RQ4: Is there a statistically significant association between executive
compensation and financial performance of publicly quoted companies in
Nigeria?
RQ5: Is there a statistically significant association between the number of
board meetings and financial performance of publicly quoted companies in
Nigeria?
RQ6: Is there a statistically significant association between board size and
financial performance of publicly quoted companies in Nigeria?
RQ7: Does the size of the firm mediate the relationship between corporate
governance and financial performance of publicly quoted companies in Nigeria?
RQ8: Does the age of the firm mediate the relationship between corporate
governance and financial performance of publicly quoted companies in Nigeria?
Research Hypotheses
According to Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2008), hypothesis
testing consists of two statistical hypotheses. The first is the research hypothesis,
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usually designated by H1. The second is the null hypothesis, which is symbolized
by H0. H1 is what the researcher wants to know. H0 is, by implication, the
antithesis of H1 (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). In this study, I tested
the following hypotheses by the stated theories and literature on the relationship
between corporate governance mechanisms and organizational financial
performance:
H01: There is no statistically significant relationship between corporate
governance and organizational financial performance in listed companies in
Nigeria.
H1: There is a statistically significant relationship between corporate
governance and organizational financial performance in listed companies in
Nigeria.
H02: There is no statistically significant relationship between board
independence and organizational financial performance in listed companies in
Nigeria.
H2: There is a statistically significant relationship between board
independence and organizational financial performance in listed companies in
Nigeria.
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H03: There is no statistically significant relationship between audit
committee independence and organizational financial performance in listed
companies in Nigeria.
H3: There is a statistically significant relationship between audit
committee independence and organizational financial performance in listed
companies in Nigeria.
H04: There is no statistically significant relationship between executive
compensation and organizational financial performance in listed companies in
Nigeria.
H4: There is a statistically significant relationship between executive
compensation and organizational financial performance in listed companies in
Nigeria.
H05: There is no statistically significant relationship between the number
of board meetings and organizational financial performance in listed companies in
Nigeria.
H5: There is a statistically significant relationship between the number of
board meetings and organizational financial performance in listed companies in
Nigeria.
H06: There is no statistically significant relationship between board size
and organizational financial performance in listed companies in Nigeria.
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H6: There is a statistically significant relationship between board size and
organizational financial performance in listed companies in Nigeria.
H07: Firm size does not significantly mediate the relationship between
corporate governance and organizational financial performance in listed
companies in Nigeria.
H7: Firm size significantly mediates the relationship between corporate
governance and organizational financial performance in listed companies in
Nigeria.
H08: Firm age does not significantly mediate the relationship between
corporate governance and organizational financial performance in listed
companies in Nigeria.
H8: Firm age significantly mediates the relationship between corporate
governance and organizational financial performance in listed companies in
Nigeria.
Nature of the Study
This study was a quantitative correlational study. There are three types of
research design in any scientific inquiry: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed
methods. If the aim of the research is to explore and understand the corporate
governance phenomenon, the qualitative method of inquiry is suitable, as it does
not aim at finding a statistical relationship between corporate governance and
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organizational performance. The main drawback of the qualitative method is that
the research findings cannot easily be replicated or generalized to other
organizations, groups, or people (Frankfort-Nachnamias & Nachnamias, 2008).
This study was not a qualitative inquiry.
In a quantitative research design, the researcher tests theories and
hypotheses that have been formulated from the literature and research questions
(Leedy & Ormrod, 2010). Quantitative research methods include experimental,
quasi-experimental, correlational, and survey research methods. In experiments,
researchers manipulate the subjects and observe the effect on them (Babbie,
2013). The advantage of experimental design is the researcher’s ability to isolate
the effect of other variables, and find a cause-and-effect relationship between
them (Babbie, 2013). Experimental research is also fairly easily replicable and
generalizable. The experimental design suffers from the fact that the research is
conducted under artificial conditions, which may not reflect what happens in a
natural environment and the society at large. An experimental design was not
suitable for the present topic as none of the variables can be manipulated, and the
research cannot be conducted in an artificial laboratory.
A quasi-experimental design, like the experimental design, was also not
suitable for this study because quasi-experimental designs are used when the
researcher cannot achieve true randomness, but can still manipulate some
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variables (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010). In a quasi-experimental design, the researcher
cannot control all extraneous variables and it is impossible to rule out other
explanations for the findings. Quasi-experimental designs do not suffer from
artificiality common to laboratory-controlled, pure experimental research design.
In this dissertation study, I used a type of quantitative research design
method defined as a correlational study. In correlational studies, the researcher
endeavors to find whether there is, and the strength of, a relationship between two
or more variables (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010). According to Leedy and Ormrod
(2010), correlational studies examine the degree to which changes in the
characteristics of one variable is related to changes in the characteristics of one or
more variables. The researcher cannot conclude that a cause-and-effect
association is present between the variables just because they are statistically
correlated.
A correlational study most suitable for the current inquiry, as my aim was
to test the statistical relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and
organizational performance in the listed companies in Nigeria. I chose
correlational studies for the present inquiry after I had considered all other
methods under the broad heading of descriptive quantitative research (Leedy &
Omrod, 2010). A correlational research design is suitable for inquiries into the
determinants of the performance of companies, which was the intent of this study.
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This correlational design was used to examine whether there was a relationship
between the chosen corporate governance components and organizational
performance metrics in listed companies in Nigeria, and the strength of the
relationship.
Possible Types and Sources of Data
In this study, I used data extracted from the published financial statements
of the 116 nonfinancial companies quoted on the Nigerian Stock Exchange from
2011 to 2015 financial years. The published accounts and reports are available
from the companies’ websites and at the archive of the Nigerian Stock Exchange.
The filings of the annual financial reports with the Nigerian Stock Exchange are
mandatory because they are one of the listing requirements for all companies
listed on the exchange. The financial statements contain information on the
companies’ income statement, financial position, principal activities, risk
management system, operational procedures, and explanatory notes to the
accounts. The information in the balance sheet and income statement of the report
was used in computing ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s Q, the dependent variables in
the study.
The financial statements also contained information on corporate
governance mechanisms, which are the independent variables in this study; these
are (a) board independence, (b) audit committee independence, (c) executive
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compensation, (d) the number of board meetings, and (e) the board size. Also, the
size of the firm was obtained from the balance sheet, which is the natural
logarithm of total assets, and the age of the corporation, which is the time since
incorporation, was reported in the corporate information section of the financial
statements. The information obtained from the annual reports was organized into
ratios, indexes, and scores. I extracted the information using content analysis
method. According to Bonna (2012), content analysis method includes theoretical
definitions, and statistical and objective analysis.
Analytical Strategies
The data analysis in this study was conducted using the Statistical Package
for Social Sciences (SPSS) software to run several multiple regression analysis
for each of the dependent variables against the predictor variables. Descriptive
and inferential statistics was employed in the study. I used three alternative
measures of performance; which are ROA, ROCE, and Tobin's Q. While both
ROA and ROCE are accounting ratios and measure a firm's historical
performance, Tobin's Q is a market-based measure and is an indication of the
company's future performance. The emerging markets, from where I conducted
this study, suffer from pricing inefficiencies and high volatility in the pricing of
stocks. Emerging markets, such as Nigeria, also suffer from hyperinflation,
inadequate information management systems, and financial illiteracy among
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investors. It is important to use alternative performance measures, which in this
study are the accounting ratios of ROA and ROCE.
I used several alternative model specifications to examine the effect of
corporate governance mechanisms on the performance of companies. The first
model specification tested the overall impact of corporate governance on firm
performance. The other models tested the association between each component of
corporate governance and firm performance. Two other model specifications
tested whether firm age and company size mediate the relationship between
corporate governance and firm performance. The first of the model specifications
that tested the first hypothesis, H1, is as follows:
OrgPerf = α0 + β1BodInd + β2AuditCommInd + β3BodSize + β4BodMtgs
+

β5ExecComp

+ β6FirmAge + β7FirmSize + ε

(1)

Where OrgPerf is firm performance measured ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s
Q. BodInd is board independence, defined as the proportion of directors that are
independent and whether the positions of the CEO and the chairperson of the
board are combined in one person. Where the two positions are combined in one
executive, there is the presence of CEO duality. I measured board independence
on a 5-point Likert scale, where 1 equals the presence of CEO duality and less
than 50% of board members are independent, 2 is presence of CEO duality, and
exactly 50% of board members are independent, 3 is the presence of CEO duality
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and more than 50% of board members are independent, 4 is absence of CEO
duality and less than or exactly 50% of board members are independent, and 5
equals the absence of CEO duality and more than 50% of the board members are
independent. A high score indicates more independence while a low score means
less independence of the board of directors.
AuditCommInd is the independence of the audit committee, defined as the
proportion of independent directors on the committee and their freedom to
communicate directly with the chief internal auditor of the firm without express
permission of the CEO. Audit committee independence was measured on a 5point Likert scale, where a score of 1 equals independent members of the
committee is less than 50% and without the freedom to communicate directly with
the chief internal auditor, a score of 2 equals independent members of the
committee is exactly 50% of the total members without the freedom to
communicate directly with the chief internal auditor, 3 indicates independent
members are greater than or equal to 50% but the committee lacks the freedom to
communicate directly with the chief internal auditor, 4 equals more than 50% of
the members are independent without the freedom to communicate directly with
the chief internal auditor, and 5 equals more than 50% of the members are
independent with the full freedom to communicate directly with the chief internal
auditor.
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BodSize is the total number of directors on the board, including the
chairman, the executive and nonexecutive directors, and the CEO. Following a
review of the literature, I adopted the view that larger boards enhance better firm
performance, although some studies indicated otherwise ( Lenard, Yu, & York,
Leung, Richardson, & Jaggi, 2014; Sun, Lan, & Ma, 2014). A 20-member board
was scored 20, a 19-member board was scored 19, and an 18-member board was
scored 18, and so on. None of the quoted companies in Nigeria, according to the
filings of the companies with Nigerian Stock Exchange, had more than 20
members on the board of directors. A high score indicates a strong corporate
governance system while a low score indicates a weak corporate governance
practice.
BodMtgs is the number of board meetings, measured by the actual number
of board meetings that took place in a year where a quorum was formed. A firm
that holds one board meeting in a year was scored 1, two board meetings was
scored 2, three board meetings was scored 3, four board meetings was scored 4,
and so on. The frequency of board meetings are important since the directors
deliberate on and take major strategic decisions at the meeting, including
decisions on investment, sale of a major unit, mergers and acquisitions,
appointment of directors, approval of strategic plans, and consideration of audit
and other committees’ reports. In Nigeria, the SEC code of corporate governance
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states that a minimum of four meetings in a year is mandatory, i.e. one in a
quarter. The frequency of the meetings may indicate the level of involvement of
the directors in the business or it may signal a problem in the organization (Alves,
Cuoto, & Franscisco, 2016; Jernias & Gani, 2014).
ExecComp is the executive compensation; measured by the total payments
to the executive in terms of salary, wages, benefits, and other perquisites, plus the
value of non-monetary benefits enjoyed by them. The Companies and Allied
Matters Act of 1990 in Nigeria makes it mandatory that the financial statements
of corporations disclose money wages and other benefits accruable to directors
and executives. FirmAge is the age of the corporation, measured by the number of
years since incorporation; FirmSize is the size of the firm, measured by the
natural logarithm of total assets; α0 is the intercept of the model; β1 to β7 are the
beta coefficients of the regression; and ε is an error term.
The other models that tested Hypotheses 2 to 9 are as follows:
ROA = α1 + β8BodInd + β9AuditCommInd + β10BodSize + β11BodMtgs +
Β12Execomp + β13FirmAge + β14FirmSize + ε

(2)

ROA = α1 + β8BoardInd + ε

(3)

ROA = α1 + β9AuditCommInd + ε

(4)

ROA = α1 + β10BodSize + ε

(5)
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ROA = α1 + β11BdMtgs + ε

(6)

ROA = α1 + β12Execomp + ε

(7)

ROA = α1 + β13FirmAge + ε

(8)

ROA = α1 + β14FirmSize + ε

(9)

ROCE = α2 + β15BoardInd + β16AuditCommInd + β17BodSize +
β18BodMtgs + Β19Execomp + β20FirmAge + β21FirmSize + ε (10)
ROCE = α2 + β15BodInd + ε

(11)

ROCE = α2 + β16AuditCommInd + ε

(12)

ROCE = α2 + β17BodSize + ε

(13)

ROCE = α2 + β18BdMtgs + ε

(14)

ROCE = α2 + β19Execomp + ε

(15)

ROCE = α2 + β20FirmAge + ε

(16)

ROCE = α2 + β21FirmSize + ε

(17)

Tobin’s Q = α3 + β22BodInd + β23AuditCommInd + β24BodSize +
β25BodMgts + β26Execomp + β27FirmSize + β28FirmAge + ε

(18)

Tobin’s Q = α3 + β22BodInd + ε

(19)

Tobin’s Q = α3 + β23AuditCommInd + ε

(20)

Tobin’s Q = α3 + β24BoardSize + ε

(21)

Tobin’s Q = α3 + β25BdMtgs + ε

(22)

43

Tobin’s Q = α3 + β26Execomp + ε

(23)

Tobin’s Q = α3 + β27 FirmAge + ε

(24)

Tobin’s Q = α3 + β28FirmSize + ε

(25)

FirmAge = α4 + β29BodInd + β30AuditCommInd + β31BodSize +
β32BodMtgs + Β33Execomp + Β34FirmAge + β35FirmSize + ε

(26)

FirmSize = α5 + β36BoardInd + β37μAuditCommInd + β39BodSize +
β40BdMgts + β41Execomp + β42FirmSize + ε

(27)

Where, ROA is the return on assets; α0 to α5 are the intercepts of the model; ROCE is the
return on capital employed; and Tobin’s Q is the ratio of market value to the
replacement cost of assets.
Other Information
The data collection and analysis for the dissertation study was undertaken in Nigeria, and
covered all the 116 nonfinancial companies listed on the Nigerian Stock
Exchange from 2011 to 2015 financial years. The criteria for selecting the firms
were: (a) the sampled companies must have been listed for at least three years
prior to 2011, (b) the firms must have at least four directors, (c) the corporation
must report earnings before interest, taxation, amortization, and depreciation
(EBITD) for the entire 5 years, (d) the market capitalization of each firm must be
a minimum of $1 million, (e) the companies must have audited financial
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statements filed with the Nigerian Stock Exchange for all the five years this study
covered, and (f) the firm’s financial statements must be published regularly as
dictated by the rules of the Exchange. The selected firms also had history of
compliance with corporate governance codes.
Financial and corporate governance data were obtained from the published financial
statements of the companies from the archive of the Nigerian Stock Exchange and
the companies’ websites. The entire data collection process did not involve
contact with any members of the society, as the study relied exclusively on
collection of secondary data. Nevertheless, I was very careful with the data
collected and the subsequent analysis and storage to prevent unauthorized usage.
The data will be stored on my laptop as well as on mobile hard disks and thumb
drives; all the storage devices will be password-protected. After the university
approves the study, the mobile hard disks and thumb drives will be securely
locked when not in use. Access to the data on the laptop will be restricted by the
password and by the fact that the personal computer is not shared with anyone. I
will keep the data for 5 years before destroying it. There will be no reference to
the firms in my analysis and report of the findings. I will handle personally the
downloading and extraction of data from the audited accounts and the
computation of scores, ratios, and indexes.
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Assumptions
The following assumptions underlined this dissertation study: The theoretical
framework provided by agency, stakeholders, and stewardship theories are appropriate to
examine corporate governance in publicly quoted firms in Nigeria. There is a logical
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance, and it is
possible to develop hypotheses that can be tested statistically to examine the association
between them
A study of corporate governance is an examination of a firm’s internal governance
structure and has implications for firm performance, returns to investors, the
welfare of the employees, the performance of the stock market, and the health of
financial system as a whole.
This study is based on all the 116 nonfinancial companies listed on the Nigerian Stock
Exchange. All the listed financial institutions will be excluded from this study
because they are under the regulation of the Central Bank of Nigeria and have
different account and disclosure requirements dictated by the bank and other
regulatory agencies. It is assumed that all the 116 non-financial companies
prepared their financial statements under the International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS) and before the country implemented the IFRS, the Nigerian
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).
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Four foreign auditing firms, Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG), Price
Waterhouse, Deloitte, and Ernst & Young audit the great preponderance of quoted
companies in Nigeria. Where a Nigerian audit firm audits a listed company’s
financial statements, it is mostly in a joint audit with the big four listed above. It is
assumed that the external auditors, regardless of the auditor and the auditing firm,
audited the financial statements by following international auditing standards and
guidelines.
Scope and Delimitations
Scope
In this study, I focused on the impact of corporate governance on the financial
performance of sampled nonfinancial companies listed on the Nigerian Stock
Exchange. The independent variables selected for the study were five components
of corporate governance mechanisms. These were: (a) the independence of the
board of directors, (b) the independence of the audit committee, (c) executive
compensation, (d) the number of board meetings in a year, and (e) the size of the
board. Financial performance, the outcome variable, was measured by three
metrics: (a) ROA, (b) ROCE, and (c) Tobin’s Q. One hundred and seventy-one
companies were quoted on the Nigerian Stock Exchange at the end of December
2015, 116 of them were nonfinancial firms. Those in the financial services
industry are subject to a different accounting and procedural regulations, different
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and distinct from those of other companies that are not licensed to take deposits
from members of the public. This study was focused exclusively on the 116
nonfinancial firms who are not subject to the regulation from the central bank and
other financial regulators.
The data for board characteristics and financial performance was obtained from the
published financial statements filed with the Nigerian Stock Exchange. Other
financial and non-financial information were obtained from the company’s
website. I made use of the companies’ historical financial data in their published
financial statements from 2011 to 2015. Research based on secondary data is
common and widely used in social and other scientific inquiry, especially research
on corporate governance and firm performance (e.g., Francis, Hassan, & Wu,
2013; Mehrotra, 2016; Muttakin, Monem, & Khan, 2015).
In this study, I used multiple regression analysis to test the association between corporate
governance mechanisms and firm performance. Before analyzing the effects of
the predictor variables on the outcome variables, I ran Pearson product-moment
correlation coefficient to examine the relationships among all the variables
(Mehrotra, 2016). The Pearson correlational analysis shows the size of the effect,
whether small, medium, or large but without distinguishing between dependent
and independent variables. Several regression analyses using ordinary least
squares method was run to test the association and the strength of the relationship
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between the independent and dependent variables. Multiple regression analysis
indicates the relationship between the dependent and the independent variables
and the percentage of the variation in the dependent variable that is explained by
the variations in the independent variables.
Delimitations
This study examined the association between board characteristics and other corporate
governance mechanisms and firm performance. The corporate governance
mechanisms were board independence, audit committee independence, executive
compensation, number of board meetings, and board size. There are many other
board features and corporate governance mechanisms that were not examined in
this study. Many researchers have identified the number and structure of the
compensation committee, the number of meetings of the audit committee, director
share ownership, and board diversity as equally important (Bonna, 2012,
Kaczmarek, Kimino, & Pye, 2014; Mehrotra, 2016; Mishra & Mohanty, 2014;
Perryman, Fernando, & Tripathy, 2016; Pugliese, Minichili, & Zattoni, 2014).
The impact of these and other variables like them on firm performance was not
examined in this study. This study examined the association between board
characteristics and other corporate governance mechanisms and firm
performance. The corporate governance mechanisms were board independence,
audit committee independence, executive compensation, number of board
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meetings, and board size. There are many other board features and corporate
governance mechanisms that were not examined in this study. Many researchers
have identified the number and structure of the compensation committee, the
number of meetings of the audit committee, director share ownership, and board
diversity as equally important (Bonna, 2012, Kaczmarek et al. , 2014; Mehrotra,
2016; Mishra & Mohanty, 2014; Perryman et al., 2016; Pugliese, et al.,2014). The
impact of these and other variables like them on firm performance was not
examined in this study.
To measure company performance, I used ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s Q. Other
performance metrics have been used in the literature. For example, Zango,
Kamardin, and Ishak (2016) examined the impact of corporate board committees,
board accounting and financial expertise, and board gender on financial risk
disclosure. Hong, Li, and Minor (2016) used compensation paid to executive to
measure the degree of a firm’s social performance. Similarly, Liu, Valenti, and
Chen (2016) used information transparency to examine the impact of corporate
governance on the performance of listed Taiwanese firms, using family ownership
as the moderating variable.
Limitations
A major potential source of limitation in this study was the use of secondary data to
obtain financial and corporate governance information. The accuracy of the
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information from secondary sources could be a potential source of bias. The use
of secondary data relied on the firms’ published financial statements. Given that
accounting scandals have been reported in many firms in recent times, some of
the information on the financial statements may have been manipulated. Also,
financial statements are prepared based on some underlying principles,
conventions, concepts, and accounting policies. Lack of uniformity in the
application of these accounting rules in many firms made comparison difficult.
Also, specifically, Nigerian firms converted to IFRS in 2012, and many are still
trying to perfect the system. Some of these issues may cause errors. The lack of
information was also a problem. Some firms were excluded from the study
because they did not have the required information for analysis. Secondly, if
information were available, I would have made necessary adjustments to some
accounting estimates and balances in the financial statements that could have been
more accurately stated, such as the figures for inventory, current assets, long-term
debt, and income and loss items.
To mitigate this bias, I gathered data from multiple sites: The companies’ websites, the
website of the Nigerian Stock Exchange, professional accountants’ websites, and
the website of the mass media. Data were collected at different points in time on
the same phenomenon. The strategy of time and space data triangulation allows
the researcher to discover what is common among the various data sources
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(Kimchi, Polivka, & Stevenson, 1991). The approach of using several data
sources and measurement in different periods would reduce the potential source
of bias referred to above. Eliminating a source of bias enhances a researcher’s
ability to interpret results more accurately.
As at the end of the fourth quarter of 2015, 171 equities were quoted on the main board
of the Nigerian Stock Exchange, with 55 firms in the financial services industries.
The rest were 116 non-financial firms that represented this study’s population.
The nonfinancial firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange are into
manufacturing; hotels and tourism; energy, equipment, and services; petroleum
products distribution; apparel retailers; courier, freight, and deliveries; road
transportation; and services.
Some of the nonfinancial companies were not selected for the following reasons: (a)
Their quotation history at the stock exchange was less than three years before
2011, (b) they had less than four directors, (c) their total market capitalization was
less than $1 million throughout the years of analysis, (d) there were no audited
financial statements covering all the 5 years of analysis that complied with, or (e)
the firms did not comply with the listing rules of the stock exchange to file
financial and other statements with the exchange. The exclusion some of these
firms from the study may introduce bias as the study will consider corporations
that are active in the market, have a solid history of trading, and have financial
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statement that meet global best practices. The companies selected may be the ones
that already have strong corporate governance structures and tradition, thus
biasing the findings. Some of the assumptions may also not be accurate, which
may cause errors and difficulties in the interpretation of results. The use of welltested scales, recognized statistical models, and a highly regarded software
package in the study address some of these potential sources of bias.
This study was designed as a quantitative, correlational inquiry to examine the impact of
corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance. The fact that not all the
companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange were included in this research
was a source of bias. Another related potential bias concerned the exclusion of
some corporate governance components and measures of firm performance. The
exclusion of some of these variables and companies not included in the sample
may affect the extent to which the result of the study can be generalized, even in
the same industrial sector. I have selected what I believe were the relevant
variables for the study of corporate governance in Nigeria, and I have chosen
measures of firm performance that are not only widely used, but that are popular
with investors, analysts, regulators, and managers as predictors of organizational
financial performance. Future researchers in Nigeria on the same subject may
extend this work by making other assumptions and including more companies and
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selecting financial performance metrics and corporate governance mechanisms
that are peculiar to nonfinancial firms.
Definition of Terms
Audit: An independent examination, on a test basis, of the accounting records of a firm by
an appointed external auditor (El-Faitouri, 2014).
Audit committee: A committee of the board composed mainly of independent directors
that monitor the reports of external auditors and ensure the management follows
auditors’ recommendations (Dalwai, Basiruddin, & Rasid, 2015)
Board independence: The percentage of nonexecutive directors that are members of the
board of directors (Adewuyi & Olowookere, 2013; Leung et al., 2014). A board
that is composed mostly of executive directors is not perceived as an independent
board.
Board leadership structure: It is the division of the leadership of the board of directors
between the chairperson and the CEO. If an individual combines both positions,
the board structure is perceived not to be independent and to exhibit CEO-duality
(Kouki & Guizani, 2015). The determinants of board size and independence:
Evidence from China.
Board meetings: It is the formal gathering together of board members where the business
of the company is considered after a quorum has been established by an appointed
company secretary and the deliberations and decisions of the meeting recorded in
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a minutes of meetings book under the care of the secretary to the board. The board
is the organ of the firm and board meetings are the place where board power is
exercised (Alves, Couto, & Francisco, 2016; Jermias & Gani, 2014).
Board size: This is the number of people that are on the board of directors of a company,
including the chair, CEO, and the executive and nonexecutive directors (Lenard et
al., 2014; Sun et al., 2014).
Committees: Members of the board that are charged to carry out specific duties on behalf
of the board and report their stewardship to the whole body of the members.
There are many committees the board can form, both standing and ad hoc
committees. Some of the important ones affecting corporate governance are
compensation, audit, employment and general purposes committees (El-Faitouri,
2014).
Democratic leadership: It is a leadership style based on open communication,
transparency, fairness, and justice in the place of work (Lojpur, Ateksic,
Vlahovic, Bach, & Pekovic, 2015).
Executive compensation: The total remuneration paid to the CEO and top management
staff, including basic salaries, allowances, performance bonuses, and stock
options (Basory, Gleason, & Kannan, 2014)
Firm size: The natural logarithm of the total assets (Darmadi, 2013)
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Foreign ownership: The percentage of total equity owned by individuals and firms that
are not nationals of the country where the business is incorporated or domiciled.
Where the shareholder is a corporate organization, if its state of incorporation is
different from that of the company in which shares are held, it is a foreign
company (Liu, Miletkov, Wei, & Young, 2015)
Gender diversity. It refers to the percentage of females to the total number of persons on
the board of directors (Isidro & Sobral, 2015; Quttainah, 2015).
Institutional ownership. The percentage of shares held by institutions to the total shares in
a firm. Examples of institutional shareholders are pension and superannuation
funds, hedge funds, and insurance and banking companies.
Market value: It is the current share price multiplied by the total number of shares in
issue at any particular time (Alipour, 2013).
Market value added: It is the excess of market value of capital (debt and equity) over the
book value of capital (i.e., the current market value of the firm’s debt and equity
less the economic book value). Economic book value is the net worth less share
capital plus reserves and debt capital (Kouki & Guizani, 2015).
Research and development intensity: Research and development intensity is the firm’s
Research and Development (R&D) investment scaled over its total assets (Zona,
2016).
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Return on assets (ROA): It is the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and
amortization (EBITDA) scaled by the total assets of the firm (Kara, Erdur, &
Karabiyi, 2015).
Return on capital employed (ROCE): The ratio of total EBITDA and total capital
employed in the firm. The total capital includes equity and long-term debt (Sahu
& Manna, 2013).
Return on sales (ROS): It is EBITDA divided by the company’s gross earnings or sales
(Kara, Erdur, & Karabiyik, 2015).
Significant shareholder ownership: If a single individual, a group of related individuals,
or an institution holds 5% or more of the share capital of a firm, the shareholder is
said to be a substantial shareholder (Chahine & Zeidan, 2015).
Stakeholders: All the individuals and institutions that are affected by the action of a firm,
including employees, directors, shareholders, investors, bondholders, creditors,
suppliers, the tax authority, and the general public (Dalwai, Basiruddin, & Rasid,
2015).
Strategic leadership: Refers to leadership mainly concerned with leading organizations
rather than leading in the organization. Strategic leaders take on overall
responsibilities for the financial health of their organization, regardless of their
department or strategic business units (Carter & Greer, 2013).
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Tobin’s Q: It is the ratio of the market value of equity plus the total value of long-term
debt to the book value of total assets (Bhagat & Bolton, 2013; Kaczmarek,
Kimino, & Pye, 2014; Silthipongpanich & Polsiri, 2015).
Transformational leadership: A type of leadership style that facilitates organizational
engagement, trust, and shared responsibilities among members of a firm (Barrick,
Thurgood, Smith, & Courtright, 2015; Mishra, Grunewald, & Kulkarni, 2014).
Transparency: Implies openness, accountability, a lack of hidden agendas, and full
disclosure of dealings, practices, and transactions. It also connotes a corporate
atmosphere where free and open exchanges are encouraged among members of
the organization, and where rules and regulations and the reasons behind them are
clear, fair, and accurately and thoroughly communicated to all stakeholders (Gu &
Hackback, 2013).
Summary
In the first chapter of this dissertation study, I highlighted the problems in major public
corporations using the agency, stakeholder, and stewardship theories as the
theoretical framework to examine the issues. I traced the continued challenges in
large firms to agency problem, which causes a conflict of interest between the
managers and shareholders due to separation of ownership from control (Fama,
1980). In publicly listed companies, the problem is mostly acute because of the
wide dispersion of stakeholders; sometimes the membership of these firms crosses
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international boundaries. The company’s affairs are left in the hands of directors
and top executives, who may be incompetent or greedy or intent on pursuing their
self-interest. The agency problem has given rise to two other related issues, one is
information asymmetry, and the other is moral hazard. The directors have more
information than the shareholders and can use the information to deceive the
shareholders or benefit themselves or both. A moral hazard then arises whereby
the shareholders have to employ other tools, such as monitoring and close
supervision of executives, to minimize their potential loss.
The government tried to address these problems by passing laws, such as the SOX of
2002. The SOX requires companies to have an independent board of directors;
independent audit committee; competent, independent, and capable members of
the board; a compensation committee; and accurate and full disclosure of the
companies’ financial affairs. The Act also set up PCAOB, a body charged with
the monitoring and supervision of external auditors. The legislation became
necessary following the collapse of Enron, a large energy trader, and Arthur
Andersen, one of the big four accountancy firms at the time, and arguably, the
most aggressive. The stock exchanges, the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) the American Business Round Table, and
the professional firms also responded to the crisis by setting up corporate
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governance codes, to which all listed companies and other large public companies
are to comply.
The SOX, PCAOB, and the various systems of corporate governance did not prevent the
financial meltdown of 2007–2008, which took down Lehman Brothers and almost
sunk AIG, but for government intervention and bailout. As McDonald and
Paulson (2016) stated, AIG suffered from poor risk management and a weak
board in its securities lending and credit swap businesses. The financial crisis led
the government in the U.S. to enact another law, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. The Act aims at strengthening the
financial stability of the US by improving firms’ accountability and transparency,
end the “too big to fail” assumption, protect the taxpayer from the costs of
bailouts, and insulate the general public from abusive banking and financial
services. The Act also established Financial Stability Oversight Council in
Section 111, and in Sections 201 to 217, the Orderly Liquidation Authority. The
aims and objectives of these Acts are similar to what the corporate governance
codes are trying to achieve in large, publicly listed companies: Instituting
transparency and adequate disclosure of the affairs of listed corporations.
Despite the legislations and the codes of corporate governance, fraudulent financial
restatements and executive misuse of power are still rampant. The $1.9 billion
accounting scandal in Toshiba was reported to have been as a result of severe

60

pressure on a weak management to show profit. For the financial recklessness in
Toshiba, the regulators imposed a fine of $60 million on the company (Adaddy,
2015). Although the fine is a loss to shareholders, the financial cost is far greater
than this, and the damage to Toshiba’s corporate reputation is inestimable. Tesco,
a British supermarket chain, also overstated its profits by $365 million to deceive
analysts and shareholders (Miller, 2015). While the expectations of the market
may be a problem for the managers, it is difficult to dispute that these corporate
scandals may also be a result of an organizational culture that values appearances
rather than substances, weak and ineffective managers, and compensation and
promotion schemes that reward short-term profitability over long-term financial
stability.
I argued in this dissertation study that legislation and corporate governance codes were
not sufficient to reduce and minimize accounting scandals and fraud in large
companies. While rules and regulations are necessary, practitioners, the
government, and all stakeholders must also look at the type of organizational
culture and leadership styles that prevail in organizations. The laws and codes of
professional practice are prescribed uniformly and are expected to apply equally
to all organizations. The firms’ leadership styles and the particular organizational
culture, the economic environment prevailing in the sector, the rate of
technological changes, the macroeconomic indications in the country of

61

operation, and the degree of market sophistication and investor knowledge affect
leadership styles and organizational culture. Organizational culture and leadership
styles have effect on how corporate governance evolves and is implemented in
firms, and these have a great impact firm performance. These and other indices
will affect how the rules and regulations are applied as well, and the outcomes in
different or similar organizations will differ. As a matter of fact, a uniform rule is
inadequate to govern all firms. Although corporate culture and leadership styles
cannot be legislated, it is within the power of shareholders and regulators to select
and approve directors and managers with leadership styles and culture that
promote firm cohesion and positive organizational climate.
I proposed a theoretical model in this study to examine the association between corporate
governance mechanisms and organizational performance. I use three theories of
corporate governance as the theoretical lens to examine the conflict of interests
that arises between owners of capital and managers that are entrusted with the
management of the corporation. As Yarram and Dollery (2014) argued, the
conflict of interest between the principal and agent is the primary source of
problems in large firms.
To examine the association between firm performance and corporate governance, I used
ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s Q as proxies for firm performance, the outcome
variable. I also chose board independence, independence of the audit committee,
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executive compensation, number of board meetings, and the size of the board as
predictor variables. Two mediating variables were hypothesized to impact the
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. The two
mediators in the study are firm size and age. The size of the company confers
advantages and disadvantages on the firm. A large size means the organization
has resources to devote to research and development, attract the most experienced
staff to the organization, and buy inputs to the processes at cheaper prices because
of the negotiating power that comes with size. Large firms, on the other hand,
may become bureaucratic over time and slow to respond to opportunities and
threats. Age is a proxy for experience. With age, firms may be able to manage
risks better and prevent costly mistakes. Age may also impede the firm from
being the first to the market; the managers may base their action on experience
and may be surprised by a much smaller, and better organized, newcomer.
The four other chapters in this dissertation study were organized as
follows: In cchapter 2, I reviewed the current state of research in corporate
governance theories and examine their impact on corporate performance. I
documented and discussed the theories and the findings, including the scope for
further research. In cchapter 3, I reviewed the research methods that I used to
examine the association between corporate governance mechanisms and firm
performance. In cchapter 4, I presented the result of my research into the impact
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of corporate governance on organizational financial performance in nonfinancial
companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. Finally in cchapter 5, I
presented the summary of the dissertation study, conclusions, and
recommendations.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
In this chapter, I review the literature on corporate governance and firm performance. I
organized the chapter into three sections. In the first section, I reviewed the
literature on corporate governance with particular reference to the agency,
stakeholder, and stewardship theories. In the review in this section I compared
and contrast the main theories of corporate governance, which are agency,
stakeholder, and stewardship theories. I examine the strengths, weaknesses, and
the significant assumptions underlying the theories. In the second section, I focus
on the conflict of interest between the shareholders and managers, the response of
the stakeholders to the problem, and the findings of research studies. The third
and final section consisted of a literature review on a firm’s performance, with
emphasis on ROA, ROCE, , and Tobin’s Q, which were the dependent variables
in the study.
Theories of Corporate Governance
There were three main theories of corporate governance that I considered in this study.
These were the agency theory, the stakeholder theory, and the stewardship theory.
These theories provided the foundation and theoretical underpinnings for the
study and showed an understanding and appreciation of corporate governance as a
crucial tool in organizational management. The theories also illustrated why
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corporate behavior is as it is and how a long-term improvement in the efficiency
and effectiveness of firms can be sustained.

Agency Theory
The agency theory assumes a conflict of interest between managers and shareholders of
large corporations as a result of the separation of ownership from control (Wallis
& Klein, 2015). The managers are sometimes motivated to pursue self-interest,
which may conflict with the profit maximization objective of the owners (Smith,
2003; Wallis & Klein, 2015). As rightly stated by Smith (2003), the owners could
not expect managers to devote their attention faithfully to the shareholders’
interests as much as their own. A conflict of interests arises as a result of
opportunistic behavior of the managers. But according to Miletkov, Moskalev,
and Wintoki (2015), the cause of agency problems in organizations is the
mangers’ excessive focus on short-term profit. Managers are appraised on the
extent to which they improve firm value and profitability in a calendar year
(Rashid & Islam, 2013). The appraisal and scrutiny of shareholders and financial
analysts force managers to focus on the short-term, and when short-term profit is
overemphasized, there is unlikely to be an ethical work climate and a positive
attitude of stewardship by the managers and directors (Hassan & Naser, 2013).
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Hiebl (2013), in a qualitative study of 14 large and privately held manufacturing firms in
Austria, found short-term management appointments increase agency problems.
The researcher also found that agency-like behavior increases agency problems
that are not present in firms managed by owners-managers, who exhibit stewardlike behavior. Some researchers see the basic assumption of agency theory as the
main cause of the conflict of interest in corporations. But the assumption that
managers are fraudulent and lack the integrity to pursue owners’ objectives when
exercising managerial power may not be applicable in all cases. The assumption
of the agency theory may have become a self-fulfilling prophecy: The managers
are assumed to be selfish and self-interested, and in practice they behave
according to type. This assumption has been the major reasons why experts call
for close monitoring of employees, especially the top management by the board of
directors (Kaczmarek, Kimino, & Pye, 2014).
Some of the self-interested attitudes of managers include compensation that is not
commensurate with performance, taking excessive risks that may put the future of
the firms in ruins as a result of pay for performance compensation, and using the
firms’ resources to fend off takeovers that may be in the interest of the
shareholders (Hiebl, 2015). Quttainah (2015) found antitakeover provisions
negatively and significantly associated with firm performance. Quttainah also
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found antitakeover provisions acted against firms’ survival and recovery during
the 2007–2008 financial crisis.
Hiebl (2013) found the presence of owner-manager in management lowers the perceived
control by top management and in turn ensures mutual trust and respect between
the managers and shareholders, reducing agency problems. But both the corporate
governance and agency theory scholarship have developed on the basis that
managers need close monitoring by an independent board of directors and an
independent audit and compensation committees to reduce agency costs (Hiebl).
The agency costs are borne entirely by the shareholders (Baulkaran, 2014; Kay &
Vojtech, 2016; Rashid & Islam, 2013). Not all research findings support the
agency theory. Kay and Vojtech (2016) found that, although the SOX laid much
emphasis on director independence to reduce agency problems, the rule fails to
reduce CEO misbehavior, such as excessive compensation and manipulation of
rules of incentive-based remuneration. Baulkaran (2014) on the other hand, found
that independent chairperson on the board of directors and majority voting rights
provisions were negatively associated with firm value. He also found say-on-pay,
a policy that allows shareholders to vote on employees’ emoluments, was
negatively and significantly associated with stock returns.
Rashid and Islam (2013) and Jermias and Gani (2014) found that a bigger board size and
CEO duality were positively associated with firm performance, but the findings
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are inconclusive. Rashid and Islam carried out their research on all listed
companies on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange and concluded that the
explanatory power of the variables was low due to many imperfections in the
market. Although the SOX laid much emphasis on the strength of an independent
board and independent committees to reduce agency problems in firms, research
results have not been consistent with these assumptions. Shank, Hill, and Stang
(2013) stated that since larger firms have much better resources than smaller
companies, availability of resources could have protected them from the
consequences of bad corporate governance practices, not because of their
implementation of the provisions in SOX or compliance with corporate
governance codes.
Shank et al. (2013) found that large firms perform better with a good corporate
governance system. Bhagat and Bolton (2013) examined the association between
corporate governance and the performance of companies, analyzing data from
RiskMetrics and Investor Responsibility Research Center between 2003 and 2007.
They found board independence was negatively associated with ROA in the
periods before 2002, but positive and significant post-2002. Bhagat and Bolton
also found the G-Index and the E-Index and ROA positive and significant in the
years following the SOX (Bebechuck et al., 2009; Gompers et al., 2003). The
result of their research suggests a positive relationship between the composition

69

of the board and firm performance, made possible by implementing the provisions
of the SOX.
Benjamin and Zain (2015) found board independence and frequency of meetings
negatively and significantly associated with dividend payout, suggesting that
corporate governance mechanisms and dividend payouts are substitutes. Cao,
Leng, Feroz, and Davalos (2015) found smaller board size, greater board
independence, greater gender diversity of the board, and lower concentration of
institutional ownership positive and significantly associated with post-SEC’s
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases. Regulatory sanctions may force
corporations to improve their corporate governance systems (Baran & Forst,
2015; Cao et al., 2015).
Gama and Rodrigues (2013) and Sun, Lan, and Ma (2014) found the urge or temptation
to commit accounting fraud and the chances of success are negatively related to
the size and independence of the board. Sokolyk (2015) and Wang (2015) also
reported that governance mechanisms had a positive and significant effect on
corporate performance. Adewuyi and Olowookere (2013) and Gama and
Rodrigues equally found that the size of the board and the number of independent
directors are positive and significantly associated with firm performance.
Quttainah (2015) asserted that board independence and board size only affect
performance when other corporate governance mechanisms are present in the
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company. This means that a firm benefits from implementing all corporate
governance codes, and part implementation may not be effective.
Other important controls to strengthen corporate governance systems are through
committees, such as audit and compensation committees. An independent audit
committee will be composed of external independent directors, and the majority
of the members will be qualified with adequate industry experience to make an
appreciable impact on the governance of the firm (Hassan & Nasser, 2013).
Jermias and Gani (2014) reported that the size of the audit committee and the
number of audit committee meetings were negatively related to firm performance.
Adewuyi and Olowookere (2013) found independence of the audit committee
positive and significantly related to ROA and Tobin’s Q. Leung et al. (2014) also
observed the independence of the audit committee was positive and significantly
associated with ROA and stock returns. The expertise of the members of the
committee was found equally important by many researchers and would dictate
the tone and the quality of discussions in the committees (El-Faitouri, 2014; Ioana
& Mariana, 2014; Leung et al., 2014). Ioana and Mariana (2014) noted that the
frequency of audit committee meetings was not related to company performance
at the one percent level of significance, but members’ expertise in finance and
accounting was positive and significantly associated with firm performance,
measured by ROA and ROCE.
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Expertise in accounting, audit, and risk management are essential for audit committee
members if they are to help their firms survive in financially turbulent times (Dah,
2016; Ioana & Mariana, 2014). In a recession, boards’ oversight tends to increase
as well as the CEO’s power (Ciampi, 2015; Pugliese et al., 2014). Ciampi (2015)
also reported that firms that became bankrupt in Italy in 2008 had higher debts to
equity ratios, higher interest payments, and weak profitability ratios than firms
that survived the financial crisis. A good corporate governance practice may have
insulated some firms from the adverse effects of the financial crisis, and a strong
CEO may have achieved the same thing.
Ciampi (2015) reported that CEO duality, a measure of CEO power, was negatively and
significantly associated with the incidence of bankruptcy in small firms, those
with turnover below 5 million Euros. When the CEO shares his or her power with
a chairperson in a small enterprise, the likelihood of financial distress increases
(Shank, Hill, & Tang, 2013). Zona (2016) reported that CEO duality was
positively and significantly associated with performance, measured by research
and development intensity. The findings of shank et al. (2013) and Zona (2016)
confirmed that absence of conflict of interest, or a conflict of interest that is well
managed by corporate governance systems, improves a firm’s performance.
Ciampi (2015) that nondefaulting firms had more of CEO duality, higher ownership
concentration, and more share ownership by insider directors. During a financial
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crisis, management entrenchment tends to increase as well as monitoring and
advice from the board (Pugliese et al., 2014). Dah (2016) reported a positive and
significant association between board independence and management
entrenchment. It is most likely that board activities and those of its committee will
become more pronounced during a crisis. The effort to rescue a company will be
heightened at this time, and the CEO needs all the power at his or her disposal to
turn around the fortunes of the firm. Sharing of power with the chairperson may
well lead to default in the company (Ciampi, 2015).
The percentage of shares held by large shareholders, institutions, and foreigners could be
major determinants of corporate performance (Du, Deloof, & Jorissen, 2015). If
the founder or a family member is in charge of the day-to-day management of the
firm’s operations, there is no separation of ownership from control. There will be
no conflict of interest, and the cost of the agency would be low. In large
corporations, agency problems are present and the percentage of shares held by
large shareholders, institutional investors, and foreigners impact firm performance
(Pugliese et al., 2014). Liu et al. (2015) did not find any relationship between
foreign ownership of a firm’s shares and performance in their examination of all
companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges between 1999
and 2012.
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Chen (2015) found that in China, companies with foreign ownership had more outside
directors, which is positively and significantly associated with performance. AlSaidi and Al-Shammari (2015) stated that the type of shareholders, whether
foreign, family, or state matters in organizational performance. This is because
some shareholders are better at monitoring the top management than others.
Azoury and Bouri (2015) found disparity between cash flow and voting rights of
large shareholders and family CEOs encourage cheating and expropriation of
minority shareholders. As stated by Yeh (2014), markets will react more
favorably to proposals of large shareholders, as directors and management are
more likely to take such suggestions seriously. Yeh also found that directors, most
often, ignore the proposals of small shareholders.
Institutional investors can ensure that the board of directors and management act in the
interest of the shareholders through monitoring, advising, and counseling. Pension
and mutual funds control a large proportion of many firms’ shareholding and can
use the influence they have to shape the activities of the board as they desire. But
the research findings have been mixed. Many institutional shareholders refuse to
get involve and simply sell their shares rather than get into arguments with the
CEO or the chairperson. Jermias and Gani (2014) found a positive and marginally
significant relationship between institutional shareholding and company
performance in the S&P 500 companies between 1997 and 2004.
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Alipour (2013reported that in Iran, ownership concentration was negatively and
significantly associated with ROA the power of institutional investors was
positively and significantly related to ROA but negatively and significantly
related to Tobin’s Q. As Tobin’s Q measures firm performance in terms of the
return on stocks and firm value, the indication is that the market in Iran and other
emerging markets may not trust corporations in which institutional shareholders
control the board of directors. Yeh (2014) found that markets react more
favorably to announcement of proposals by large shareholders because it has the
effect of reducing managerial entrenchment.
Agency literature starts from the premise that the separation of ownership from control
motivates managers to use their position to benefit themselves at the expense of
the shareholders (Ahmadpour & Shahsavari, 2016; Arenas & Rodrigo, 2016). If a
business is family-run, then the problems and consequences of principal-agent
conflict of interest should disappear. A review of the current research findings
leaves many doubts. Jameson, Prevost, and Puthenpurackal (2014) found the
association between organizational performance and family firms and familycontrolled boards of directors to be negative and significant. Tsai, Yu, and Wen
(2013) found advertising intensity, market-to-book value, and independent
directors positively and significantly associated with Tobin’s Q in familycontrolled firms.
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Jameson, Prevost, and Puthenpurackal (2014) also found that controlling shareholders
and family and founder firms are positively and significantly associated with
lower Tobin’s Q. These relationships were found to be significant in non-financial
firms in India. The research findings indicate that the validity of the assumption of
separation of ownership from control as the major issue in corporate governance
remains a difficult area. Gama and Rodrigues (2013) reported positive and
significant correlation between family ownership and firm performance. In
manager-controlled firms, Tai et al. (2013) found negative and significant
association between debt ratio and debt ownership and Tobin’s Q. Tsai, et al.
(2013) also found independent directors negatively and significantly associated
with firm performance. It is possible that non-family firms outperform family
companies because the former tend to be bigger and more professionally
managed, and the control systems and corporate governance structures in nonfamily firms are more elaborate than in family-controlled companies.
Managerial ownership, like family ownership, is a corporate governance mechanism that
may enhance firm performance, since theoretically, it closely aligns the interests
of managers and shareholders. If a conflict of interest arises from the separation of
ownership from control as stated by the agency theory, the more managerial
ownership there is in a firm, the less should be agency problems and the better the
performance of corporations. Baulkaran (2014) studied 218 companies listed on
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the S&P/Toronto Stock Exchange between 2003 and 2010 with 1,744 firm-year
observations. The researcher stated that managerial ownership decreases firm risk
and reduces agency costs. Mangantar and Ali (2015) and Jermias and Gani (2014)
found a positive and significant relationship between managerial ownership and
Tobin’s Q. On the other hand, Tsai (2013) reported a negative and significant
association between Tobin’s Q and managerial share ownership. If managers, due
to weak corporate governance structure and poor internal control systems extract
value they are not entitled to from the firm, they may not be motivated to manage
the company efficiently and effectively. This is more so if the illegally obtained
value is more than, and significantly disproportionate to, the returns they get from
their investment in the corporation.
Managerial share ownership is part of the broader share ownership structure in a large,
publicly listed firm. The combination and the percentage of each of the
components in the structure exert different influences on the performance of a
company. Jermias and Gani (2014) found a positive and significant association
between managerial ownership and Tobin’s Q. Kouki and Guizani (2015) did not
find a significant relationship between managerial ownership and board
independence not significant in 30 nonfinancial firms listed on the Tunisian Stock
Exchange. Managerial compensation, like managerial share ownership, is a factor
that can affect a company’s financial performance. A compensation scheme that is
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a combination of fixed and variable pay linked to company performance could
motivate the CEO and top management staff to perform better than when the total
emolument is fixed regardless of the level of performance.
Basory, Gleason, and Kannan (2014) and Al-Matar, Al-Sivid, and Bt Fadzil (2014) found
a positive association between CEO compensation and firm performance. Basory
et al. (2014) reported a positive and significant relationship between CEO
compensation and firm performance positive and significant. Al-Matar et al.
(2014) observed that the relationship was not significant in the study they
conducted. Sila, Gonzalez, and Hagendiorff (2016) found no evidence of a
connection between gender diversity and CEO compensation. Nevertheless, Sila
et al. (2016) stated that in 1,960 firms in the US between 1996 and 2010, there
was a gender bias appointing a female director once at least one is already on the
board of directors, but female directors as a factor do not affect CEO
compensation.
Alves, Couto, and Francisco (2016) found that the higher the CEO remuneration, the
higher the book value of assets and dividend yield; that is, both the dividend yield
and assets value were positive and significantly associated with higher CEO pay.
A higher CEO pay is an incentive to motivate the CEO to perform better than
when the total remuneration is lower than what is obtainable in the industry as a
whole (Alves et al., 2016; Basory et al., 2014). It is a good policy that when firms
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set the CEO and management compensation, directors should be aware of the
structure of pay in the industry. Alves et al. (2016) found that the remuneration
committee was positively and significantly associated with higher CEO pay in
Portugal, suggesting that the firms without a compensation committee pay less to
their CEOs.
The agency theory posits that managers need to be monitored and closely supervised to
ensure that they are doing their duties in the interests of the shareholders. The
annual financial statements and the interim financial reports are the principal
documents and main channels for informing the shareholders of how well their
company is doing, at least financially. The law makes it mandatory to present
financial statements to the shareholders every year in an annual general meeting
(AGM). A balance sheet, income and cash flow statement, and explanatory notes
are part of the documents that must be laid before the meeting for approval. Other
information on the financial statement and annual reports are the report of the
CEO, the report of the chair, major events that happened during the year under
review, risk management procedures, contribution to charity, and environmental
reporting. Sometimes, these statements do not present a “true and fair” view as
required by law. Manipulations of financial statements have many causes, such as
the need to meet profit estimates, the need to shore up share price to satisfy major
shareholders, the desire to cash-in on options, or management’s objective to
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increase the firm’s performance and earn higher pay when part of the pay is
linked to performance (Morgenson, 2016).
An independent firm of certified accountants is required to audit financial statements and
certify them as true and fair to prevent untrue statements in financial reports. One
of the important mechanisms in corporate governance is the establishment of
audit committees to supervise the work of the external auditors. The SOX also
established the PCAOB with similar aims and objectives. Ioana and Mariana
(2014) and Al-Matar et al. (2014) found a positive and significant association
between audit committee and Tobin’s Q. The size of the committees, its
frequency of meetings, independence of the members, corporate complexity, audit
fees, and the status of the audit firm also have effect on the relationship between
audit committee and corporate performance. Ioana and Mariana (2014) found no
correlation between audit committee structure, frequency of meetings, and the
independence of audit committee members. Research findings on the relationship
between audit committee process and firm performance are mixed (Adewuyi &
Olowookere, 2013; Alves et al., 2016; Dalwai, Basiruddin, & Rasid, 2015;
Jermias & Gani, 2014). In their study of 487 listed firms on the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange, Leung et al. (2014) found the effect of family ownership on the
interaction between audit committee independence and firm performance mixed.
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Hassan and Naser (2013) found a negative and significant association between audit fees
and the proportion of the members of the committee that are independent. Hassan
and Naser (2013) also reported a positive and significant relationship between the
presence of audit committee and the size of the committee, profitability, status of
the audit firm, and corporate risk in non-financial companies listed on the Abu
Dhabi Stock Exchange. Ioana and Mariana (2014) reported a positive and
significant association between the professional experience of audit committee
members and ROA .Contrary to the findings in Hassan and Naser (2013), Jermias
and Gani (2014) found the size of the committee and the number of meetings
were negatively associated with performance. Adewuyi and Olowookere (2013)
examined the effect of corporate governance codes on firm performance in 70
nonfinancial companies listed on the Nigeria Stock Exchange following the
introduction of the code by Securities and Exchange Commission in 2003. They
found that firms that have independent audit committees recorded a good
corporate governance change. A good governance change was defined as an
increase in board independence and director share ownership, and a decrease in
CEO duality and board size. Adewuyi and Olowookere (2013) found board size
negative and significantly related to a good corporate governance change.
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Stakeholder Theory
The industrial revolution made it possible for a large number of people, first in
England, then around the world, to escape poverty. The quantities and quality of
goods and services available multiplied, and at this time, what was more
important was to safeguard the interests of the owners of capital, the capitalists,
that made the substantial progress possible. As many ventures became too large
for one person or family to finance, partnerships, and later, companies whose
liabilities were limited, were formed. The first of those companies were chartered
companies, specially authorized by the government or the king to carry out trade
in a particular territory or business area. Special protections were afforded the risk
takers. Even later when ordinary citizens began to own shares, the focus of the
legislation was on the supremacy of the shareholders over the financial and other
affairs of the firms, and the need to protect investors from acts of fraud by
dubious businesspeople.
The agency model is based on a narrow view of contractual relationships, whose
underlying philosophy is internally driven (Giudice, Peruta, & Maggioni, 2013;
Miletkov, Moskalev, & Wintoki, 2014). The stakeholder model’s underlying
philosophy is a much broader, and an externally focused model, as it considers the
interests of shareholders, employees, clients, suppliers, strategic partners, and
other groups that have connections with the firm (Conyon & He, 2016; Haβ,
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Johan, & Schweizer, 2016). Some researchers have stated that the notion of
considering the interests of all stakeholders may have been extended to an
impracticable extent, and it is important for corporate managers and practitioners
to know where to draw the line (Arenas & Rodrigo, 2016; Perrault & HcHugh,
2015).
Corporate organizations have a contractual relationship with many entities apart from
their stockholders, all of who are considered as stakeholders of the firm
(Donaldson & Preston, 1995). To be considered a stakeholder, the relationship
with the company needs not be contractual, but it should be limited to those that
establish contact with the company and a relationship that is capable of producing
mutual benefits. It is reasonable to assume that a company should expect
stakeholders’ support only if the firm undertakes projects that are seen as
desirable by those who have a reasonable expectation that they would benefit or
suffer harm from the actions of the corporations. In other words, a company’s
action or inaction should have a potential impact on an individual, community, or
other entities for them to be qualified as stakeholders of the firm.
Andre and Pache (2016) did not see why there should be a limit to the definition and
scope of the concept of the stakeholder as advocated by other researchers, such as
Van Oostenhout et al. (2006). Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), local
communities, and the natural environmentalists are included in the definition of
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stakeholder advocated by Andre and Pache (2016). Andre and Pache
differentiated between stakeholders that provide resources to the firm (suppliers,
partners, and customers) and those that are without resources. Each of the two
different types of stakeholders requires equal but separate treatment by firms
(Andre & Pache, 2016).
A firm draws resources from the environment and ought to be responsible for the
preservation of it for the present, incoming, and future generations. The question
is whether future generations can be considered as stakeholders (Arenas &
Rodrigo, 2016). Whether or not future generations are so considered, the question
of fairness and equity in the use of resources is a fundamental one. It is difficult to
determine the identity of future generations, and what is a fair allocation to them
out of a firm’s resources. Arenas and Rodrigo (2016) stated that the solution is to
consider future generations as the direct descendants of the present stakeholders,
out of who the firm will get future employees, customers, suppliers, and
managers.
Research has shown the benefits to businesses of having a broader view of participants in
the corporate entity. Mande and Rahman (2013) found that employees’
involvement in decision-making ensures effective firm performance. Jameson,
Prevost, and Puthepurackal (2014) reported a negative and significant association
between controlling shareholders and firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q.
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To tap the benefits that come along with looking after the interests of all
stakeholders in a company, managers need to keep them informed about the
affairs of the company by giving timely and accurate information (Conyon & He,
2016; Sendjava, Pekerti, Hartel, Hirst, & Butarbutar, 2016). All employees, and
most importantly managers, must at all times think of how their actions and
decisions affect every stakeholder in the organization (Sendjaya et al., 2016).
One of the most important performance indicators in a firm is the ability to generate cash
for the financing of the business. In the short-term as well as over the long period,
availability of cash is crucial to organizational survival and growth. As the
managing partner of Idea Booth has stated, cash not EBITDA is the best test of
survival and growth opportunities (Cole, 2016). Martin, Campbell, and GomezMejia (2016) also said if a company is to have good reputation and grow, it has to
obtain good financing terms from relationships it has built with its various
stakeholders. Cole (2016) remarked that every CEO needs to think of survival in
the short-term and growth and expansion in the long-term. Having partners in the
form of suppliers and other stakeholders to help achieve these twin objectives is
crucial in today’s ever-changing business climate.
Fair dealing with all stakeholders also affects a firm’s reputation and corporate image.
The opinions that are held by the company’s partners affect the relationship with
stakeholders and the way and extent to which they participate in the firm’s
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activities. The firm’s image also affects the type of employees that are attracted to
the company and the type of commitment and loyalty the organization gets
(Ayoso, Roca, Arevalo, & Aravind, 2016). The concept of reciprocity is important
in obtaining stakeholders’ cooperation. For taking the risks to invest in the
company, shareholders deserve to be fairly treated for the important contribution
they are making in the firm. Also, creditors and finance providers need to trade
with the firm at profit.
The firm needs to consider the interests of all the stakeholders so that there would be a
mutually beneficial relationship between them. The organization contributes value
to the stakeholders in return for unfettered access to the resources and expertise
they bring to the firm. Shen and Gentry (2014) found that a firm’s strategic
decisions affect corporate governance because such actions alter ownership
structure. In the stakeholder theory, researchers must strike the right balance
between what is possible and what is simply impracticable. There must be some
delineation in the definition of who a firm’s stakeholders are. Those who have
contractual relationships can be considered as stakeholders as well as those who
stand to lose if the firm goes out of business, degrades the environment, or carries
on activities that are damaging to the community interest and wellbeing. Beyond
the aforementioned stakeholders, it becomes increasingly difficult and
conceptually problematic to argue that a firm should take into consideration the
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interests of all persons, whether foreseeable or not, when setting and executing
corporate strategy.
Stewardship Theory
The stewardship and agency theories are at the different ends of a continuum of corporate
governance. While the agency theory is based on the rational economic human
beings, always striving to look after their self-interest and think and act basically
in the short-term, the stewardship theory is based on the model that sees a
manager as an equal partner in business. The steward tries at all times to render
faithfully and truthfully the resources committed to his or her hand, always with
unequivocal devotion to the objectives of the business even at the expense of his
or her economic interest. The stewardship attitude of the manager engenders trust
and dependability and little control is necessary to see that the steward gets the
job done satisfactorily (Hiebl, 2013; Miletkov et al., 2015).
The stewardship theory emphasizes that the manager is committed to the long-term goals
of the organization instead of the steward’s interests. There are thus little
mechanisms that need to be put in place to ensure corporate objectives are
achieved (Hiebl, 2013). The savings in agency costs when managers imbibe the
philosophy of a steward instead of that of an agent should improve organizational
performance. Perhaps the best test of the differences between the attitudes of
agents and stewards is seen during takeover battles and recessions. Agents tend to
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entrench themselves in the organization during recessions and use the opportunity
to maximize personal gains. During takeover battles, agents employ various
stratagems like poison pills and issuance of new shares to frustrate a merger deal
(Bebchuck et al., 2009). Stewards will not only present truthful information to the
decision-makers, but will work in the overall interests of the organization and
shareholders (Dah, 2016).
Stewardship theory posits that the ultimate goal of the stewards is to maximize the wealth
of the shareholders and that of their organizations. To the extent that the steward
focuses exclusively on the interest of the organization, the goals of the firm, the
shareholders, and managers would have been perfectly aligned, and the
consequences of divergence of ownership from control considerably reduced. But
it would appear that the stewardship theory suffers from the same problem as the
agency theory because the concern and focus of the theory is still quite narrow.
The two theories are still not as broad in their outlook as the view taken by the
stakeholder theory, which takes a bigger picture view of all the participants in a
corporate environment.
The stewardship theory is yet to be fully accepted as a basis for analyzing organizational
dynamics. But there are various benefits for using the theory to analyze
organizations:
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The adoption of the theory is likely to ensure a relationship between managers and
shareholders based on trust and cooperation.
As stewards are motivated by a higher order of needs, such as self-esteem and selfactualization, they are likely to work for the long-term interests and sustainable
performance of the organization. The benefits of the stewardship model will also
be of benefit to shareholders and stakeholders.
By emphasizing a different model of the economic person who is only motivated by selfinterest, the stewardship theory ensures a corporate atmosphere where decisiontaken is simplified and easier than in a pure agency relationship. Information
asymmetry and moral hazard that make decision-making difficult are not present
when the central philosophy of management is to serve as stewards of the
organization (Almadi, 2015).
As a model of governance, the stewardship theory changes employees’ orientation and
behavior from individualistic, self-serving agents, to a different type of
individuals whose primary concern is advancing the collective benefit of other
individuals and the organization. For an individual to have a sense of
responsibility and an other-centeredness orientation, there is a need to transition
from an agency-centered to a stewardship-centered person. The organization must
change the control system from the traditional ones that lay emphasis on budgets,
individual key performance indicators, and an appraisal system that recognizes
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only individual efforts, to one that focuses on relationship-centered collaboration
and promotion of collective responsibilities of employees for desired outcomes.
The organization also needs to change the reward system from individual-centered,
winner-takes-all to those that emphasize intrinsic benefits, compensation for selfefficacy, and self-determination. Lastly, the organization needs to develop
individual’s commitment to self-actualization rather than a short-term pursuit of
financial gains. The outcome of all these efforts is an inculcation of stewardship
behavior in employees. But the stewardship model cannot stand alone, and needs
to be considered together with organizational policies, managerial structure, and
leadership styles, which are the control and reward systems through which most
things in the organization, including the stewardship model, works.
Corporate Governance: The Historical Context, Attributes, and Principles
Page (2005) defined corporate governance as the principles and legal and
contractual frameworks that define and regulate the sharing of power in a
corporation. The modern firm may be incorporated in the United States, has its
headquarters in Hong Kong, manufactures in Taiwan and China, and source raw
materials from Africa and Latin America. Corporate governance is the process
and procedure for coordinating the various activities of the firm and ensuring
stakeholders are treated fairly and equitably. The legal framework is necessary to
ensure the firm respects the law and the contractual system that regulates the
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firm’s business behavior with all stakeholders: Debtors, creditors, financial
institutions, shareholders, employees, regulatory authorities, the community, the
government, and the general public.
The contractual framework defines the relationship between the actors in a
corporation and the power relationship between the parties. The legal and
contractual frameworks within which companies operate are necessary and
justifiable because markets are imperfect, and managers usually have superior
information than shareholders, and a contract needs to define the duties and
responsibilities of the parties. Corporate governance is also defined in terms of the
duties, responsibilities, and interactions of top management of the firm with the
members of the board of directors. The board represents the shareholders in the
company, and the most important duty is to oversee the managers and ensure that
strategic goals of the firm are achieved without damaging its reputation.
The Historical Context of Corporate Governance
Corporate governance started in antiquity, from the time of tribal communes. The
communities selected leaders to ensure members comply with the norms and
standards of behavior in the community and that crimes are kept to the minimum
to ensure progress of the society. In the 16th century, tribal communes gave way
to global trading entities that were given Charter by the Crown to trade in a
particular territory. Some of the well-known companies at this time were the East
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Indian Company, the Hudson’s Bay Company, and the South Seas Company.
Corporate governance, as we know it today, was weak in these companies at the
time. For example, the East India Company became a colossus, with a standing
army. Charles II of England even granted the company a right to declare war. But
all was not well with these early companies because of their weak corporate
governance practices and extremely weak internal structure. The South Sea
Company gave rise to the South Sea bubble, following massive fraud and
economic disaster that followed the chartered firm’s collapse (The Thorogood
Publishing). The Bubble Act of 1720 was probably the first attempt to formally
regulate companies and put in place corporate governance mechanisms. The aim
of these efforts was to protect the members of the public and the investors. The
Act itself had unintended consequences in that it hampered the development of
joint stock companies.
The granting of charter was slow and inconvenient for businesses. The next
progress came when the Parliament in England started incorporating companies,
but this process took considerable Parliament time. Some of the legislations at this
time in England were the Trading Acts of 1834 and the Chartered Companies Act
of 1837. The real breakthrough came when the Parliament set up a committee
chaired by William Blackstone to look into the issue. The result was the
enactment of the Joint Stock Act of 1844, which required company registration,
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but no limited liability. The Act also set up the Companies House and the office
of the Registrar of Companies (The Thorogood Publishing). This was the first
piece of legislation in the world that put incorporation of companies within the
reach of ordinary business people (The Thorogood Publishing).
The U.K. Parliament passed the Companies Act of 1855 and the Joint Stock
Companies Act of 1856. The Acts introduced the concept of limited liability and
amended the Act of 1844. The specific requirements of the Acts of 1855 and 1856
foreshadowed corporate governance systems as corporations practice it today. The
key provisions were: The U.K. Parliament passed the Companies Act of 1855 and
the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856. The Acts introduced the concept of
limited liability and amended the Act of 1844. The specific requirements of the
Acts of 1855 and 1856 foreshadowed corporate governance systems as
corporations practice it today. The key provisions were:
All companies should file annual returns with the Registrar of Companies at the
Companies House.
All limited liability companies should appoint external auditors
The word “limited” or its shortened version “Ltd.” shall end the company’s name.
The amount of authorized and paid-up capital should be stated.
The dividend paid, and the amount of loans given to directors, must be specified.
The companies must have a minimum of 25 members.
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Despite these requirements, dishonest businessmen exploited the loopholes in the law and
practice of the time to perpetrate frauds and dupe shareholders. One of these
frauds, the run on Overend, Gurney bank, made the Bank of England to increase
interest rate to 10%. The gurney bank episode was the last known run on an
English bank, that is, until 2007 when a similar faith befell the Northern Rock.
Poor corporate governance practices and inadequate board oversight brought the
Northern Rock down, the same as what corporate governance codes, the Joint
Stock Act of 1856, and many other companies’ legislations tried to prevent.
The Cadbury Committee. In May 1991, the stakeholders in company management in
the United Kingdom, concerned about the number of corporate collapses and
financial scandals in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and investors’ lack of
confidence in the financial statements following these collapses, took action. The
Financial Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange, and the accountancy
profession in England and Wales established the Cadbury Committee to address
the financial aspects of corporate governance. Some of the issues the committee
was charged with were: (a) to review the structure and responsibilities of the
board of directors and recommend a code of best practice, (b) to consider the
statutory duty of independent auditors and make necessary recommendations to
the accountancy profession, and (c) to address the rights and responsibilities of
the shareholders.
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The Cadbury Committee’s recommendations became a landmark and innovative
thinking on corporate governance. Some of its recommendations have been
incorporated into legislation and stock exchanges’ codes and principles of
corporate governance around the world. The rate of adoption of the
recommendations shows that the system, process, and challenges of managing a
corporation is universal, and most especially that concerted efforts and
cooperation are required to minimize fraud, irregularities, and misstatements in
companies’ financial affairs to ensure free flow of capital in free market
economies.
Some of the relevant recommendations of the Cadbury Committee were:
All listed companies on recognized stock exchanges should comply with the code of
corporate governance, both in the spirit and the letter. The annual reports of all
companies must contain a statement of compliance.
All listed companies should separate the office of the chairman from that of the CEO. If
the two offices are combined in one person, the board should nominate a Lead
Director from the group of non-executive and independent directors to counterbalance the considerable power vested in the Chairperson/CEO.
Non-executive directors should be independent and of high caliber, regarding
qualifications, experience, and integrity.
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The nomination committee, the audit committee, and the compensation committee,
ideally, should be composed entirely of non-executive or independent directors to
improve corporate governance standards.
The remuneration of directors, including the chairperson, should be disclosed in the
financial statements.
The audit report should state the responsibilities of the directors for the financial
statements and the auditor’s responsibility to express their opinion on the
financial statements.
Audit fees, rotation of audit partners, and earnings from non-audit services should be
disclosed in the financial statements.
The collapse of Enron and the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. After the
Second World War, the U.S. economy considerably expanded, many American
corporations witnessed tremendous growth, both locally and overseas. The major
priority at this time was to make money and satisfy shareholders’ objective of
wealth maximization. How the corporation was being governed was of less
concern to shareholders: Dividends and share price appreciation were major
concerns. SEC initiated a major reform agenda in the mid-1970s. SEC sued Penn
Central directors in 1974 for preparing false financial statements and for
misrepresenting the state of the company’s financial health (Cheffins, 2012).
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The financial scandals in Enron brought the world’s attention, once again, to the danger
of neglecting corporate governance practices. The demise of Enron led to the
enactment of the SOX. The Act’s cornerstone was the requirement for an
independent board, independent audit committee, and independent remuneration
committee. The Act also established the PCAOB The board was charged with the
task of overseeing the external audit process and authorization of the audit firms
that audit public companies. The committee also has the power to discipline
erring firms.
Attributes of Corporate Governance
Corporate governance systems and mechanisms are meant to address the conflict
of interest that arises in corporations where ownership is divorced from control.
The twin problems of information asymmetry and moral hazard are largely a
result of the mistrust that exists due to that separation. Managers, on the one hand,
are rational human beings and are concerned with self-interest, which typically,
are career progression and security of employment, personal development, and
adequate remuneration. The shareholders, the owners of the firm, on the other
hand, have as their objective the maximization of returns on their investments
consistent with the risks they assume. The objectives of shareholders and
managers are incompatible, which is why there is a conflict of interest with
consequent agency costs entirely borne by the shareholders.
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Effective corporate governance practices lower the conflict of interests between
shareholders and managers by more closely aligning the two interests (Jameson et
al., 2014). Two types of conflict can be distinguished in firms: A conflict of
interest exists between shareholders and the debt holders as well as between
stockholders, board, and management. While the last conflict is internal to the
firm, the first is external, involving a specialized group of creditors, mainly the
bondholders and others who hold secured and unsecured credit of the firm. If
management takes unreasonable risks because it wants to increase returns to
shareholders, it may jeopardize the assets secured creditors depend on as a last
resort for the repayment of their loans. The situation is even worse for unsecured
creditors because they get paid after secured creditors have been settled and
certain regulatory obligations have been satisfied.
The lenders rely on a firm’s integrity, the quality of its assets, the soundness of its
business fundamentals, and the dependability of its financial statements in making
loan decisions. A company’s integrity and reputation and a high standard of
financial reporting should translate to superior performance. Many studies have
found significant improvement in the performance of firms that are transparent
(Bijalwan & Madan, 2013; Gu & Hackbarth, 2013; Kara, Erdur, & Karabiyik,
2015). Governance and transparency are good for firms, but a more transparent
company may attract corporate raiders.
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Characteristics of good corporate governance practices. Certain characteristics
differentiate a good corporate governance mechanism from others. Some of these
features are as follows:
Transparency. This is an essential component of corporate governance. It ensures that the
affairs of the firm are run in an open manner and information for decisionmaking is accurate, relevant, and promptly available. It means that management
and the board have no hidden agendas, employees know the direction of the firm
and understand their roles in the organization, and other stakeholders know the
company’s policies in areas that affect each of them.
Fairness. The modern corporation has many actors. The shareholders are technically the
owners of the company, while the managers are the agents of the shareholders
who have been charged with the responsibility of the day-to-day management of
the firm. There are other members of the corporation without whom the company
cannot grow and thrive. The employees, the suppliers, the bondholders, the
various service providers, and the community are all stakeholders. These
stakeholders supply labor, credit facilities, materials, and a peaceful environment
for a firm’s operations. While the agency and the shareholders’ wealth
maximization theories focus on the needs of the shareholders exclusively and how
to align the managers’ and shareholders’ interests, the stakeholders’ theory
recognizes that every stakeholder has the right to receive information from the
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company and be treated fairly. In today’s connected, interdependent, and
technology-driven world, the concept of ownership is changing, so also should be
the focus of firms. Shareholders are becoming more dispersed, leaving control
and management in the hands of the very few. With the directors’ control over
proxy votes, the real owner’s voice is unheard. Also, institutional shareholders
now own large chunks of a company’s equity, complicating the concept of
ownership further. The financial institutions and the debt holders supply needed
finance to the corporation, just like the shareholders, and ought to be treated fairly
and equitably as well. In the new economy, employees must be well treated as
knowledge now trumps capital. The shareholder supremacy as a philosophy is
becoming outdated. The focus of corporate governance should not be only
shareholders, but employees as well, specifically how to recruit, train, control, and
retain knowledge workers.
Discipline. A company’s corporate governance mechanism works within the legal
framework of a nation, and what is required first and foremost is for the firm to
obey the laws of the host country and rules and regulations of the particular sector
or industry in which it operates. Part of the characteristics of good corporate
governance is for the board and management to be disciplined enough to obey the
rules. The Volkswagen’s emissions cheating scandal occurred when the company
thought that the U.S. emission standard was too onerous to follow, and cutting
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corners only brought temporary gains. The costly scandal that followed the
exposure of the cheating has been described by the company’s communications
chief as embarrassing (Hakim, 2016). The directors took an unreasonable and
unnecessary risk.
Self-evaluation. The board of directors charged with the duty to control and monitor the
management must evaluate each director and the work of the subcommittees on
which they are nominated. The periodic evaluation will ensure the board
continues to meet its obligations, and that the directors are still qualified,
independent, and fit for the office of the director of the firm. As Mack (2016)
stated, a constant evaluation ensures that potential problems are spotted,
communicated, and mitigated before they become real and embarrassing issues.
Effective risk management. The Board and management need to understand, evaluate,
dimension, and measure the firm’s risks to reduce or eliminate them before they
become major disasters. The risk management process in the firm should be
enterprise-wide, proactive rather than reactive, and cover operational, country,
environmental, reputational, regulatory, and other risks affecting the particular
area in the company. Good risk management seeks to balance the cost of risk
management with potential benefits, the procedures being subject to ongoing
review by the board and management. The directors also need to report the firm’s
risk management procedures in the annual financial statements, especially how
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they identify and measure the risks, and the contingency plans in place in case of
unexpected crystallization of known and unknown risks.
Clear strategy. Strategic planning and strategy implementation are the exclusive preserve
of the top management. The board must also devote considerable attention to the
company’s strategic goals and its implementation. A clear strategy sets the limits
to what the company can and cannot do, and how it wants to be perceived by its
customers. If the strategy is clear and unambiguous, it has the power to rally
employees and set a clear path for the firm to achieve its objectives.
Social responsibility. A firm must be socially responsible, both to the host community
and to the environment. Social responsibility starts with obeying the written and
unwritten rules of the community. It also covers the company’s efforts at waste
disposal; the policy on global warming and use of recycling materials; the policies
on employment of the disabled, charitable contribution, and political donations;
and investment in the community.
Principles of Corporate Governance
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2016) defined a principle as “a moral rule or
belief that helps you know what is right and wrong, and that influences your
actions”, or “a basic truth or theory: An idea that forms the basis of something”,
or “a law or fact of nature that explains how something works or why something
happens” (The Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2016). The principles of corporate
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governance help the shareholders, management, and all other stakeholders to
know why corporate governance is important and the basis of the rules. The
Business Round Table (BRT) is an association of American CEOs of large
corporations with combined annual revenues of over $6 trillion and 14 million
employees. In 2012, the association established corporate governance principles
that all members are to adopt in their firms. The Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) also has corporate governance principles,
which were revised in 2015. Stock exchanges around the world have adopted
some of these principles as best practices. The United Nations Development
Program (UNDP) also listed characteristics of good corporate governance, which
include participation, the rule of law, transparency, equity, accountability, and
strategic vision (UNDP, 1997).
The Business Round Table principles of corporate governance. In their 2016
statement of the principles of corporate governance, the BRT identified corporate
actors, to whom the document is addressed, as the board and the shareholders, and
their relationship with the other stakeholders. They stated that the relationship
between the actors should be based on fairness and transparency, some of the
attributes of a good governance system that were earlier addressed in this study.
The firms must also be good citizens of the community where their operations
take place, and must be committed to complying with the rules and regulations of
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their host country. The BRT sees the duties of the board as one of selecting and
overseeing qualified and ethical CEOs, monitoring management performance, and
complying with the laws and corporate ethical standards. Management is to give
unbiased information to the board and be responsible for corporate planning, risk
management, and strategy setting. The shareholders are not saddled with the dayto-day administration of the corporation, but are to elect representatives to look
after their interests and receive information to make voting and investment
decisions. Perhaps, the most important point on the BRT principles is the section
on board oversight. The SOX also placed considerable emphasis on board
oversight and its independence, and the independence of board committees. The
BRT principles on board oversight are as follows:
Board composition. Directors should be elected by majority vote, and the elected
directors should come from a variety of backgrounds to guide the company
through the various stages of an increasingly complex business environment.
Board leadership. Board leadership structure cannot be the same in all organizations. The
complexity of the firm’s business, industry, ownership structure, business
environment, and area of operations dictate the type of board leadership structure
in a firm. The BRT recommends that where the positions of CEO and chair are
combined, there should be appointed an independent director as a lead director. It
is the same requirement recommended by the United Kingdom’s Cadbury
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Committee on corporate governance. The lead director would chair and
coordinate executive sessions and has the right to call meetings of the
nonexecutive directors. He or she chairs the meetings in the absence of the
chairperson of the board, reviews and approves agendas of the meetings, and
oversees performance evaluations of both the CEO and top management of the
corporation. The same recommendation is advocated in the OECD principles of
corporate governance.
Board organization. The BRT favors the use of committees to address in-depth key issues
affecting the organization that may not be accommodated in a full board meeting.
The committees supported by the BRT principles of corporate governance are as
follows:
Audit committees. The audit committee should be composed of at least three independent
directors, who are financially literate as defined in the listing particulars; at least
one member should be a financial or accounting expert. The audit committee is to
select and oversee the terms of engagement of the external auditors and see to
their independence on an ongoing basis, oversee the firm’s financial reporting and
its crucial accounting policies, judge the accuracy of its estimates, and read and
review the management letter on the state of the firm’s internal control and
reporting systems. The provisions in the PCOB established by the SOX of 2002
are similar to the audit oversight requirements of BRT principles. Apart from its
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oversight functions on the firm’s accounting and reporting systems, the committee
should also review the firm’s risk management processes; its ethical, legal, social,
and corporate code of conduct; the scope, depth, and comprehensiveness of the
internal audit plan; and the appraisal of the senior internal auditor and the key
staff, including their qualifications, independence, competence, and quality of
reports. The committee should have direct communication with the chief internal
auditor, meet frequently, and make their reports available to the full board.
Nomination committee. The committee, which should be composed only of independent
directors, should have at least three members. Its duties are to (a) recommend
director nominees to the board, (b) oversee the structure of the board, its
composition, and regular evaluation, (c put in place and review the succession
planning, (d review board policies, agenda, and processes, (e) monitor the board’s
efforts to connect and engage with all stakeholders, and (f) recommend, where
appropriate, changes to the firm’s principles of corporate governance.
Compensation committee. Some of the duties of the compensation committee may be
shared with the nomination committee, especially the duty of overseeing the
compensation of the board. Every firm should have a compensation committee to
address the important issue of remuneration in the company, especially the
compensation of top management and directors. The Cadbury Committee, the
OECD, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 recommended a compensation
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committee to be composed of independent directors. A minimum of three
directors is recommended by the Business Round Table to oversee all
compensation matters. Many researchers have also found a significant and
positive association between compensation and firm performance (Dah, 2016;
Perryman, Fernando, & Tripathy, 2016). The committee should have a
compensation scheme that links pay with performance, but should also be aware
of the incentives and motivation pay-for-performance compensation structure
affords management in terms of potential for misstatements in financial
statements and accounting fraud. The most important task for the committee is to
ensure managers’ remuneration structure establishes meaningful goals for
performance and reduces the gap between their interest and the long-term
objectives of shareholders by encouraging the managers to invest in the company.
Relationship with stakeholders. The board must establish a relationship with all
stakeholders based on equity, fairness, and trust. Although the interest of the
shareholders is paramount, other stakeholders should also be considered, and their
views taken into account as follows:
Shareholders. Firms should be responsive to shareholders’ grievances and concerns,
educate them on the policies and procedures in the company, and bring them up to
date on the role and activities of the board and the challenges facing their
company. The board should encourage the shareholders to attend meetings and
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make recommendations for the interest of the company. Effective communication
with the shareholders through annual reports, press releases, proxy statements,
and other corporate communications channels are important to get the shareholder
informed and engaged in the firm.
Employees. Many firms claim employees are their most valuable assets, yet actual
corporate practice may not reflect this sentiment in most corporations. Employees
must be treated fairly and equitably, informed of the firm’s policies and
procedures, especially concerning job responsibilities, security, and in seeking
redress if wrongfully treated. Employees must feel that they are making
meaningful contributions to their firm’s objectives and that the company values
their contributions.
Communities. The host communities provide the raw materials, labor, and a peaceful
working environment for the firm. The company must be a good corporate citizen,
contributing to community projects, promoting awareness of public health and
safety, and be seen as ethical and responsible. It is a good policy to report in the
annual financial statements the company’s policy towards the physically
challenged, the number of the physically challenged employed from the
community, recycling policies, preservation of the natural environment, and
participation in community activities.

108

Government. To be a good corporate citizen, the firm must first and foremost operate
within the law and be actively involved in the legal compliance and development
in its area of operations. Political activities should be handled very carefully. The
board needs to oversee all the firm’s political activities and contributions to
political parties. Full disclosure should also be considered in the financial
statements (BRT, 2016).
The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development/G20 principles of
corporate governance. In 2015, the OECD revised its principles of corporate
governance originally developed in 1999 and revised in 2004. The principles have
been widely adopted in many countries and have influenced several corporate
governance codes. The organization stated that corporate governance is not an end
in itself, but a means of achieving market efficiency, business confidence, and
liquid equity markets. All the G20 countries partook in the review of 2015; as
well as the Basel Committee, the Financial Stability Board, the World Bank; and
regional governance roundtables in Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and
North Africa.
The principles were in six chapters. Chapter 1 deals with the role of governance in
promoting a transparent and fair market and efficient allocation of scarce
resources. Chapter 2 of the OECD principles of corporate governance is
concerned with the rights of shareholders, their responsibilities, and how they can
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be treated equitably. The chapter emphasizes the shareholders’ rights to accurate
and timely information, and the importance of their participation in decisionmaking and in setting management remuneration. Chapter 3 deals with
institutional investors, the stock market, and other intermediaries. The need for
institutional investors to act in a fiduciary capacity in company matters is
emphasized, and the importance of disclosing information to avoid conflict of
interest with proxy advisers, analysts, brokers, and rating agencies.
Chapter 4 of the OECD principles of corporate governance focused on the role of
stakeholders in a firm’s corporate governance. Active cooperation between firms
and stakeholders is to be encouraged. Firms must respect the rights of
stakeholders recognized by law. Corporations must also give access to timely and
accurate information to all stakeholders. Chapter 5 details key areas of disclosure:
Financial and operating results, company objectives, remuneration, ownership
structure, related party transactions, and risk factors affecting the firm. Finally,
Chapter 6 focuses on the responsibility of the board. Key functions of the board
include a review of corporate strategy, selecting competent and effective CEOs,
overseeing major acquisitions and divestiture, and reviewing the firm’s risk
management procedures. Other duties include ensuring the integrity of accounting
and financial reporting, tax planning, selecting and supervising board committees,
and board evaluation and training (OECD, 2015).
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I have reviewed the history, attributes, and the principles that guide corporate
governance codes and implementation in publicly listed firms. A close look at the
different principles shows that a common thread runs through the provisions.
Foremost is the power of the board to shape whatever happens in a corporation.
When shareholders are widely dispersed, the board is charged with the
responsibility of directing the affairs of the firm by establishing control and
monitoring the top managers through various tools such as the use of committees,
reviewing the company’s performance, hiring the best professional managers for
the top jobs, and disciplining erring managers. But in practice, some boards are
manipulated by powerful CEOs, which is the reason why the law and codes of
corporate governance call for a fully independent board of directors for public
companies and for separating the position of the chair of the board from that of
the CEO (El-Faitouri, 2014; Lin, Hutchinson, & Percy, 2015; Mehrotra, 2016).
The Effect of Conflict of Interest on Firm Performance
The professional managers act as the agents of the shareholders who are the
owners of the firm. Being a paid agent, the manager could not be expected to
devote as much time, commitment, and diligence to the company’s affairs as the
owners (Smith, 2003). The separation of ownership from control is the primary
cause of agency problems and its associated costs. Some managers exploit the
situation to self-deal and make considerable gains for themselves, using price-
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sensitive information in their possession. Other managers pressure a weak board
to award huge compensation to them, higher than what the firm’s complexity and
performance justifies, and far above the industry average. Some other ways in
which the conflict of interest manifests itself in a firm are when managers post
huge short-term but unsustainable profits that could lead to massive losses in the
future. Another is when managers delay a strategic investment that may affect
short-term profit but which is good for the long-term survival and growth of the
company. Top management is prone to taking bad risks if their remuneration is
linked to short-term profit performance and a board that does not spell out what is
an acceptable and unacceptable risk (Cybinski & Windsor, 2013).
Perhaps the best example of the conflict arises during takeover battles and merger
and acquisitions negotiations. Ordinarily, the directors should advise the
shareholders objectively, disclosing their relationship with the bidders, the merit
of the proposal, and what shareholders should do given the information at the
managers’ disposal. The managers and directors should act in the best interests of
the firm and the shareholders. Gu and Hackbarth (2013) has stated that, although
governance and transparency are complements and positively and significantly
associated with firm performance, transparent firms are much more susceptible to
takeover than less transparent ones. But Quttainah (2015) stated that antitakeover
provisions are injurious to shareholders’ wealth. If anti-takeover provisions

112

damage shareholders wealth, then their presence in the articles of corporations is a
sign of weak corporate governance (Bebchuck, Cohen, & Ferrell, 2009). Bhagat
and Bolton (2013) also found a negative and significant association between
return on assets and the G-Index (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003). This
indicates that the higher the scores on the G-index, the weaker the corporate
governance practice, and the lower the firm's return on assets.
Some of the financially hurtful managerial actions in takeover situations are
greenmail, where managers buy the potential acquirers’ shares at a higher amount
than the proposed price; golden parachute, where employment contract are drawn
up to guarantee a lump sum or cash flow over a period when a manager loses his
job as a result of hostile takeover; poison pills, a cash flow right or other benefits
triggered by a hostile takeover; and overpaying for acquisitions. All these actions
are detrimental to the wealth-maximizing objective of shareholders, and
overpayment for acquisitions directly hurts them because wealth is being
transferred from the vendors to the acquirers. Transparency and objectivity are
important. But as Gu and Hackbarth (2013) found, transparent firms are more
prone to takeovers because the acquirer is more confident of the value of the
company and they will get adequate value for what they paid. The art of corporate
governance practice is for managers to know the essential information to disclose
to company stakeholders without compromising trade secrets.
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Conflict between Managers’ Attitude to Risk and Shareholders’ Need to Embrace Risk
Risks are the perfect partner of opportunity. Instead of running from risk, business
managers should embrace and exploit it. Sensible risk-taking not only gives shortterm profit, but it also gives the firm sustainable long-term growth and survival.
To embrace risk, managers must understand, assess, measure, and dimension
every aspect of a decision. Exploitation of risk requires patience, deliberation, and
hard work. Managers and analysts may be impatient for the result of risk-taking,
which may exacerbate the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders.
As Shank et al. (2013) observed, the governance-stock performance is better
studied over the long-term, as the outcomes of a risk-aversion or risk-seeking
attitude can be fully assessed over the long period.
To make substantial and long-term sustainable profit, firms must take risks in
marketing; manufacturing innovation; research and development; investment in
property, plant, and equipment; expanding overseas; and innovation in
management, operations, and control systems. All these actions are risky, and
many come with a trade-off with the current period’s profit with which managers
are judged, and the long-term profitability, which ensures survival and increase in
share price. Instead of investing for the long-term and running the risk of failure
or termination of employment due to perceived nonperformance, managers may
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devote considerable attention to short-term profit at the expense of long-term
sustainable profit and growth.
Nowhere else is the tradeoff between short-term profit and long-term growth and
survival more evident and pronounced than in funding research and development.
Managers may delay research and development (R&D) expenditures to meet
profit and sales forecast, which may hurt shareholders in the long run. El-Faitouri
(2014) noted a negative and significant association between changes in R&D
spending and Tobin’s Q, meaning that a reduction in research and development
expenditure will improve performance, but only in the short-term, but hurt longterm profitability. The tremendous growth and profitability of pharmaceutical and
other companies and the amount they devote to research and development is a
clear testimony. Jermias and Gani (2014) reported a positive and significant
correlation between growth opportunity (R&D/Sales) and firm performance.
Shortterm Profit versus Longterm Sustainable Performance
The theory that financial markets are efficient and make a good judgment of true
value of firms may not be so in practice, and certainly not in all cases. There is
evidence that managers hide information from the shareholders (Page, 2005).
Managers may also conceal or delay bad news to achieve a particular objective,
like cashing in on their stock options before releasing damaging information
about the firm. Untrue and fraudulent information is also common. It is in the
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interest of managers to exploit their information advantage, and to give out untrue
and fraudulent information to achieve their short-term interests to the detriment of
shareholders’ long-term goals. In the long-term, the agency mentality of the
managers will end up hurting them. A lackluster performance compared with
what the market expects could well mean that the managers will lose their jobs or
a smarter corporate raider will acquire the company. Dah (2016) reported a
significant and positive association between industry turnover and firm value
from the data obtained from RiskMetrics, Compusat, and ExecuComp from 2001
to 2009.
Conflict of Interest between Shareholders and Managers
The shareholders are the real risk-takers. They put equity or risk capital in the
firm and hope to make substantial profit and capital gains if all goes well. They
also stand to lose everything if the unexpected happens. In theory, shareholders
ought to have significant and overriding influence and control over managers.
According to Page (2005), the preferred corporate governance model is the one
that places the interests of shareholders above those of other stakeholders in a
capitalist society. In practice, what obtains is radically different from this
commonsense view.
While it is indisputable that shareholders’ power is a result of law, contract, and
informal rules, the board and management most often have absolute power over
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the affairs of the firms. First, stockholders are usually widely dispersed and may
not have the time, information, or willingness to form a critical mass to challenge
the directors. Secondly, management has a clear advantage; being in possession of
superior information and proxy powers, they could use the leverage to oppress the
shareholders. Thirdly, even though shareholders’ activism is becoming
established in corporate governance, what often happens in real life is for large
stockholders to sell off their entire shareholding when dissatisfied with the way
managers run the firm rather than challenging the status quo.
Conflict of interest Between Shareholders and Bondholders
Bondholders are creditors of the company, and whether the company makes a
profit or not, they have to be paid interest due on the debt and, eventually, the
original loan. The debt covenants usually require firms to do or abstain from
doing certain things, such as the prohibition to sell a property or relocate a
business or merge with another firm without the creditors’ permission. In good
times, these conditions are easily met, especially the payment of interest or
repayment of principal. But in bad times, leverage becomes very burdensome and
risky, and keeping to the agreements difficult. During economically difficult
times, the bondholders have a bigger voice in the organization.
In theory, there should be no conflict of interest between the shareholders and the
bondholders. The availability of debt in a firm’s capital structure is good for the

117

company. In many jurisdictions, the cost of debt is tax-deductible, and the effect
is to lower the cost of funds and improve the bottom line. The downside is that
overleveraged firms have more difficulty borrowing further, and when the
debt/equity ratio rises, the cost of capital increases, as creditors demand more risk
premium. Not all research findings found support for the relationship between
leverage and firm performance. Al-Najjar (2014) and Arora and Sharma (2015)
reported no or weak support for the relationship between leverage and firm
performance. Al-Najjar (2014) did not find any relationship between leverage and
firm performance in Tunisian companies, but this may be limited to the
specialized tourism industry investigated and the country where the inquiry was
done.
In practice, a conflict of interest arises when shareholders, through the managers,
take on more risky ventures that bondholders perceive as a danger to their
investment. Firms may also borrow excessively on the same assets or sell
mortgaged properties without the knowledge or permission of the debt holders.
Also, managers can exploit a bad economic condition to obtain more private
benefits, hurting both the bondholders and shareholders (Dah, 2016).
Conflict of Interest between Firms and Society
It used to be assumed that what was good for business was also good for the
society. The industrial revolution and the industries that were established in its
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wake raised the living standards of the people of England, which then spread
around the world. The concerns today are different. Substantial progress in the
reduction of poverty and want allows people to devote more time and attention to
global warming, environmental degradation caused by industrial activities, the
gap between the rich and poor, exhaustion of natural raw materials, the
intergenerational inequity, and the limits to harmful scientific advances. Themes
such as stem cell research, artificial contraceptives, transgender issues, assisted
suicide, genetically modified foods, and many other concerns, all made possible
by advances in technology, are generating fierce debates in the society.
For example, the decision of Valeant to increase its drug prices to recoup research
and development expenditure backfired and resulted in the sacking of the firm’s
CEO. The company’s business model was not only attacked in the media, but the
firm was also seen as the ugly and unacceptable face of capitalism. The
company’s pricing strategy was considered inhuman; it generated political storms,
with Hilary Clinton, the U.S. Democratic Party presidential nominee quoted as
saying, “I’m going after them” (The Economist, 2016). The U.S. Senate also
invited the management of the company to appear before it. As businesses expand
and affect the whole society, unsavory business practices will continue to be
attacked. Business managers must realize that members of the society are not just
shareholders and providers of various services to business, but are also the
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consumers of firms’ products and services. The business world must not only
listen to their voices, but also anticipate their reaction to strategic initiatives,
products and service offerings, race and gender equality, and the treatment of
those that physically challenged.
There is little doubt that industrial and scientific activities, though beneficial, have
costs associated with them. And society, ultimately, bears those costs. This is
because there is no way the societal costs can reasonably be traced and charged to
any firm in particular. Collectively, the society has to pay from the
commonwealth. Another challenge is that the decision from thousands of firms
often creates costs, which is difficult, and sometimes impossible to quantify.
These social costs are created by firms but paid by everyone in the society. Some
may argue that the tax paid by firms is adequate and sufficient for the central
government to solve the problems of the common costs. The proportionate tax on
profits is arbitrarily fixed by law and in no way represent an equitable distribution
to firms of the cost incurred in polluting the environment or in causing other
harms.
Major Areas of Focus in Corporate Governance Research
Agency problems arise whenever a principal mandates an agent to carry out
specified activities on his or her behalf. The agent sometimes exceeds the terms of
his engagement or performs so woefully as to cause losses to the principal.

120

Although the problems predated the establishment of the joint-stock companies,
the focus and attention of modern day research are on the problems in business
organizations that arise when ownership is separated from control. In any
relationship where there is cooperation or a joint effort, even though strict
principal-agent relationship does not exist, there are agency problems lurking
somewhere in the background (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Agency problems are important research focus because there are costs associated
with them. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency costs are the sum of
the cost of observing and controlling the agent’s behavior. Firms try to control
agents’ behavior by instituting controls such as budget and expenditure
restrictions, policies based on a cap on compensation, audit and internal control
systems, operating rules, and strict supervision. Jensen and Meckling stated that
there are other residual costs that may be difficult to measure or quantify. For
example, there is a cost incurred whenever the agent’s decision diverges from
those that maximizes the principal’s welfare. To minimize the cost of agency, and
to more closely align the principal’s objectives to those of the agent, research has
focused on several corporate governance mechanisms and principles. In this
section of the dissertation study, I will focus on the board of directors,
shareholders’ rights, executive compensation, audit oversight, and committees.
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The Board of Directors
The board of directors is the organ of the business. In a large corporation, the
shareholders are widely dispersed and do not have the time and professional
competence to manage the business. Professional managers are employed to run
the firm on a day-to-day basis, reporting to a board of directors as frequently as
possible. The boards of directors, the members of which have been appointed in a
general meeting by the shareholders or appointed by the board to fill a temporary
vacancy, are put in charge to monitor the activities of the company and the
behavior of the managers, and report on the stewardship of both to the
shareholders at an annual general meeting.
It would seem that the shareholders exercise considerable control over the affairs
of their companies. The nature of this control is not only ambiguous and illusory,
but may have been overstated as well. The fact is that the controls shareholders
exercise over their corporations have been weakened over the years by the wide
dispersion of share ownership, the lack of time and experience to devote to
company affairs by the owners, and the absolute control directors have over proxy
votes and other key decisions in the company. The current reality is that in the
major companies in America and Europe, shareholder control have been severely
weakened and significantly reduced because of the forces referred to above.
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The SOX and the OECD principles of corporate governance lay much emphasis
on the duties of directors, the leadership of the board, board independence, and
the role of the committees. Both in America, Europe, and the emerging markets,
corporate law and governance principles focus attention on the directors who are
the representatives of the shareholders, holding the individuals constituting the
board of directors accountable, not only to the shareholders but to all
stakeholders. This century-old governance arrangement is still the best we have,
and a better alternative has not been found for the Anglo-Saxon model. The
German and Japanese model, a two-tier board, is a variant of the one-tier board of
the British-American model, where a supervisory board is sandwiched between
the regular board and the management. The two-tier model is not without its
difficulties, especially that of coordination and lack of unity of command.
Board leadership. Board leadership refers to how the board is structured to
deliver on its objectives. Both the BRT and OECD corporate governance
principles favor a board structure in which the role of the CEO is separated from
that of the chairperson. If the roles are combined, it is recommended that a leaderdirector, who is selected from independent members of the board, be appointed.
The leader-director will be a senior member of the board and will function to
minimize some of the considerable power the chairperson/CEO wields.
Combining the positions of chair and CEO, named CEO duality, without the
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necessary safeguards may affect the functioning of the board and the firm. Zona
(2016) discovered a positive and significant association between a firm’s research
and development intensity and CEO duality. But Bhagat and Bolton (2013)
reported a negative and significant association between CEO duality and ROA.
In takeover situations, CEO duality may lead to wrong and self-serving advice
from the board to the shareholders. Bhagat and Bolton (2013) and Knockaert,
Bjornali, and Erikson (2015) noted a negative and significant relationship
between CEO duality and firm performance. Knockaert et al. reported a negative
and significant association between CEO duality and board service involvement.
It means that a powerful CEO somehow prevents the board members to get
involved in the firm’s affairs, leading to poor company performance. Bhagat and
Bolton documented a negative and significant relationship between CEO duality
and the E-index, the entrenchment index, that is an abridged version of the Gindex (Gompers et al., 2003). Not all researchers found a negative association
between these variables. Rashid and Islam (2013) reported that CEO duality
affects performance, but too many market imperfections limit the explanatory
power of the variables in Malaysia, an emerging economy.
Board size. There is no absolute size for a board of directors. The appropriate size
depends on many factors such as the size of the firm, the complexity of its
operations, the experience of its members, and the age of the company since
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incorporation. Size could be both a strength and liability for the company. The
bigger the size of the board, the more likely is the experience and quality of the
members of the board, and the greater its diversity. Unwieldy size would increase
bottlenecks, bureaucracy, and bickering in the board of directors, and slows down
decisions that may adversely affect performance. Research findings have revealed
positive and significant associations between board size and performance,
measured by Tobin’s Q, return on assets, and return on capital employed (Kouki
& Guizani, 2015; Xie & Fukumoto, 2013).
Other research findings reported a negative and significant association between
performance and board size (Jermias & Gani, 2014; Nath, Islam, & Saha, 2015).
Knockaert et al. (2015) stated that board size did not moderate the relationship
between top management team and board service involvement in Norwegian
universities and public research institutes. This means that board size has no
effect on the involvement of the members of the board in the affairs of the
institutions. White, Woidtker, Black, and Schweitzer (2014) also posited that the
likelihood of appointing a business expert unto the board decreases with the size
of the board.
Board independence. If the board is to control, advice, and monitor the behavior
of managers, the independence of each member cannot be compromised. While
the corporate governance principles call for formal independence, independence is
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essentially an attitude of mind. For the board to be seen as formally independent,
the majority of the members must not be past or present employees of the firm, or
employees of a significant shareholder, who owns 5% or more of the ordinary
stock of the company, or the relatives of present or past director, past auditor, or a
large shareholder (Quttainah, 2015; Tai et al., 2013). Independence of the board
has a significant effect on the quality of board deliberations, the power of its
recommendations, the impact of its controls on the CEO and entire management,
and the extent of its contribution to the firm’s strategic planning agenda. Some
research findings suggested that the impact of board independence on firm
performance is situation-specific. Bhagat and Bolton (2013) noted that board
independence was negatively associated with return on assets pre-2002, before the
passage of SOX of 2002, and positively associated post-2002, after the passage of
the Act.
Dah (2016) also reported board independence and management entrenchment
positive and significant post-SOX. The independence of the board was weaker
before the Act of 2002 was passed, as it was the tradition at the time for the board,
and especially the CEO, to handpick directors loyal to them. The various research
findings were mixed. Sun, Lan, and Ma (2014) discovered a weaker association
between board independence and firm performance post-SOX of 2002. But
Adewuyi and Olowookere (2013) noted the increase in the proportion of outside,
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independent directors, was associated with good corporate governance change.
Liu et al. (2015) and Leung et al. (2015) reported a positive and significant
relationship between board independence and firm performance. Also, Liu et al.
(2015) documented a positive association between board independence and
organizational performance. Sun at al., (2014) found board independence
negatively and significantly associated with firm performance before the SOX Act
of 2002.
Board diversity. Board diversity refers to the number of female directors on the
board. For several decades, men dominated boards of directors in Europe and the
US. But the situation is changing as research into board structure confirms the
advantages of having women on board. Women constitute a large percentage of
the work force, and many pursue careers in management, engineering, and in
other fields of human endeavor. Women also buy firms’ products for themselves
and the entire household. It stands to good reason that women’s views and voices
are essential and needed on the board of directors. Lucas-Perez, Minguez-Vera,
Baixauli-Solar, Martin-Ugedo, and Sanchez-Marin (2014) reported a positive and
significant association between women on board and the variable pay of
managers. An equitable payment structure increases employees’ satisfaction,
which may enhance their loyalty and firm performance. Isidro and Sobral (2015)
reported no statistical evidence of a direct relationship between women on board
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and the value of the firm, but a positive and significant association between firm
performance and the indirect effect of women on the board of directors.
Board meetings. The members of the board of directors typically meet once in a
quarter to deliberate on the progress of the company. Meetings may be more
frequent during an economic crisis and when takeover battles are being fought.
Corporate governance principles lay emphasis on attendance at meetings and
making positive and objective contributions as board and committee members.
The board is charged with the responsibility of overseeing the firm’s strategic
planning, the risk management process, the audit function, and top management
remuneration. These tasks are accomplished during meetings of the members of
the board. Board meetings represent a major part of corporate life where decisions
on the vision and strategy of the firm take place.
The frequency of these meetings, the quality of the deliberations in them, and the
positive impact on organizational management of the decision taken in them, have
far reaching effects on corporate performance. Al-Matar et al. (2014) documented
a positive and significant association between board’s frequency of meetings and
Tobin’s Q. Sahu and Manna (2013) also discovered a positive and significant
association between board meetings and annual stock returns, net profit, and
market value added (MVA). Pugliese et al. (2014) found board monitoring to be
positively and significantly associated with the past performance of firms. Mishra
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and Mohanty (2013) also found that board effectiveness improves return on
assets. While a well-planned and productive meetings increase board monitoring
and effectiveness, an unproductive meeting or meetings that only rubber-stamp
CEO’s proposals would likely have a negative impact on profitability and
corporate value. Many researchers have found a negative and significant
relationship between the number of board meetings and firm performance
(Jermias & Gani, 2014; Mehrotra, 2016). An unproductive meeting could well
lead to weaker company valuation (Jermias & Gani, 2016).
Shareholders’ Rights
The shareholders, being the owners of the business, ought to have control over the
affairs of the firm through their appointed representatives. Sometimes, the control
may be more apparent than real. The rights of the shareholders are enshrined in
the company’s law and the articles of the association of the firm. But due to the
inability of the shareholders to exercise adequate controls over the affairs of the
company, the power to force the directors to do what is in the stockowners’
interests are severely curtailed.
The legal model in most countries has always regarded the shareholders’ interests
as exclusive and supreme, all other rights and interests in the firm are satisfied at
their pleasure. But these rights and privileges may not be more apparent than real
in practice. Shareholders are widely dispersed, and they neither have the time nor
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the experience to manage the business. They employ managers who are more
interested in self-interest and self-preservation. Even the board of directors
appointed to monitor the managers may do a poor job and may not devote enough
time and attention to the affairs of the business. The law still upholds the
supremacy of shareholders’ right: Anything the firm does should be in the
furtherance of the objective to maximize returns to the stockholders. The
American case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. (1919) succinctly illustrated this
point. The court held that it was wrong for the management to limit dividend
payments to the shareholders by lowering the price of their cars to increase
employment and spread the benefits to employees (Richardson, 2002).
Seeing the futility of the strict application of the legal model in the modern firm,
the corporate governance model recognizes other important actors beside the
shareholders. Even within the shareholders as a group, there are challenges. For
example, the Companies and Allied Matters Act of 2009 in Nigeria gives majority
shareholders the right to buy off minority shareholders in a hostile takeover after
certain conditions have been met. Rashid and Islam (2013) noted that majority
shareholders sometimes expropriate minority shareholders in Malaysia. Francis,
Hassan, and Wu (2013) stated that cumulative stock returns to be significantly
and positively associated with accounting conservatism that may benefit the
shareholders but harm the interest of other stakeholders.
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In summary, the directors are required by law to maximize the interest of
shareholders, the interests being defined purely in financial terms. In looking
exclusively after the interests of the shareholders, managers seek to maximize the
value of the firm, after satisfying all claims, such as those of creditors, finance
providers, employees’ agreed wages, and costs of other inputs and services. In
other words, maximizing the value of the company is equivalent to profit
maximization. Whatever the managers do should, theoretically, contribute to the
profit maximization objective since the stock market is assumed to be efficient by
theory of Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). The wealth of shareholders is
rarely maximized because markets are not efficient in the strong sense. Also,
information exists that is known only to company managers and markets cannot
take account of this in pricing the shares. Other institutional arrangements, like
entrenched CEOs, large shareholders, and proxy votes may also impact company
performance and wealth maximization.
Executive Compensation
The board of directors determines the firm’s executive compensation, which may
be a combination of cash and stock options. The remuneration of the top
management should be high enough to attract the smartest and the most able
applicant to the company, but not too high that it may amount to unfair
exploitation of the shareholders, but also not woefully inadequate as to deter good
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applicants. Executive compensation should reflect the complexity and risk of an
employee’s duty and the expected performance targets. The performance goals
must be meaningful and achievable and should not be perceived as punitive.
Usually the board’s remuneration committee decides on executive compensation
and takes their recommendations to the board for approval.
Alves, Couto, and Francisco (2016) found the presence of a remuneration
committee in a firm positively and significantly associated with CEO pay in
Portugal. This means that executive pay tends to increase with the presence of a
remuneration committee. Al-Matar et al. (2014) documented a positive but
nonsignificant relationship between executive compensation and firm
performance. Sila, Gonzalez, and Hagendiorff (2016) discovered no evidence of
a relationship between the proportion of female directors and executive
compensation. Alves et al. (2016) reported a negative and significant association
between independent members of the board and CEO remuneration. Independent
members of the board tend to reduce the total remuneration paid of the company’s
CEO. This may be good or bad for the company depending on the industry
practice in a particular context and the impact of executive pay in attracting
talents to the organization.
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Audit Oversight
The law requires that a company should prepare its financial statements and have
it audited at least once a year. It is also a requirement for all public companies to
have the account and other reports read out to the shareholders in an annual
general meeting. For example, the Nigeria’s Companies and Allied Matters Act of
2009, in Sections 357 to 369 set out the rules for the appointment of auditors,
their qualifications, remuneration, duties and powers, attendance at the annual
general meetings, and resignation. The codes of corporate governance in Nigeria
and the Nigeria’s Financial Reporting Council (FRC) make it mandatory for the
board to oversee the work of the auditors. In the U.S., the PCAOB established
under the SOX is a government agency that performs the same function for public
companies.
The oversight function of the board with regard to the audit of the financial
statements is discharged through the audit committee of the board. The BRT
principles of corporate governance require that audit committee be composed
entirely of independent directors and with at least three members. At least one of
the members must be an expert in finance and accounting. Information for
decision-making is important to all of the company’s stakeholders. The
shareholders, the financial analysts, the creditors, and the bondholders all need
information to make informed decisions. The Cadbury Committee on the
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Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance noted that the weakness in the
financial reporting arose from the use of different accounting methods applied to
what are essentially the same transactions in different companies (The Cadbury
Committee, 1990).
To prevent accounting irregularities and fraud, like using off-balance sheet and
special purpose vehicles to hide losses as was done in Enron and many other
companies, the board through the audit committee must supervise the auditors.
This is done by reviewing the audit plan, attending to auditors’ queries, and
asking managers to provide timely and accurate response to the auditors’
enquiries. The committee must also review key areas of financial disclosure,
operating results, related party transactions, and risk factors as highlighted in the
financial statements.
Audit committees, no matter the degree of their independence and proficiency,
cannot completely prevent audit failures or eliminate accounting fraud in its
entirety. The primary responsibility of auditors is to report to members, but in
practice, auditors are appointed by the shareholders on the recommendation of the
directors, who are also empowered by the members at the annual general meeting
to fix the auditor’s remuneration. This arrangement, although convenient and
efficient, is highly unsatisfactory. The loyalty of the auditors most of the time is to
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the members of the board, and if other services are provided, like consultancy and
special reviews, the loyalty may be total, stumping all other safeguards.
The Enron scandal and the collapse of its auditors, Arthur Andersen, may be seen
as a leadership failure or as a clannish organizational culture taken too far; but the
signs were all there to see if one looked well enough (Carter & Greer, 2013).
Arthur Andersen provided Enron with audit and several other financial services.
The closeness between the directors of Enron and the partners of the accounting
firm did not allow a healthy skepticism that auditors should have, and the caution
they should take in arriving at their audit opinion (Pugliese et al. 2014). The board
of Enron failed to oversee the work of the auditors, and the audit committee did
not exercise the required due diligence.
In Nigeria and many other countries, the auditors are required specifically to
introduce a paragraph in their audit report on the respective responsibilities of
auditors and directors. While the directors are responsible for the preparation of
the financial statements, the duty of the auditors is to form an opinion on the
accounts and reports as prepared and presented by the directors. Nevertheless,
most directors in Nigeria do not behave as if they understand the import of these
statements.
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Committees
Board time is limited, and there are many issues that cannot be comprehensively
deliberated upon in a full board meeting. A committee is the most efficient and
effective forum to discuss matters in-depth and find solutions to the company’s
problems. In this dissertation study, I will highlight the work of the audit,
compensation, and nomination committees. These are the subcommittees of the
board, and their reports go to it for approval and action.
Audit committee. The audit committee is a subcommittee of the board. The BRT
principles of good corporate governance require that at least three independent
directors be appointed to the committee, who are experienced and knowledgeable
about the business. In Nigeria, the law requires six members, at least three of who
will be independent, representing the shareholders. An independent director will
be nominated as the chairperson. At least one of the members of the committee
must be a financial or an accounting expert. The committee recommends to the
board the selection and retention of the external auditors, deliberates on an
ongoing basis the independence of the auditors, oversees the critical aspects of the
firm’s accounting and disclosure requirements, and carries out risk assessment
and procedures of the firm. Other functions of the audit committee are oversight
of the system of internal controls in the company, disaster recovery readiness
procedures, and internal audit function. A direct communication between the
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committee and the chief internal auditor is also desired and recommended. The
committee should also deliberate on the merit and demerits of hiring former
auditors and their staff and the potential conflict of interest this recruitment may
entail.
Audit committee independence, number of meetings, and size. Hassan and Naser
(2013) noted a negative association between the proportion of independent
members of the audit committee and audit fees. The size of the audit committee, if
unwieldy, may affect the performance of the firm by making the meetings a forum
for arguments and nothing else. Jermias and Gani (2014) documented that the size
and number of meetings of the audit committee had a negative and significant
association with Tobin’s Q. On the other hand, Leung et al. (2014) noted that the
effect of family ownership on the relationship between audit committee
independence and performance of family firms mixed.
Compensation committee. This subcommittee of the board should, ideally, be
composed of nonexecutive and independent directors only. They duty of the
committee is to address the firm’s compensation and remuneration issues. The
committee, according to the BRT’s recommendations should (a) oversee every
aspect of remuneration and compensation structure in the firm, (b) recommend to
the board the appropriate performance goals against which top management
should be judged, (c) put systems and procedures in place to link remuneration
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with goals, (d) ensure that part of the remuneration of directors and senior
managers are performance-driven and that the rules are clear and fair, (e) establish
goals that are meaningful, objective, and easy to measure, (f) be aware of
incentives that may lead to dysfunctional behaviors, (g) understand all aspects of
executive compensation, taking into account industry standards, (h) attempt to
link the interest of managers to those of shareholders through compensation
packages, and (i) advise the board and the auditors on disclosure aspects of
executive compensation (The BRT, 2015).
Nomination committee. The nomination committee should have at least three
directors and the members must be external directors who are independent from
the firm (BRT, 2015). The committee deals with the important subjects of
nominations to the board of directors and other corporate governance matters. The
work of the committee sometimes overlaps with that of the compensation
committee. The directors are recognized in law and practice as the organ of the
business, and are made responsible for the acts of their firms. They also set the
agenda for the company, determine its strategy and determine how they want
customers, suppliers, financiers, and the general public to perceive the firm and its
activities.
It is important to carefully select men and women who will occupy this position
from time to time. The duties of the committee are (a) recommend to the board
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persons who are qualified both academically and ethically for board nomination
(b) study the composition, structure, and independence of the board and make
recommendations, (c) oversee the firm’s top management succession planning
and ensure that it is adequate and appropriate to the needs of the firm, (f) ensure
the board continues to play a leadership role in the firm, monitor and safeguard
the integrity and independence of the board, (e) review the board’s policies and
procedures, (f) review the relationship between the firm and its stakeholders to
ensure the later are treated fairly and equitably, and (g) ensure good working
relationship between the chairman of the board, the CEO, and other directors.
Financial Performance
The overriding objective of a business is to maximize the wealth of its
shareholders. Maximization of the wealth of the shareholders means the firm will
make adequate and sustainable profit, generate enough cash flow to run the
operations, pay dividends, and retain the rest for research and development and
future investment. A firm’s financial performance continues to be the yardstick
for measuring the efficiency of management and the effectiveness of the use of
corporate assets. Any other objective of the firm is subordinate to the financial
objectives because the business must survive and thrive to compensate
employees, contribute to the community, and pay taxes.
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The wealth or profit maximization objective of the firm has come under severe
criticisms. According to Jensen and Meckling (1982), many commentators have
accused corporations for several antisocial activities in the guise of profit
maximization, including behaving irresponsibly, using excessive profit to bribe
government officials, polluting the environment, destabilizing foreign
governments, and discriminating when hiring, especially against women,
minorities, and the disabled. As Smith (2003) stated, making profit is ethical and
justifiable. Friedman (1970) stated that the social responsibility of business is to
make profit, without it investors will not put in their money and take the risks that
they will be compensated with adequate returns. The profit maximization
philosophy is only considered from the point of view of economic efficiency, but
social welfare maximization theory states that individuals are free to pursue other
interests apart from maximization of wealth. Nevertheless, companies are
appraised and rated first and foremost on their financial performance. The
financial performance metrics that will be examined in this section of the
dissertation are ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s Q. These are the performance measures
that will be used in the analysis of the results.
Return on Assets (ROA). ROA measures the efficiency with which an asset is
used during the period. It is through the assets that a company generates its profit.
Baulkaran (2014) defined return on assets as the ratio of EBITD and the total
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assets of the firm. Some analysts prefer this measurement due to its neutrality to
tax and depreciation treatments, and the company’s source of financing, whether
debt or equity. Liu et al. (2015) defined return on assets as operating income
before extraordinary income divided by total assets. Extraordinary incomes are
not recurrent by nature; they do not arise from normal operations. An example of
income of an extraordinary nature is a gain from sale or divestment of a business
or compensation paid to a company by a foreign government that expropriated its
assets. Extraordinary items are not recurrent, they are once off; including them in
the computation of return on assets will make comparison between one period and
the other difficult. The ratio will not be comparable to that of other firms, which
do not have the same extraordinary income during the period.
Many empirical accounting studies have focused on earnings research,
investigating the association between corporate governance mechanisms and
return on assets (Adewuyi & Olowookere, 2013; Alipour, 2013; Dalwai,
Basirudden, & Rasid, 2015). But as Mattessich (1995) remarked, accounting
ratios like return on assets are not without problems. First of all, the extent to
which management can manipulate earnings depends on whether they can select
accounting methods to manage earnings without problems from the auditors.
Secondly, earnings announcements have information content that the market rely
on, and when those earnings figures are not in line with forecasts, the market
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reacts in a negative way, which may lower the share price and the value of the
company. The IFRS and the accountancy bodies have imposed uniform
accounting rules and treatments for similar transactions in many jurisdictions.
This is to ensure that accounting ratios such as return on assets can be relied upon.
Audit oversight provided by the audit committees will also reduce the disparity
between financial statements of firms reporting similar transactions.
An important consideration is whether the highest degree of ethics has been
observed in the preparation of the financial statements from which the researchers
compute the ratios. According to Stuart, I., Stuart, B., and Pedersen (2014), the
important considerations are (a) when and how the directors recognized revenue
in the financial statements, as the amount of revenue recognized should not be
below what the directors expect to collect as cash, (b) how the current and longterm liabilities have been recognized and recorded, and (c) whether there was
distinction between operating and finance leases. Several other issues affect the
figures in the financial statements that have important implications for earnings.
Some of these issues are the company’s depreciation policy, accounting treatment
of defined benefits pension plans, the decision to recognize losses in a subsidiary,
treatment of stock options, purchased goodwill accounting, patents and copyright,
and restructuring expenses. All these accounting issues have different effects on
return on assets.

142

Schroeder, Clark, and Cathey (2014) remarked that some adjustments are
necessary to improve return on assets, such as making adjustments incorporating
the effect of off-balance sheet financing. Nevertheless, return on assets is
frequently used as a measure of a firm’s performance. For example, Chen (2015)
discovered that, return on assets, defined as net income standardized by the firm’s
total assets in the previous year, have a positive but nonsignificant relationship
with a firm’s access to finance, while negatively and significantly related to
private ownership, and positively and non-significantly associated with foreign
ownership. Sila, Gonzalez, and Hagendorff (2016) defined return on assets as the
earnings before taxation divided by the book value of total assets. Sila et al.
(2016) found a negative and significant association between total, systematic, and
idiosyncratic risks and return on assets. A firm’s return on assets tends to decrease
as more risks are taken. The more debts that are added to the firm’s capital
structure, the higher the risks, and the cost of funding may be so high as to reduce
the firm's profit.
Balsmeier, Buchwald, and Stiebale (2014) carried out a research study on German
companies on the impact of outside directors on return on assets. Their definition
of return on assets was net income after taxes divided by total assets. The earnings
figure was taken after corporate tax, and thus the differential tax incidence on
firms of similar size and profitability was not considered (Schroeder et al., 2014).
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Alipour (2013) documented a negative and significant association between return
on assets and ownership structure and state ownership in 60 nonfinancial
companies listed on the Tunisian Stock Exchange. Adewuyi and Olowookere
(2013) also used return on assets as a measure of corporate performance. They
found a positive and significant relationship between a good governance change
that is an increase in the number of independent directors and in the independence
of the board and audit committees, and splitting the board leadership between the
CEO and an independent director as chairperson, and return on assets. The
research studies mentioned above and many more like them show that analysts
and researchers alike consider return on assets a good measure of corporate
performance despite the conceptual and theoretical challenges described above.
Return on Capital Employed (ROCE). Like ROA, ROCE uses earnings as the
numerator of the performance ratio. Accountants measure capital employed in a
firm in a variety of ways. While some use net assets as the denominator (after
deducting current and long-term liabilities from total assets), others include debt
and bonds. The classical accounting equation remains assets equals liabilities plus
equity. Liabilities and equities make a claim on the enterprise’s assets whereas
equity is an ownership interest. Liabilities are claims of creditors, some of who
receive priority treatment in liquidation and insolvency situations. For decisionmaking and disclosure purposes, assets, equity, and liabilities are listed separately.
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According to the entity theory, there is little to no difference between liabilities
and equities (Schroeder et al., 2014). The accounting equation in the entity theory
is assets equal equities. Both debt and equities are compensated by interests and
dividends respectively, even though dividends are not mandatory and can be
deferred or not paid at all, except for cumulative preference shares, but interest on
debts is accrued and paid whether or not the firm is making profits.
Under the proprietary theory, the net assets of the firm belong to the owners, the
shareholders. The net asset is equal to the equity in the firm, and it is also the
equity of the owners, or what is termed as shareholders’ funds in Nigeria. The
accounting equation under this theory becomes assets less liabilities equal equity.
In the preparation of financial statements under the IFRS and the pronouncement
of the Auditing Practices Board in their Statement Number 4, “Basic Concepts
and Accounting Principles Underlying Financial Statements of Business
Enterprises” (Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB, 1970), the above
accounting equation is implicit (Schroeder et al., 2014). Also, the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in Statements of Accounting Concepts
Number 6 defined liabilities and equity in accordance with the propriety theory:
Liabilities are future economic benefits given up in exchange for current or past
transactions, and equities are the residual interest in assets belonging to the
owners after deducting the firm’s liabilities (FASB, 1970).

145

Return on equity is sometimes treated as if it is equivalent to return on capital
employed. The book value of equity is different from the book value of capital
employed. The capital structure of a firm might include equity and long-term
debt, such as bonds, loans, and preference shares. Some preference shares are like
long-term debts in all respects and many others are not too different from equity.
The accounting treatment is also different, and sometimes, very complicated when
preference shares are convertible to equity at the happening of specific events.
The trigger for the events that makes conversion possible may be set up by
conditions not under the control of management, and thus unpredictable. Return
on capital employed measures the efficiency with which the firm uses all of its
capital, whether liabilities or equity.
Return on capital employed, as defined in this study, equals EBITDA divided by
the total capital employed. EBITDA does not take account of debt levels and
taxes, which will be different from firm to firm. Total capital employed is a
combination of equity and long-term debt in the capital structure of the firm. The
return on capital employed measures the results of operations relative to the
amount of capital used in generating the earnings. Compared to return on assets,
return on capital may be a more appropriate measure for investors that desire to
beat the market.
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Return on capital employed and return on equity have been used as measures of
company performance in research studies. The return on equity considers only the
returns to shareholders without considering creditors. Where there is no debt in a
corporation, the two measures give the same answer. The ratio will be lower the
more debt is in the capital structure of the firm. Sun et al. (2014) documented a
positive and significant association between return on equity and the growth in
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Whaba (2013) also reported a positive and
significant relationship between CEO duality and return on equity. Alipour (2013)
found a negative and significant association between ownership concentration and
return on equity in companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. What these
research findings show is that the measures of firm performance have a lot in
common, and they are essentially measuring the same things, although from
different conceptual and theoretical viewpoints.
Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q ratio was named after the great James Tobin, the Yale
University Nobel Prize winner in economics who stated that the cost of
replacement of a firm’s assets is about the same value as its market value. The
ratio is equal to the market value of the company’s equity divided by the cost of
replacement of its tangible fixed assets, that is the market value of the installed
capacity divided by the replacement cost of the installed capacity. According to
the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), the price of securities fully reflects all
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publicly available information. If the EMH is valid in the strong sense, the Q ratio
should hover around one, and any increase above and decrease below one will
quickly be brought to equilibrium by market forces. But as Scott (2009) noted,
share prices may not fully react to financial information immediately, and
abnormal securities prices may prevail for some time. Market imperfection could
cause information in the financial statements to be interpreted incorrectly, leading
to opportunity for arbitrage.
Any value of the Q ratio above one means the firm is efficiently utilizing its assets
and should buy more to increase shareholder’s wealth. A ratio less than one
signals to management or a predator that the company is undervalued and a
candidate for a takeover. Some analysts have attacked the theoretical basis and
assumptions of Tobin’s concept. Roche (2015) stated that there are problems
associated with determining the replacement cost of assets, and many analysts
assume the book value should be a close approximation. In a highly inflationary
economy, this assumption may be incorrect. Lewellen and Badrinath (1997)
proposed a better measure of asset replacement costs by properly understanding
the purchase history of the assets. For a large corporation, this may be a difficult
task. Also, Roche did not believe that a ratio above one indicates overvaluation or
undervaluation for a ratio below one: Everything depends on the firm context, and
the economy in which the firm is operating.
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The rational question is why firms don’t act quickly to exploit the differences
between the firm’s market value and the replacement costs of its assets (Smith,
2015). The reasons are many, but two are the heterogeneity of capital and
monopoly rents. According to Powell (2010), capital is not only heterogeneous,
but multi-specific as well. The problem for the economists is how the capital can
be aggregated and summed together since their value derives from firm-specific
intention for the capital goods. A computer may be a capital good if used in a
business, but it will be classified as consumption good if used at home for movies
and video games. In summary, summing-up and aggregating the monetary costs
of these goods will be valid only if the heterogeneous plans of the actors are
perfectly coordinated (Powell, 2010). And if a firm can earn monopoly rent with
the present investment, there may be no motivation to invest more.
The possibility of monopoly rent is also one of the reasons why firms do not
respond quickly or at all to an apparent overvaluation as evidenced by Tobin’s Q
ratio. According to Harvey (2013), all rents are based on monopoly power. It is
the ability to extract excessive value from a consumer based on the uniqueness or
scarcity of the product or service. The scarcity or uniqueness could be due to a
technical innovation or marketing and advertising power that create an illusion of
doing well (Harvey, 2013). Firms may not border much about overvaluation if
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they could use scarce resources to create a monopoly situation, sometimes
pressurizing governments to achieve this aim (OECD, 2002).
Nevertheless, Tobin’s Q is used to evaluate capital expenditure decisions. There
has also been an expansion in the use of the ratio in research examining the
association between corporate governance and firm performance (Bhagat &
Bolton, 2013; Jermias & Gani, 2014; O’Reilly, Caldwell, Christman, & Doerr,
2014). Other uses of Tobin’s Q are in evaluating the performance of managers
and decisions on divestment.
Baulkaran (2014) defined Tobin’s Q as the market value of common and
preferred stocks plus the book value of debt divided by the firm’s total assets. ElFaitouri (2014) calculated the ratio as total assets minus book value of equity, plus
market value of equity, divided by the total assets. In a study of CEOs and board
characteristics of Thai family firms, Sitthipongpanich and Polsiri (2015) measured
Tobin’s Q as the ratio of market value of total assets to book value of total assets.
In all these studies, the proxy for the replacement cost of total assets was the book
value of total assets. These values may not be the same, and could depend on the
economy and the inflation rate prevailing at the time of measurement. Book value
of assets also depends on each firm’s accounting policies, especially the
accounting basis for charging depreciation and amortization.
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El-Faitouri (2014) added liabilities to the market of equity in the numerator, agreeing
with the propriety theory that holds that the firm belongs to the owners, and the
accounting equation then becomes equity plus liabilities equal assets. This is
precisely the case in family-controlled firms, especially in developing and
emerging countries.
Many researchers considered Tobin’s Q as a market-based measurement, different
from measures such as return on assets and return on capital employed that are
accounting measures of firm performance (Baulkaran, 2014; Bhagat & Bolton,
2013; Sun et al., 2013; Wahba, 2014). Wahba (2014) regarded Tobin’s Q and
other profitability measures such as return on assets and return on capital
employed as complements rather than substitutes, there being no evidence that
either type is a better measure than the other, and both types of performance
metrics contain useful information about market power, profitability, and
efficiency.
Endogenous issues may arise when a market-based measure is used as the
outcome variable and investment opportunity is the independent variable (Sun et
al., 2013), as a market-based measure focuses on investment opportunity set. For
example, a Q ratio below one is a sign to potential investors that the firm is
undervalued, and buying it could be profitable. A ratio greater than one, on the
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other hand, means the stock is overvalued and it is profitable to sell the stock.
Investment opportunity and Tobin’s Q are highly correlated.
Baulkaran (2014) noted that voluntary corporate governance best practices lead to
higher Tobin’s Q ratio in 218 firms quoted on the S&P Toronto Stock Exchange
Composite Index. Poutziousis, Savva, and Hadjielias (2014) reported that
ownership concentration in firms quoted on the London Stock Exchange (LSE)
Financial Times FTSE Index between 1998 and 2008 negatively and significantly
associated with Tobin’s Q. Alipour (2013) also discovered a negative and
significant association between ownership concentration and ROA in the listed
companies on the Tehran stock exchange. Alipour documented a positive and
significant correlation between ownership concentration and return on equity,
which also is a measure of market performance. The research findings in are
mixed when the relationship between Tobin’s and corporate governance
mechanisms were examined.
According to Adewuyi and Olowookere (2013), the shareholding of directors is
positively and significantly associated with Tobin’s Q. Yeh and Kuo (2015)
reported that directors’ shareholding to be non-linearly associated with firm
performance. Sun et al. (2014) reported a positive and significant relationship
between company performance and directors’ shareholding, concluding that
directors with shares have the required incentive to maximize shareholder value
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and firm performance. Yeh (2014) also noted that large shareholders’ proposals
are positively and significantly related to market value, as the market reacts more
favorably to their proposal announcement than those of small shareholders.
Evaluating the Corporate Governance Structure of a Firm
Corporate governance structure needs to be assessed and reviewed periodically to
ensure that the mechanisms are still effective and appropriate to the firm. As
many researchers have stated, what works are different from firm to firm, from
industry to industry, from country to country, and from period to period (Almadi,
2015; Nath, Islam, & Saha, 2015; Poutziouris et al. 2014). To evaluate a firm’s
corporate governance structure, the analysts use qualitative factors to make a
sense of what may not be seen. The elements for analysis are found in documents
and declarations, like in financial statements, press releases, conferences,
employees’ handbook, policy statements, and seminars organized by the
company.
The analyst must understand the context of the corporation; including its history,
ownership, capital structure, locations, leadership styles, organizational culture,
and products and services; as well as research and development activities. These
factors play a decisive role in corporate governance systems as they affect the
firm’s complexity, the type of directors that are attracted to the company, and the
issues and challenges the firm faces. Understanding the company context is very
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important because corporate governance principles and codes do not have the
same impact in all companies in equal measure. The analyst must understand the
context of the corporation; including its history, ownership, capital structure,
locations, leadership styles, organizational culture, and products and services; as
well as research and development activities. These factors play a decisive role in
corporate governance systems as they affect the firm’s complexity, the type of
directors that are attracted to the company, and the issues and challenges the firm
faces. Understanding the company context is very important because corporate
governance principles and codes do not have the same impact in all companies in
equal measure.
Independence of the Board
If the board is not independent, it will function only to rubber-stamp the decisions
of management. The analysts must evaluate the leadership structure and
composition of the board of directors. Ideally, the majority of the members of the
board should be independent, to have the motivation to look critically into the
activities of the management (Quttainah, 2015; Tai et al. 2013). The firm’s share
structure is another area that indicates whether the board is independent or not. If
there are multiple voting classes or if some shareholders have more voting power
than their cash flow rights, it is an indication that the board may lack
independence of action (Eklund, Palmberg, & Wiberg, 2013).
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The leadership of the board is another matter for corporate governance analysts to
evaluate in determining its degree of independence. The OECD and the BRT
principles of corporate governance recommend creating the position of a lead
director when the office of the CEO and the chairperson is combined in one
person. The danger to the company is that CEO duality may lead to a CEO who
will exploit his power to the detriment of the shareholders. Kouki and Guizani
(2015), Miller and Yang (2015), and Wahba (2014) reported that CEO duality
was negatively and significantly associated with a firm’s performance.
Poutziouris et al. (2014) found a positive and significant association between
CEO duality and company performance. Xie and Fukumoto (2013) did not find
any relationship between CEO duality and firm performance non-significant in
Japanese companies. The results of these findings have not been consistent in all
countries.
Tsai et al. (2013) reported a positive and significant association between board
independence and Tobin’s Q. The independence of the board increases when the
majority of the directors are independent. When a director owns shares in the
company, agency theory predicts that the director, being a part owner, will devote
his or her attention to the affairs of the firm. Adewuyi and Olowookere (2013)
stated that director shareholding and exposure to debt are significantly associated
with bad governance changes. The reason for the relationship between the
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directors’ shareholding and bad governance changes is that directors may use the
opportunity of their seat on the board and their considerable shareholding to
extract better returns than the cash flow rights to which their share ownership
entitles them. Some of the ways directors with significant shareholding exploit
their position, such as engaging directly in the company’s contracts or using
hidden, price-sensitive information, to their advantage. In contrast to Adewuyi
and Olowookere Sun and Ma (2014) reported that the coefficient of the
interaction between CEO shareholding and investment intensity positive and
significant. If the CEO has substantial shareholding, which constitutes a large
proportion of his or her investment, it is likely that this will be a motivation to do
the best for the company.
No matter the range of experience possessed by the members, the board may need
to hire advisers from time to time for consultation regarding legal, ethical,
business, environmental, and regulatory issues. The power to hire outside
consultants independent of the CEO and management is an indication of the
independence of the board. Directors should also be able to meet members of the
management, especially the chief internal auditor and the Chief Finance Officer,
without the approval of the CEO. The ability to hold meetings and consultations
between nonexecutive directors and take decisions is also a measure of the
independence of the board of directors.
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Accountability of the Board of Directors
The members of the board of directors are the representatives of the shareholders.
The relationship between the shareholders and each board member is both legal
and contractual. The Companies’ Acts in many jurisdictions require each
incorporated company to have at least two directors. For example, Section 246 of
the Nigeria’s Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) of 1990, the main
company law in Nigeria, specifies at least two directors for every company
incorporated in Nigeria under the Act. If the number should fall below two, the
company is given 30 days to appoint another director. The firm should cease
doing business if it fails to appoint a director within the stipulated time. In
Subsection 3 of Section 246, any director that remains a director for more than 60
days after the number of directors has fallen below the minimum shall be
responsible personally for the debt and liabilities of the firm incurred during the
entire period when the number of directors falls below the minimum.
The relationship between the directors and the shareholders is also contractual.
The directors are appointed because they agree to represent the shareholders on
the board of the company, and they are required to follow the terms of their
appointment, which clearly set out the remuneration, duty, and other conditions.
The law imposes its own duty on the director as well, such as the requirement to
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act in a fiduciary manner and attend meetings regularly. The directors owe a duty
of accountability, both at law and contract, to the shareholders.
The directors must develop and abide by a formal code of conduct. The code of
conduct sets out the standard of ethics that a director must observe in carrying out
his or her duties. The standards are common to many firms but the areas of
emphasis may be different. The European Investment Bank (EIB) code of conduct
for directors includes the basic conduct required of a director, responsibility to the
firm, conflict of interest, confidentiality and insider information, acceptance of
gifts and other advantages, proper use of company’s property, treatment of
reimbursable expenses, relations with staff and members of the board, and
cooperation with investigating bodies (EIB,2011).
General Mills, a big U.S. food company, has similar codes to EIB, but added that
directors should deal fairly with suppliers, creditors, service providers,
competitors, and other stakeholders in the firm. Credit Union One, a U.S.
financial institution, added to the code of conduct the directors’ oversight duty on
continuity. This means directors must oversee the firm’s strategic planning,
capital adequacy, assets and liabilities, succession planning, and directors’
continuing education. By reviewing the code of conduct of directors and the level
of compliance with it, the analyst would be able to judge the independence with
which directors perform their duty of care to the company.
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The way directors are compensated is also part of their accountability to the
shareholders. Improper use of company information, assets, and a wrongful claim
of reimbursable expenses depart from proper accountability and conduct expected
of a member of the board. The remuneration of the directors should also be
properly disclosed in the financial statements. Proper accountability means going
beyond the requirements of the law to include and disclose the benefits-in-kind
the directors enjoy.
In Nigeria’s listed companies, many of the perks enjoyed by the directors are not
disclosed because the law does not require disclosure. Sometimes, the benefits-inkind significantly exceed the emoluments paid to them. For directors whose total
emolument includes performance-based bonuses, the performance metrics ought
to be disclosed to ensure accountability. The firm should also disclose directors’
related-party transactions, interest in the company’s contract, and any criminal
proceedings against a director.
Shareholders’ Rights
The shareholders employ or appoint directors to act as their agents. Although the
interests of other stakeholders are important, the supremacy of the shareholders’
objectives in the firm cannot be compromised. In the eyes of the law, the
shareholders are the owners of the business, entitled to the firm’s residue of assets
after every other claim has been satisfied. A good corporate governance system
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would treat the interests of shareholders as very important. The rights of
shareholders will be enshrined in the corporation’s articles of association. In a
company where the corporate governance system is strong, a number of
provisions will be in the articles of association. The internal rules concerning
supermajority votes, proxy voting, greenmail, golden parachute, and poison pills
will be part of the code of conduct of directors.
The requirements for supermajority votes. To amend articles of association,
approve a merger plan, or change the objects clause of a company, majority votes
(50% and above) is usually required. Supermajority votes require an approval
from at least 67% to 90% of the shareholders present in the meeting and voting
(Investopedia, 2016). This is a good corporate governance mechanism that
ensures that weightier issues are decided on by a large number of shareholders.
Proxy voting. In very large corporations, with thousands of shareholders
dispersed widely, proxy voting is very important device in giving shareholders
that cannot attend a meeting a voice and vote. The disadvantage is that the
directors may hijack the proxy machine and get the votes for the outcome that
they desire. If a proper and objective outcome is desired, an outsider should
handle the process of proxy voting.
Harmful managerial actions. Provisions in the directors’ employment contracts
like the poison pill (making a company less attractive to a hostile bidder),
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greenmail (own share purchase far in excess of what it is worth), and golden
parachute (unmerited and large compensation to managers for loss of office if the
merger succeeds) are harmful to the interest of the shareholders for two main
reasons. One is that provisions such as these have a way of entrenching the
directors in their positions, as shareholders become reluctant to oust an ineffective
director because of the financial cost of the disengagement. Dah (2016)
documented a negative and significant association between firm value and the
entrenchment index. The higher the score on the entrenchment index, the smaller
the value of the firm. The second reason is that the provisions constitute a
technical expropriation of shareholders’ assets.
Director Education. The OECD principles of corporate governance require
directors to keep abreast of the development in their companies. Director
education is important as it enhances a director’s contribution to corporate value.
Knockaert et al. (2015) reported that the board chair industry experience is
positively and significantly associated with board service involvement, which
entails monitoring and advising top management and networking. Many
researchers have also found that the audit committee is more effective when a
finance expert is a member (Ioana & Mariana, 2014; Leung et al., 2014). Director
education is also crucial because we live in a fast changing world, the changes
being brought about by technological innovation, globalization, complex financial
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products, cultural diversity due to migration, and internationalization of tertiary
and technical education.
Sources of Information for Corporate Governance Analysis
To evaluate the strength of corporate mechanisms in a firm, the analysts need the
following documents and facts:
The website of the firm should contain information about most aspects of corporate
governance; including director information, education, other directorships,
shareholding, qualifications, and experience; information on leadership of the
board; board size; risk management; audit oversight; and committees.
The corporate governance section of annual financial statements.
Company’s memorandum, articles of associations, and bylaws.
The annual reports to shareholders concerning the firm’s corporate governance processes.
The code of corporate governance concerning the industry to which the company
belongs. If listed on a recognized stock exchange, the firm must also comply with
the Exchange’s code of corporate governance. In Nigeria for example, the
Securities and Exchange Commission of Nigeria has a code of corporate
governance and the Nigeria Stock Exchange has one as well.
General Websites like those of Business Roundtable, Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, the World Bank Group, trade groups, stock
exchanges, and the professional accounting organizations.
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Corporate Governance in Nigeria
Introduction
Nigeria is a developing country, a member of Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), and one of the largest economies in Africa by gross
domestic product (GDP). It has a population of around 200 million people; many
of these are literate and speak the English language, a legacy of the British
colonial rule. The country is governed centrally from the capital, Abuja, although
it has 36 states with elected chief executive officers designated as governors of
the states. Politically, it adopts the executive presidency, patterned after the U.S.
model, but with less mature democracy and rule of law. There are two legislative
houses that make up the national assembly, the Senate and the House of
Representatives. The states’ laws are made in the States’ Houses of Assembly.
The laws are only made on the concurrent lists, while the exclusive lists are for
the federal government alone. The country has a vibrant judiciary and law
enforcement, but these institutions, including the executive branch, are plagued by
fraud, corruption, and a fragrant self-dealing and rent seeking culture. The
government elected in 2015 won the platform of its declared war on corruption.
The Listed Securities Market on the Nigerian Stock Exchange
The Nigerian government derives 35% of its GDP from its oil producing activities
(OPEC, 2015). Apart from oil and gas production, the country has other mineral
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deposits such as coal, tin, iron ore, bauxite, and limestone. The rural populace
engages in agriculture, although majority of them engages in subsistence farming.
At December 31, 2015, 171 equities were listed on the NSE, with total
capitalization of $85.3 billion. There were also 15 federal government bonds, 21
corporate bonds, 22 state and municipal bonds, 7 exchange traded products, and
two supranational bonds. The companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange
were in 12 industrial sectors, including agriculture and agro-allied, conglomerates,
construction, real estate, consumer goods, financial services, healthcare,
information technology, industrial goods, natural resources, oil and gas, and
utilities. This research study will be conducted on all the non-financial companies
in the main and premium board that contain 171 listed equities.
The NSE tracks markets and sector performances by indexes, amongst which are the NSE
All Share Index, NSE 30 Index, NSE Pension Index, NSE Banking Index, NSE
Consumer Goods Index, NSE Industrial Index, NSE Insurance Index, NSE Lotus
Industrial Index, NSE Premium Bond Index, NSE Main Board Index, and NSE
Alternative Market Index. The main index is the NSE 30 Index. The average
daily volume for the last quarter of 2015 was 296.34 million units; average daily
traded volume was $13.98 million, translated at the official exchange rate of
N199.98 to one U.S. dollar. The market’s average price per share to earnings per
share (PE ratio) for the listed equities was 17.8; compared with FTSE 250 of 11.2.
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The majority of businesses in Nigeria are not publicly listed, and in terms of numbers, the
greater percentage are not even registered for many reasons, such as lack of
proper education, the need to escape the tax net, and the insignificant nature of the
business carried on by these businesspeople. Oyejide and Soyibo (2001) estimated
that 13.3% of businesses in the country are not publicly listed, and of the
registered companies, only 38% operate in the formal sector. More than 87% of
Nigerian businesses carry out their operations outside the rules governing the
stock market; such as duty to comply with corporate governance codes and IFRS
(Oyejide and Soyibo, 2001).
Between 1995 and 1998, the government owned 8.1% of the companies quoted on the
Nigerian Stock Exchange, and domestic investors only 35% (Oyejide & Soyibo,
2001). The shareholding structure is not as diverse as in other nations, and the
market is subject to manipulation and dominance by large shareholders and
foreign-owned companies. Compliance with corporate governance codes, like the
law that governs most activities in the country, is poor.
Enforcement of Corporate Governance Codes in Nigeria
According to Ejavbekpokpo and Esuike (2013), corporate governance in Nigeria
is an entirely new concept. Although the CAMA, Banks and Other Financial
Institutions Act of 2002 (BOFIA, 2002), as amended, Investments and Securities
Act of 1999 (ISA; 1999), and the Securities and Exchange Commission Act of
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1988 (SEC; 1988) included many provisions concerning corporate governance
practices, the laws are merely in the books but not in action. Enforcement is poor
in the country where matters are more often than not settled through quasi-legal
means. Also, many investors are only interested in receiving yearly dividends, and
because most are widely dispersed and of little education, the directors are in total
control of the affairs of the business, and the annual general meetings are usually
rigged in their favor.
The enforcement of compliance with corporate governance codes does not rest
with one institution in Nigeria. The CBN supervises the financial institutions and
ensures compliance. If a bank is quoted on the NSE, the exchange also assumes
some jurisdiction. Lately, the IFRS has come on the scene after Nigeria joined
other nations in implementing IFRS. The Financial Reporting Council is now
claiming to be the preeminent enforcer of these codes. There is a lot of confusion
regarding which institution a listed company should be answerable.
The Securities and Exchange Commission’s code, which was approved in 2003,
focused on board responsibilities and composition, CEO duality, procedures and
frequency of meetings, requirements for nonexecutive directors, compensation of
the members of the board, and financial reporting and control (Afolabi, 2015;
Ejuvbekpokpo & Esuike, 2013). The NSE’s code, which was fashioned after the
OECD principles of corporate governance, also stipulated the rights and
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responsibilities of shareholders; audit committees’ duties and responsibilities,
qualifications, and meetings; and the size, diversity, experience, and
independence of the board of directors. Afolabi (2015) stated that the reason why
corporate governance is ineffective in Nigeria could be traced to a wholesale
adoption of the British company’s law of 1948 by the Nigeria legislatures without
considering the peculiar history and business environment in Nigeria, and the
country’s level and stage of development.
The failure of Nigeria’s businesses is traceable to other factors than corporate
governance weaknesses, though a poor control system is a significant contributor
to corporate collapses in the country. The aftermath of Cadbury NigeriaPublic
Limited Company (PLC)’s financial scandals and fraud is a revealing example of
a much deeper problem in the country’s business environment: The cavalier
attitude with which law enforcement treats the business elite that behave
inappropriately. Between 2002 and 2006, Cadbury Nigeria PLC inflated its
income statements by some N13 billion ($65 million). The three directors
involved confessed to account manipulation to manage profit, meet analysts’
expectations, and improve share price. The SEC found the company guilty of
inadequate disclosure, noncompliance with corporate governance guidelines,
obtaining loans to pay dividends contrary to SEC regulations, fraudulent and
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unauthorized share buybacks, giving the auditors false stock certificates, and
illegal payment to directors (http//nairaland.com, 2015).
The auditors of Cadbury Nigeria PLC, Akintola Williams Deloitte, was equally
found guilty by the SEC. The auditor failed to properly carry out its statutory
duties. They failed to check and verify inventory certificates and bank
reconciliation statements, and they received oral representations without third
party confirmation and documentary evidence. When the directors’ statements
were unclear and contrary to the evidence in plain sight of the auditors, they were
not put on notice and they failed to probe the matter to the bottom. In the case of
Enron, some directors went to jail, some committed suicide, while Arthur
Andersen, the auditor, collapsed. The Nigerian executives and the company
involved got the lightest sentences ever in a case like this. Cadbury was fined only
N21, 215, 000.00 ($134, 272.15) and the three directors involved, the CEO, the
CFO, and another director, were only banned from operating in Nigeria’s capital
market and from being a director in a public company. The auditors and the guilty
directors got off absolutely free (http://nairaland. com, 2015).
Corporate Governance Research in Nigeria
A number of research studies in Nigeria have focused on the association between
corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance, and the incidences of
accounting scandals in the country. Adewuyi and Olowookere (2013) found that
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31.71% of all the nonfinancial firms on the NSE surveyed between 2000 and 2008
showed good corporate governance changes. A change that resulted in the
increase in independent directors, independence of the audit committee, decrease
in board size, and lower leverage was deemed to be a good corporate governance
change. The fact is that in many cases appointment to the boards of Nigerian
companies is based on family ties, recommendations by large shareholders, and
close networks of individuals or professionals. The prevailing practice is that
merit takes a backseat in board appointments in Nigeria. The culture of not
appointing the right persons to the board makes implementation of good corporate
governance systems difficult in the country.
Zango, Kamardin, and Ishak (2016) examined the impact of corporate governance
characteristics and the IFRS 7 on 14 banks listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange
between 2008 and 2012. Zango et al. reported that IFRS 7 (financial instruments
disclosure) was positively and significantly associated with board committee,
board financial and accounting expertise, and board gender. The findings show
that accounting and financial expertise of board members matter. Hassan and
Ahmed (2012) also documented a negative but not significant association between
audit governance scores and absolute discretionary accruals. They also found a
negative and significant relationship between institutional shareholding and
discretionary behavior of managers, meaning that at least in Nigeria, the freedom
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enjoyed by managers of corporations to deliberately misstate accounting
information decreases with the presence of institutional investors. This means that
institutional investors act as a check on managers’ excessive risk taking and
accounting manipulations. The presence of other nationalities on the board of
directors tends to promote competition amongst various listed companies.
Obembe and Soetan (2015) stated that competition had a positive and significant
effect on productivity growth in Nigerian companies. Obembe and Soetan also
reported that the interaction effect of productivity with corporate governance
mechanisms had substitution effect but not significant effect in productivity
growth in Nigerian companies. Akinkoye and Olasanmi (2014) noted that
corporate governance initiatives were embedded in Nigerian companies that they
studied between 2003 and 2010. Furthermore, Akinkoye and Olasanmi
documented the compliance rate with corporate governance best practices among
Nigerian companies to be 72.15%. They also observed a shift in corporate
governance structure in Nigerian companies and a slow-down in corporate
governance practice.
The issue of nationality and ethnicity are extremely important in Nigeria’s
business life and politics. Foreign companies dominate the listings on the
Nigerian Stock Exchange in terms of capitalization, where foreign nationals hold
a high proportion of the shares. Although the Nigerian authorities continue to
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promote homegrown investment culture, the efforts are hampered by poverty,
poor savings culture, and a lifestyle of conspicuous consumption. The average
person does not believe in investment in shares due to poor working knowledge of
the stock exchange. Ethnicity is also a very important consideration in Nigeria
and an important variable that should be taken into account when considering
board composition, because the country has about 250 ethnic groups, and each is
a powerful force in business and politics (World Fact Book, 2016). Board
composition with different ethnic nationalities is a bulwark against unethical
practices.
Salaudeen, Ibikunle, and Chima (2015) investigated unethical accounting
practices and financial reporting of companies quoted on the NSE. In a case study
conducted in one of the biggest first generation banks in Nigeria, Afribank PLC,
which collapsed in 2015, the researchers found extended audit tenure impaired
auditor’s independence. Before the SEC of Nigeria started to implement corporate
governance principle in the country from 2003, many companies retained external
auditors for as long as possible, many of them also serving as tax and internal
audit consultants, advisers on strategy and information technology, and training.
Salaudeen et al. (2015) stated that poor corporate governance was largely
responsible for the eventual collapse of the banks.
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Summary
I focused on agency, stakeholder, and stewardship theories in this review
of the literature. The stakeholder theory assumes that, by taking into account the
interests of all stakeholders in all decisions in the corporation, organizational
performance should improve. The stewardship theory assumes that managers who
act as stewards looks after the interests of the shareholders without any
consideration for their self-interest, thereby reducing agency problems and agency
costs. The agency theory posits that the separation of ownership from control
causes agency problems in firms. Agency problems lead to costs, which are
entirely borne by the shareholders as managers exploit their superior information
knowledge to extract value from the firm and stockholders. Using agency,
stakeholders, and stewardship theories, I explained the relationship between
managers, shareholders, and other stakeholders, and how managers can be made
to act in the best interests of all stakeholders, especially the stockholders.
Specifically, the literature review covered (a) the theories corporate governance,
including agency, stakeholders, and stewardship theories, (b) corporate
governance antecedents and attributes, (c) conflict of interest and firm
performance, (d) major themes in corporate governance research, (e) financial
performance, using return on assets, return on capital employed, and Tobin’s Q as
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performance metrics (f) evaluating the corporate governance of a firm, and (g)
corporate governance practice in Nigeria.
In Chapter 3, I provided I provided information on the research design and
method that was used to organize and analyze the data. I also documented the
dependent and independent variables and their measurements, the type of data that
were used, the data gathering and organization techniques, and the target
population. I also gave details of the sampling method, instrumentation, and the
data analysis software that was used. In addition, I restated the research questions
and the research hypotheses of the study.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
In this chapter, I described the research methodology that I used to conduct this study. I
described in detail the research design, hypothesis formulation, target population,
sampling strategy and methods, instrumentation, data sources, and data analysis
and reporting. While this study was entirely based on secondary data sources and
did not involve any population that might be at risk in the process of data
gathering, nevertheless, I sought and obtained the approval of the Institutional
Review Board (IRB) before commencing any aspect of the research. Also, I
included in this chapter a literature review of the proposed research design and
other designs that could have been used to conduct the study.
Research Design
I used a quantitative research design and multiple regression analysis to examine
the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on firm financial performance.
The general equation for k independent variables in the model is given by: Y = a
+ b1X1 + b2X2 +…….+ bkXk + e, where Y is the dependent or criterion
variable, a is the intercept of the model, b1….bk are the regression coefficients
applied to the Xs, X1…Xk are the predictor or independent variables, and e is the
residual or random error in the model (Pedhazur, 1997, p. 136). The dependent
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variable in this study was financial performance, measured by three ratios: ROA,
ROCE, and Tobin’s Q.
Dependent Variables
ROA is defined as the ratio of EBITDA and the total assets of the firm
(Baulkaran, 2014; Poutziouris et al., 2014). ROA has been used to measure
financial performance in many studies (Dah, 2016; Muttakin et al., 2016;
Perryman, Fernando, & Tripathy, 2016). ROCE is the ratio of EBITDA to the
capital employed in the firm (Zona, 2016). Capital employed is measured as the
total of equity and debt, or simply total assets less current liabilities (Investopia,
2015). Tobin’s Q is the ratio of market value of assets to the cost of replacing the
assets (Jermias & Gani, 2014). Tobin’s Q ratio measures the company’s market
value, where a ratio above one indicates an overvaluation, and a ratio below one
indicates undervaluation of the firm (Eklund & Poulsen, 2014).
Independent Variables
In the model, the independent variables that I selected for the study were board
independence, independence of the audit committee, executive compensation,
number of board meetings, and the size of the board. The five variables are some
of the metrics shareholders and analysts use to measure how their companies are
performing. Board independence is present when there is separation of the role of
the CEO from that of the chair and when more than 50% of the members are
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outside, nonexecutive directors, who do not have any relationship with the
company, either as a former employee, auditor, or a family member of the CEO or
other directors (Quttainah, 2015; Tsai et al., 2013).
To assess the independence of the audit committee, the OECD’s corporate
governance principles require that it be composed entirely of independent
directors. In this study, I defined an independent audit committee as one
composed mainly of independent directors, at least more than 50%, with a direct
communication between committee members and the chief internal auditor
without obtaining approval from the CEO. Executive compensation was defined
in this study as the total amount of money and benefits-in-kind paid to top
management of the firm, disclosed in the financial statements as required by the
Nigeria’s Company and Allied Matters Acts of 1990 and the FRC.
I measured the number of board meetings by the total number of meetings held in
any one year, where a quorum was formed. The board directs the affairs of the
firm by holding meetings. Apart from satisfying statutory requirements, the
frequency of board meetings indicates board activity, the time and attention the
board devotes to the organization, and board service involvement (Knockaert et
al., 2015). The number of board meetings also indicates to the executives how
seriously the board considers the affairs of the corporation. The size of the board
is the absolute number of directors. The appropriate board size depends on the
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organizational context, the complexity of the company’s operations, the number
of foreign subsidiaries, the macro-economic situation, and the need for proper
coordination and control (Knockeart et al., 2015; Lucas-Perez et al., 2014). The
size of the board may not be sensitive to the benefits and costs of monitoring and
advising the management of the firm.
The Different Types of Research Design
There are three types of research designs that may be used for studying a
phenomenon: qualitative, quantitative, and mixed-methods. There are alternatives
strategies that a researcher may use in his or her study within the three types of
research designs. In a qualitative research design, the strategies can be a narrative
research, phenomenology, ethnographies, grounded theory, and case study
(Babbie, 2014). In a quantitative inquiry, the alternative approaches are
experimental designs and nonexperimental designs, such as surveys and
correlational studies (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). According to
Trochim and Donnelly (2008), a qualitative research design is appropriate when
the researcher desires to generate new theories or hypothesis or explore a new
phenomenon to gain a deeper understanding of the issues, and to develop detailed
stories to describe a phenomenon (p. 142).
Quantitative research design allows the researcher to test theories by examining
the relationships among the variables (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008).
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According to Babbie (2014), quantification makes observations more explicit, and
data are easier to summarize, compare, and aggregate (p. 24). Quantitative
research also offers advantages of precision because numbers remove ambiguities
and subjectivity. Quantitative research can be correlational, (i.e., looking for
relationships among variables) or experimental (Hill & Lewicki, 2006).
In correlational research, the relationship between the variables is investigated to
find out whether there is a statistically significant correlation between them (i.e.,
whether the changes observed in one variable are correlated with the changes in
the other variable (Bonna, 2012). In social science research, the variables are not
usually susceptible to manipulation; in other words, the researcher cannot state
whether there is a cause and effect in in the variables, because there is no
possibility of performing the study in a laboratory. But in experimental research,
some variables are manipulated and the effect is measured on the other variable
(Hill & Lewiscki, 2006, p. 3). Usually, a cause and effect can be established in
pure experimental research.
A mixed-methods design stands in-between qualitative and quantitative inquiries.
It is used when neither of the two other research designs is deemed appropriate to
understand the phenomenon under investigation (Babbie, 2014). By combining
the strengths of the two traditional methods of inquiry, the mixed-methods
researcher is able to address and understand complex social problems that neither
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the qualitative nor quantitative inquiry can handle satisfactorily and completely.
In a mixed-methods inquiry, the researcher may choose to do sequential,
concurrent, or transformative research designs (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias,
2008).
Qualitative research uses small samples to explore and understand human
perspectives to a problem or phenomenon by using rich and lengthy and full
descriptions to capture those experiences and perspectives (Babbie, 2014).
Qualitative researchers are less interested in generalizing their findings to the
whole population, but only in a deep understanding of the phenomenon from the
few samples selected. This is one of the flaws of qualitative research; that the
research findings may not be capable of generalization to other populations,
groups, or geographic areas (Babbie, 2014). Quantitative research, on the other
hand, relies on large samples randomly drawn from a population to test data and
find correlations or relationships among the variables for generalization to the
whole population, but a quantitative measure may not be as rich in meanings as a
qualitative design (Babbie, 2014).
According to Babbie (2014), research serves three main purposes; and these are
exploration, description, and explanation. An exploratory research is typically
done for three purposes: (a) to satisfy the researcher’s curiosity for better
understanding, (b) to test the feasibility of undertaking a study, and (c) to develop
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the methods to be employed in any subsequent study (Babbie, 2014, p. 90). A
qualitative research design is suitable for exploring and understanding social and
human problems from the worldview of particular participants (FrankfortNachmias & Nachmias, 2008). No predetermined answers are assumed in a
qualitative study, and the method allows the researcher to deal with new questions
and theories (Babbie, 2014).
Although various researchers have used qualitative inquiries to examine the
impact of corporate governance mechanism on financial performance, a
qualitative inquiry was not suitable for this study, which was based on
correlational study. Researchers have advocated using qualitative characteristics
in corporate governance studies to gain a deeper understanding of the issues.
Almadi (2015) used a narrative method to explain the significance of
incorporating context with corporate governance systems to assess how it works
in practice.
Qualitative methods have the advantage that complex cases can be studied indepth, but it also suffers from serious disadvantages in that results cannot be
generalized to other populations. It is also difficult to test hypotheses and make
quantitative predictions, and the results frequently incorporate the researcher’s
biases (Babbie, 2014). The distinguishing characteristics of qualitative from the
quantitative inquiry are not only the absence of quantification, but also the
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underlying assumptions, data gathering techniques, data analysis tools, and
generalizability of the results (Jackson, 2015). Madill (2015) stated that what
distinguishes qualitative from quantitative inquiries is not mere labeling, such as
descriptive, interpretative, or lived experience. The labeling will exclude many
research studies using this method of inquiry that produce conceptual and
theoretical explanations of observed phenomena.
The major purpose of a quantitative inquiry is to test theories through examination
of the relationships among variables (Pedhazur, 1997). In this study, I used the
correlational analysis method and a multiple regression model, which tests a
relationship between two or more variables where changes in one are associated
with changes in the other (Babbie, 2014). A quantitative method of inquiry was
suitable for this study because I tested the association between corporate
governance mechanisms and firm financial performance. Although correlation
does not mean causation; nevertheless, it is one of the criteria of causality
(Babbie, 2014).
A quantitative research design using a multiple regression model is suitable when
the researcher’s aim is to test the relationship between a dependent or criterion
variable and several predictor variables (Hill & Lewicki, 2006; Pedhazur, 1997).
Multiple regression models have been used in many studies to examine the
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance
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(Baulkaran, 2014; Bhagat & Bolton, 2013; Francis et al., 2013; Muller, 2014).
Researchers have also predicted the likely magnitude of change in financial
performance by using corporate governance indices (Chahine & Zeidan, 2014;
Gompers et al., 2003; Quittainah, 2015). Gompers et al. (2003) constructed the
24-item G-Index that indicates a manager’s control and influence over important
decisions affecting the firm using multiple regression analysis (Dah, 2014).
Bebchuck et al. (2009) stated that only six of the 24-item G-Index governance
provisions have a significant effect on the value of a firm. Bebchuck et al.’s
modified Entrenchment Index (E-Index) included provisions in the firm’s articles
for golden parachutes, poison pills, staggered boards, a supermajority requirement
for charter amendment, a supermajority requirement for merger amendments, and
placing limits on shareholders’ bylaw amendment (Dah, 2014). For example, Dah
(2014) used multiple regression analysis to study the effect of recession on
management and found that managerial entrenchment was significantly higher
during periods of recession, by using the E-Index (Bebchuck et al., 2009).
Ioana and Mariana (2014) used multiple regression models to examine the
association between the characteristics of corporate governance and firm
performance in Romania; the proxies for firm performance chosen were ROA and
return on equity (ROE). Satayesh, Razaie, and Kazenezhad (2016) also used a
quantitative research design with multiple regression analysis to investigate the
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role of investment in R&D as it relates to corporate governance and
organizational performance in listed companies in Iran. Several other research
studies cited in the literature used quantitative methods and multiple regression
analysis to examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on company
performance (Abdioğlu, 2016; Arena, Cirillo, Mussolino, Pulcinelli, Saggese, &
Sarto, 2014; Haji, 2014; Mishra & Mohanty, 2014; Reutzel & Belsito, 2015).
To investigate the impact of corporate governance on firm performance, many
researchers have used primary data collected through surveys and structured or
semistructured questionnaires and then used the multiple regression method to
analyze the data. For example, Du, Deloof, and Jorisen (2015) examined the role
of the board of multinational companies’ subsidiaries in Belgium by distributing
questionnaires to the CEOs of 428 firms. Pugliese et al. (2014) investigated how
company profitability and industry regulation affect corporate performance by
surveying the CEOs of top 2, 000 Italian firms through questionnaires in 2004,
and using multiple regression analysis of quantitative method to analyze the data.
Knockart et al. (2015) sent questionnaires to the CEOs of 300 firms in Norwegian
universities and public research institutes in their study on the role of top
management staff and board chairperson as antecedents of board service
involvement. Knocaert et al. (2015) used multiple regression analysis of
quantitative method to analyze the data. Many other researchers have used
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multiple regression analysis to analyze data with the help of statistical software
such as SPSS (Akash & Abbas, 2015; Kouki & Guizani, 2015; Yeh, 2014).
Although many researchers gather primary data through questionnaires and then
use quantitative method of multiple regression analysis to analyze the data, there
are several issues with questionnaire design, administration, and analysis. As
Fowler (2014) remarked, designing questionnaires is equivalent to creating a
measure (p. 75). It is important to ensure that bias and double meaning are
removed from the questions. Some of the biases in question design are leading,
threatening, and double-barreled questions, which may render the survey
inaccurate (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). Other types of errors and
biases in questionnaires are incomplete and poorly worded sentences, and poorly
defined terms and multiple questions (Fowler, 2014). Common sources of error in
the wording of questions also arise from ambiguous and loaded questions, and
those that are difficult to understand or beyond the level of comprehension of the
respondents (Donovan & Hoover, 2014). Questionnaire administration is also
costly and time consuming (Fowler, 2014).
According to Babbie (2014), questionnaires are versatile tools used in many
research studies, including experiments, field research, and other data collection
activities (p. 261). In this study, I collected data on corporate governance from
secondary data, using the financial statements of the target companies. The
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audited financial statements will be accessed from multiple sources: The
corporations’ websites, the website of the NSE and from the websites of FRC and
SEC.
I have chosen the multiple regression method for the data analysis stage of this
dissertation after a careful consideration of the other tools of analysis that are
possible and readily available. Some of the other methods considered are simple
regression analysis, ANOVA, correlational analysis, discriminant analysis, log
linear models, and nonparametric test. Simple regression analysis only applies
when the independent variable is limited to one, and in correlation analysis, no
distinction is made between the independent and the dependent variable
(Pedhazur, 1997). These two types of analysis methods were not suitable for this
dissertation study.
ANOVA combines cases under study into groups of independent variables and
the extent to which the group differs from one another is investigated (Babbie,
2014, p. 486). The discriminant analysis method is similar to multiple regression
analysis but the dependent variable can be nominal. The log linear models “test
the factors used in cross-tabulations and their interaction for statistical
significance” (Pedhazur, 1997, p. 311). Many of these tests measure the variables
at the ratio level. The advantage of measuring variables at the ratio level is the
precision of their numerical values, which allows statistical manipulation
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(Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008, p. 147). Nonparametric methods are
applied where the traditional statistics are not applicable, and the assumptions for
parametric tests are not met (Gibbons, 1993, p. 2). Nonparametric analysis is also
used when the researcher does not know the parameters of the distribution of the
variables, such as the mean and the standard deviation (Pedhazur, 1997, p. 381).
Target Population
The research population for this study consists of all the 116 nonfinancial
companies listed on the NSE between 2011 and 2015. At the end of December
2015, 55 companies in the financial services industry were quoted on the NSE
excluding banks and insurance firms. These will be excluded from the analysis.
The financial and related companies were excluded from this study because they
are subject to different rules dictated by their regulators, and based on the
conditions of the license given to them to operate. The CBN, the Nigeria Deposit
Insurance Corporation, and the Nigerian Insurance Commission regulate the
financial services companies listed on the stock exchange. Including any of these
corporations will seriously bias this study as they are subject to different
accounting and financial regulations that are separate and distinct from those that
the firms in non-financial industries are required to observe
The 116 nonfinancial firms on the stock exchange represent this study’s
population. These firms are in many industrial sectors, including manufacturing,

186

hotels and tourism, energy, equipment, and services; petroleum products
distribution; apparel retailing; courier, freight, and deliveries; road transportation;
and services. The study covered 5 years from 2011 to 2015. All the 116 nonfinancial companies listed on the stock exchange was examined to determine
whether they met the eligibility criteria for inclusion in the sampled companies.
To be included in the final sample, a firm must have met the following criteria: (a)
compliance with the NSE code of corporate governance, (b) trading for at least 3
years prior to 2011, (c) the share must be active on the stock exchange throughout
the 5 years under study, (4) the market capitalization must be a minimum of $1
million, (5) no loss is recorded in any of the 5 years under analysis, (6) the audited
financial statements must contained financial and corporate governance
information for analysis, and (7) the firm must be in active operation throughout
the 5 years ending on December 31, 2015. This research covered all the
nonfinancial companies listed on the main and premium boards of the NSE that
meet the above conditions.
The NSE is a member of International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO), the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE), SIIA’s Financial
Information Services Division (FISD), and Intermarket Surveillance Group (ISG).
Equities are listed under several industrial sectors, including consumer goods,
food products, financial services, healthcare, pharmaceuticals, industrial goods,
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chemicals, energy, equipment, services, integrated oil and gas services,
hospitality, and printing and publishing. The Exchange tracks stock and market
performance by 12 indices, including the NSE All Share Index, NSE Main Board
Index, NSE 30 Index, NSE Banking Index, and NSE Oil and Gas Index. The main
index is NSE 30 Index. Institutional investors, including pension and mutual
funds, use the NSE Indexes to monitor the performance of their stock holdings
and check the performance of their individual holdings against the NSE stock
index.
Sampling Methods
There were 252 listed securities on the NSE at the end of December 2015. Three
securities were listed on the premium board, 171 equities on the main board, 11
on the alternative securities market board; seven exchange traded products, and 15
federal government bonds. There were also 21 corporate bonds, 22 state and
municipal bonds, and 2 supranational bonds. The total market capitalization of all
the listed securities as on December 31, 2015 was $85.3 billion (NSE, 2016). This
study considered only listed equities on the main board of the NSE.
Fifty-five equities on the main board of the NSE belong to banks and other
financial institutions. The 55 equities belonging to the financial institutions were
excluded from the analysis because these institutions are subject to different
regulations and accounting and disclosure requirements by the regulatory
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authorities, including the CBN, Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation, and
Nigerian Insurance Commission. Including the financial institutions with the nonfinancial companies may make interpretation of the findings difficult. The
exclusion of financial institutions left 116 firms as the population for the study.
The 116 nonfinancial firms belong to 10 industrial sectors, namely: (a)
agriculture, (b) conglomerates, (c) construction/real estate, (d) consumer goods,
(e) healthcare, (f) ICT, (g) industrial goods, (h) natural resources, (i) oil and gas,
and (j) services.
There were several sampling techniques that may be considered to obtain a
representative sample for this study: (a) a simple random sampling technique
selects samples from the population with every sample having equal chance to be
selected (Trochim & Donnelly, 2008), (b) in stratified random sampling, the
population is divided into homogeneous subgroups and a simple random
sampling taken in each subgroup (Trochim & Donnelly, 2008), (c) a systematic
random sampling technique involves the researcher first determining randomly
where to start sample selection from the sample frame, and thereafter, every nth
item is then selected, (d) convenience sampling is based on convenience and
availability of information the researcher is seeking, and (e) finally, a purposive
sampling method is a sampling technique used when the researcher has a purpose
in mind that he or she desires to achieve. According to Trochim and Donnelly
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(2008), subcategories of purposive sampling are modal instance sampling, expert
sampling, and snowball sampling.
The sampling technique for this dissertation study was based on convenience
sampling method, because it was based on the availability of data, and whether
the sampled companies met a set of conditions, such as the numbers of years since
being listed on the NSE availability of audited financial statements, number of
directors, absence of loss in all the 5 years covered by the study, and market
capitalization. Researchers call this type of sampling technique nonprobability
sampling. It is nonprobability because it does not involve a random selection of
samples, and it is impossible for the researcher to specify the chance of each unit
being included (Frank-fort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). But as Trochim and
Donnelly (2008) stated, it does not necessarily mean that nonprobability samples
are not representative of the population. What it means is that the statistical rules
of the probability theory may not be applicable, and the researcher may not know
how well the samples represent the population (Trochim & Donnelly, 2008).
From the 116 nonfinancial firms whose securities were listed on the NSE between 2011
and 2015, I selected all the companies that met the following criteria:
A quotation history on the exchange for three years prior to 2011.
A verifiable tradition of implementation of SEC’s corporate governance codes and
compliance with the listing rules of the Nigerian Stock Exchange.
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Active quotation on the NSE throughout 2011 to 2015.
Financial statements for the five years that comply with IFRS, which also contain
information for the computation of ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s Q; with the
disclosures of corporate governance variables of board composition, audit
committee composition, executive remuneration, number of board meetings, the
size of the board, and the age and size of the firm.
Be in operational existence throughout the 5 years ending December 2015.
Have total market capitalization of $1 million or above, translated at the prevailing
official exchange rate determined by the CBN in any particular year. Have total
market capitalization of $1 million or above, translated at the prevailing official
exchange rate determined by the CBN in any particular year.
Recorded no losses throughout the 5 years covered in the study (i.e., from 2011 to 2015).
I assumed that companies that have traded for 3 years prior to 2011 would have a
tradition of implementation of good corporate governance practices and be
comfortable disclosing the governance process in the financial reports. Companies
with market capitalization of $1 million and above would also have the resources
and motivation to put in place good corporate governance practices in the
Nigerian context. Large cap companies as defined above with a minimum of $1
million in market capitalization, in the unique situation in Nigeria, tend to have
structures, systems, and ability to set up and implement effective corporate
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governance mechanisms to monitor and advice the top management. Market
capitalization is defined as the total outstanding shares multiplied by the price per
share at the end of the business day when the market value was determined.
Smaller firms, those with less capital than $1 million and those that have not been quoted
for a minimum of 3 years, may have constraints to implement sound corporate
governance systems, arising from lack of ability to attract widely sought-after
independent directors to the board. Company size is important in corporate
governance systems. For example, the studies by Li and Tan (2015) and Quttainah
(2015) reported that company size is positively and significantly associated with
firm value. The purpose of a good corporate governance system is to reduce
agency problems in firms by reducing the conflict of interest between managers
and shareholders. One of the mechanisms to ensure agency problems are
minimized is to institute a system of control and monitoring of executives through
an active board and its committees (Berle & Means, 1932; Fama, 1980; Jensen &
Meckling, 1979). Only large companies have the resources and attractiveness to
bring to the firm independent and experienced directors.
Big companies, because of size, position in the economy, the number of shareholders,
and the number of employees are under more scrutiny by regulators, activist
shareholders, and financial institutions. Analysts and institutional investors are
less tolerance of weak corporate governance practices in large companies than in
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smaller ones. I will exclude small firms and those whose shares are newly listed
on the stock exchange because these corporations may not have had the time,
resources, and tradition to develop an effective corporate governance structure
due to their size and lack of resources to implement a robust system.
Big companies, because of size, position in the economy, the number of shareholders,
and the number of employees are under more scrutiny by regulators, activist
shareholders, and financial institutions. Analysts and institutional investors are
less tolerance of weak corporate governance practices in large companies than in
smaller ones. I will exclude small firms and those whose shares are newly listed
on the stock exchange because these corporations may not have had the time,
resources, and tradition to develop an effective corporate governance structure
due to their size and lack of resources to implement a robust system.
I relied on the publicly available financial information of the firms listed on the
companies’ websites, the NSE websites, the companies’ 2011 to 2015 filing with
the NSE, the websites of the SEC, and the NSE’s Daily Activity Summary for
Equities. The Daily Activities Summary, published daily in all major newspapers
in Nigeria, includes the

total capitalization of each company, price per share,

and the volume of trading. The convenience or judgmental sampling used in this
study was based on substantial evidence; I relied on figures published in the
official websites of the companies, the stock exchange, and in national
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newspapers. According to Deming (1990), an evaluation of the reliability of
judgmental sampling rests on the researcher’s expertise, as the theory of
probability cannot be used to test its reliability. Deming (1990) also stated that it
is necessary to report full details of a judgmental sampling procedure.
Instrumentation
Although corporate governance systems have existed as part of company management
infrastructure since the separation of ownership and control became inevitable due
to the size and scale of operations of modern business enterprises, a uniform
measuring instrument has not been devised (Bonna, 2012). Rather, many
instruments have been developed by researchers to measure corporate governance
mechanisms (Zona, 2016). Also, financial performance has traditionally been
measured by objective performance such as accounting ratios, but some
researchers have used subjective performance measures as well.
While financial ratios are based on the historical data from a firm’s accounting records,
researchers compute subjective performance metrics by asking managers what, in
their views, constitute good performance and how they rate their own company.
Throughout this study, I used objective accounting and financial data to measure
company performance. Researchers have also constructed many instruments and
indexes to measure different aspects of corporate governance, and others are still
been invented as businesses become more complex and global. Many researchers
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have used several instruments to investigate the impact of corporate governance
mechanisms on firm performance. For example, Adewuyi and Olowookere (2013)
classified a decrease in board size and separation of the CEO and the board chair
as good corporate governance changes.
In this study, I investigated many corporate governance indexes in the review of the
literature. The G-Index, devised by Gompers et al. (2003), computes a firm’s
score based on certain provisions that decrease shareholders’ rights and hence
weakens corporate governance, provisions such as poison pill, staggered boards,
limitations of the right of shareholders to call meetings, and golden parachute.
The higher is the index, the greater the manager’s influence over important
decisions in the firm. The higher score indicates a weak or poor corporate
governance structure. The G-Index is a 24-item governance provisions
constructed from RiskMetrics, formerly Investors Responsibility Research
Center’s (IRRC) publicly available information on the company’s database. The
lowest figure is 0 and the highest 24 for each provision in the company’s byelaws.
Bebchuck et al. (2009) believed that only six provisions, out of the 24 proposed by
Gompers et al., (2003) were needed to determine whether there is a poor or strong
corporate governance structure in a firm. Bebchuck, et al., (2009) constructed the
managerial E-Index from IRRC data and the six provisions are a subset of the GIndex. The six provisions are golden parachutes, poison pills, staggered boards,
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supermajority requirement for merger amendments, supermajority requirement for
changes to the firm’s charter, and limit to shareholder bylaw amendments. The EIndex scores the six provisions from 0 to 6, and a higher score is associated with
poor corporate governance while a lower score indicates strong corporate
governance (Bebchuk et al., 2009).
Brown and Caylor’s (2006) governance score (Gov-score) was constructed from
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS’s) database, using a 52-item firm
characteristics to assign scores to provisions of the firm’s bylaws (poison pill,
supermajority provisions, etc.), board structure (independence, CEO/chair duality,
nominating committee, etc.), audit committee (independence, auditors’ fees from
other services, auditor rotation, and changes), firm progressive practices
(directors’ term limits, mandatory retirement age, etc.) and management and
directors’ compensation (directors’ stock options, interlocks in compensation
committee). The Gov-score ranges from 0 to 52, with high scores associated with
better corporate governance practices. Many of these instruments measure the
same things although from different perspectives.
The Corporate Library is a commercial vendor of corporate governance data analysis and
assessments tools. The instrument is based on 100 criteria, scores range from 0 to
100 for constructing a benchmark score. The scoring follows closely the G-Index
(Gompers et al., 2003), the E-Index (Bebchuk et al., 2004), and the Brown and
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Caylor’s (2006) Gov-score. The provisions concern bylaws (poison pills,
supermajority rules), board structure (independence, CEO duality, nominating
committee), audit committee, executive compensation, and progressive practices.
A high Gov-score indicates good corporate governance practices and a low score
weak signifies a weak corporate governance practice.
S&P’s Corporate Governance Scores (CGI) is another index that offers a detailed
measure of a firm’s corporate governance structure, benchmarked by reference to
global best practices. S&P’s corporate governance scores assigns scores to
companies’ practices ranging from 1 to 10, with 10 standing for best corporate
governance practices. A high score indicates good corporate governance practices
while a low score is associated with poor or weak practices. S&P corporate
governance scores are divided into three sub-indices. The first focuses on
ownership structure and relationship with investors, the second concerns financial
and information transparency, and the third addresses the firm’s board and
management structure and processes.
The G-Index of Gompers et al. (2003) and the E-Index of Bebchuck et al. (2009) are the
most traditional corporate governance indices used in extant literature. Support is
found in the literature for both composite and separate measures of corporate
governance (e.g., Bebchuk et al., 2009; Bhagat & Bolton, 2013; Gompers et al.,
2003). But as Bhagat and Bolton (2013) stated, a single measure of board
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characteristics can be as effective as the multiple measures of the G-Index, the
S&P CGI, and Bebchuck et al. (2009)’s E-Index. The reasons are: (a) because the
board of directors has the power to make all decisions, they have an incentive to
provide effective monitoring and supervision of managers if they own stocks in
the firm, (b) the errors associated with a single measure would be less than those
arising from multiple measures.
Poutziouris et al. (2014) used a combination of primary data on compensation,
ownership, internal governance, and financial and market information from the
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Xie and Fukumoto (2013) also used
separate measures of corporate governance (board size, average CEO tenure, nonCEO chair, and financial kereitsu) to examine the impact of corporate board size
and financial performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q) in Japanese companies listed in
the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. There are many instruments that
researchers have developed to measure separate components of corporate
governance mechanisms.
Following Bhagat and Bolton (2013), I accomplished the objective of this dissertation
study by combining separate and combined measures of corporate governance. I
calculated and used several indexes to measure corporate governance mechanisms
by the equal weighting technique used in constructing the G-Index (Bonna, 2012;
Gompers, et al., 2003). The index for each variable was computed for each of the
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5 years from 2011 to 2015. To calculate the average score for each variable, the
total score was divided by the number of years the study covers. I followed the
convention established in both Corporate Library and Brown and Caylor (2006)
where a high score indicates a strong corporate governance practice and a lower
score a weak corporate governance system. The separate measures of corporate
governance mechanisms were (a) board independence, (b) independence of the
audit committee, (c) executive compensation, (d) number of board meetings, and
(e) board size. I calculated the indices by following the equal weighting technique
in the G-Index and the E-Index. To ensure that the measurements were contentvalid, I defined adequately the key concepts of the constructs that I measured
(Bonna, 2012). The following definitions and measurements of the variables have
been adopted in this study:
Board Independence
In this dissertation study, I defined board independence as the proportion of
directors on the board that is independent, and whether the positions of the chair
of the board and the CEO are combined in one person or separated (CEO duality).
CEO duality arises when the positions of the chairperson and CEO are combined.
An independent director will have no financial ties with the firm, neither will he
or she be a former employee, auditor, or connected to a former or present
employee, auditor, finance provider, major supplier, or a large stockholder who
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owns 5% or more of the firm’s stock. I measure board independence using a 5point Likert scale, where 1 equals presence of CEO duality and less than 50% of
the board members are independent, 2 is presence of CEO duality and exactly
50% of board members are independent, 3 is the presence of CEO duality and
greater than 50% of board members are independent, 4 is absence of CEO duality
and exactly 50% of board members are independent, and 5 is absence of CEO
duality and greater than 50% of the board members are independent. A high score
indicates more independence while a low score means less independence of the
board of directors (Brown & Caylor, 2006).
Independence of the Audit Committee
Audit committee independence was defined as the proportion of independent
directors on the committee and whether the committee is free to communicate
with the internal auditor without the CEO’s approval. Ideally, the entire members
of the audit committee should be independent. Members of the committee are
independent if they do not have any financial ties with the firm, neither would
they be former employees, auditor, or connected to a former or present employee,
auditor, finance provider, major supplier, or a large stockholder who owns 5% or
more of the firm’s shares. To measure audit committee independence, I use a 5point Likert scale, where 1 equals independent members constitute less than 50%
of the total with no right to communicate with the chief internal auditor without

200

authorization of the CEO, 2 equals exactly 50% of the audit committee members
are independent without direct communication with the chief internal auditor, 3
equals independent members constitute more than 50% of the total but with no
right to communicate with the chief internal auditor, 4 equals independent
members equals 50% of the total and can communicate freely with the chief
internal auditor, and 5 equals more than 50% of the members are independent and
can freely communicate with the chief internal auditor. A high score indicates
more independence while a low score indicates less independence of the
committee.
Executive Compensation
The agency theory is based on the conflict that arises when ownership is separated
from control. Managers tend to pursue strategies motivated by self-interest. By
adequately remunerating the managers, especially by giving them ownership stake
in the company, the interest of managers and that of the shareholders should be
more closely aligned and agency costs reduced. Managers’ compensation was
measured by the total remuneration given to them, which may be a combination
of cash payments, stock options, paid holidays and insurance, and all kinds of
benefits-in-kind. In this dissertation study, I used the figure of the highest paid
director disclosed in the financial statements as proxy for executive
compensation. The CAMA in Nigeria makes it mandatory that a range of
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executive pay should be disclosed in the annual reports, including the amount
paid to the highest paid director.
Number of Board Meetings
The board of directors carries out its statutory duties by holding meetings. The
frequency of the meetings is an indication of the level of involvement of the
members in the firm’s activity, and the regularity of attendance of members
shows their commitment to the company. Knockaert et al. (2014) stated that the
frequency of meetings indicates board activity and the level of involvement of the
members in the organization. The Nigerian Company and Allied Matters Act of
1990 does not indicate the minimum frequency of board meetings, but the SEC
code of corporate governance says that directors should meet at least once every
quarter, and a director must attend at least two-thirds of all meetings. In this
study, I assigned one score to every full board meeting held during the year. For
example, when the board meets eight times in a year, I scored the firm 8, seven
meetings was scored 7, six meetings was scored 6, and so on.
Board Size
The size of the board is the number of directors on the board, including the
chairman and the CEO, but excluding alternate directors and the secretary of the
board. To measure the size of the board, I assigned 1 point to each director, using
the equal weighting approach. From the literature review, there has not been total
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agreement whether larger boards impact firm performance better than smaller
ones. Larger boards are prone to the problems of coordination, which may reduce
firm performance. On the other hand, larger boards tend to have a greater
diversity of experience, necessary management capacity, and ability for quality
advice and counseling to the top management of the firm. Many researchers have
stated that the coordination, communications, and free-rider problems in larger
boards may diminish the advantages of diversity of experience and ability for
quality and impartial advice (Al-Matar et al., 2014; Al-Najjar, 2014). Although
there is no absolute size for an active board, in this study, I adopted the view that
larger boards enhance better firm performance. I used the equal-weighting
approach in this study by scoring a 20-member board 20, a 19-member board 19,
an 18-member board 18, and so on.
Firm Size
The size of the firm confers advantages and disadvantages on the firm. A large
firm may be able to negotiate substantial discounts from suppliers, get
concessions from the government, and benefit from substantial cash available for
research and development. On the other hand, large firms tend to be inundated by
bureaucracy and red tape, bitter rivalry among executives, and complacency. In
this research, I adopted the view that large firms have the resources to engage in
research and development, negotiate good terms with suppliers and governmental
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agencies, attract and retain brilliant minds, and recruit directors that contribute
substantially to the firm’s performance. I used the natural logarithm of total assets
as the proxy for size of the firm.
Firm Age
The age of the firm is a proxy for experience. An older firm should be able to
withstand better a severe economic shock to the system than a new firm. The age
of the company may also be a point of attraction for employees who see older
firm as safe and steady, and a place to build careers on a long-term basis. In this
research, the age of the firm is measured as the number of years since
incorporation.
Financial Performance
In this study, I measured financial performance with three outcome variables. The
firms’ ROA is the EBITDA divided by the total book value of assets. The ratio
was calculated using the firms’ historical results published in the financial
statements and reports. I computed the ratio for each of the 5 years and then
divided by 5 to get the average for the 5 years. I also compared each of the
company’s accounting and disclosure policies to ensure that the financial
statements have been prepared, as much as possible, on the same basis of
accounting principles and concepts.
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ROA is the yield on the total capital employed in the corporation. Stockholders
invest in a particular stock to earn returns. The same capital could have been
invested in government treasury bills or bonds, which are far less risky than
investment in shares. ROA can be compared with returns on these guilt-edged
securities to know how efficient the company managers deploy the capital. ROA
was computed as the ratio of EBITDA and the total capital employed. The total
capital employed is the firm’s book value of equity plus preferred stocks and the
long-term borrowings.
Tobin’s Q, which is a market measure, is the third outcome variable in this
dissertation study. Tobin’s Q was defined as the ratio of the firm’s market value
to the replacement cost of its assets (Jermias & Gani, 2014). It is approximated to
the ratio of market value of common equity plus book value of preferred stock,
plus book value of long-term debt, plus book value of inventory, plus current
liability, minus book value of current assets, to book value of total assets
(Dharmadasa, Gamage, & Herath, 2014). Mathematically, Tobin’s Q is computed
as
MV (CS) + BV (PS) + BV (INV) + BV (CL) – BV (CA)
BV (TA) BV (TA)
Where MV and BV are market and book values respectively, CS, PS, LTD, INV, CL,
CA, and TA are respectively common stock, preferred stock, long-term debt,
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inventory, current liabilities, current assets, and total assets (Dharmadasa et al,
2014).
Data Collection Sources
The data collection in this dissertation study was from multiple sources. The
sources included the companies’ annual financial statements from 2011 to 2015
published and filed with the NSE and displayed in the firms’ corporate websites,
proxy documents, companies’ articles of association, press statements, the NSE
Daily Official List, and the Fact Book of the NSE Every company listed on the
stock exchange must cause its accounts to be audited by registered auditors and
filed with the exchange and other regulatory bodies.
Data were collected from the financial statements on the independence of the
board, the independence of the audit committee, executive compensation,
frequency of board meetings, the size of the board, the age and size of the
company, and the firms’ accounting ratios of return on assets, return on capital
employed, and Tobin’s Q. The market value of common stock is the price per
share of the common stock multiplied by total amount of stock outstanding. The
share price information for the 5 years was obtained from the historical data
department of the NSE. The firms’ total assets; EBITDA; current liabilities,
inventory; current assets; and book value of preferred shares were also obtained
from the published financial statements.
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Data Organization Techniques
I collected the data for this dissertation study from public documents that have been filed
with the NSE from 2011 to 2015. Every listed company is required to file their
annual financial statements with the exchange in compliance with the listing
requirements. The annual financial statements are also available from the websites
of the sampled companies. The various financial ratios and corporate governance
statistics collected from the annual reports and accounts was organized and
summarized into a composite dataset. I manually reviewed the data using
Microsoft Excel to ensure all errors were corrected before exporting the data to
SPSS for statistical analysis. The Excel spreadsheet is a good tool for calculating
the ratios and other figures for this study, specifically (a) ROA, (b) ROCE, (c)
Tobin’s Q, (d) mode, (e) mean, (f) standard deviation, (f) median, (g) sum, and (h)
variance. The SPSS was also used to calculate measures of central tendency such
as mean, median, and mode.
Data Analysis Plan
I carried out the data analysis with the aid of SPSS. The SPSS software contained
both the descriptive and inferential statistics. With the aid of the SPSS, I
computed measures of central tendency (i.e., the mean, median, mode, and sum;
dispersion measures such as standard deviation, variance, minimum and
maximum, and range; and partial correlations). Inferential statistics includes
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ANOVA analysis, the t test, and multiple regression analysis that enables a
researcher to calculate part and partial correlations, collinearity diagnostics, R
squared change, and residual statistics such as Durbin-Watson and casewise
diagnostics.
Prior to using the multiple regression analysis method to analyze my data, I
calculated a simple correlation analysis to identify the variables to be included in
the regression analysis. In the literature review section of this study, I developed
the theoretical framework based on agency, stakeholders, and stewardship
theories. I hypothesized that there was a statistical relationship between the
corporate governance mechanisms, measured by board independence, audit
committee independence, executive compensation, number of board meetings,
and board size, and firm performance. I also hypothesized that the age and size of
the firm were mediators of the relationship between corporate governance and
firm performance. The firm performance was measured by ROA, ROCE, and
Tobin’s Q. My aim was to examine whether the selected corporate governance
variables are predictive of organizational performance in nonfinancial companies
quoted on the NSE. It is possible that some of the predictor variables may be
measuring the same things, which will be revealed by Pearson’s Product Moment
correlation analysis.
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Many researchers have used multiple regression models to examine the
association between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. For
example, Yeh (2014) used multiple regression method to examine whether a
legally binding shareholder resolution has the effect of making the top
management to put in place a good corporate governance system. Pouziouris et al.
(2013) used multiple regression analysis to see whether family involvement in
management affects the performance in corporations listed on the LSE, using
agency and stewardship theories as the theoretical framework, and ROA and
Tobin’s Q as the outcome variables.
Francis et al. (2013) investigated the extent to which conservative accounting
affects the shareholder value in the S&P 1500 composite index between 2007 and
2009 using multiple regression analysis. Kouki and Guizani (2015) also used
multiple regression analysis to examine the extent to which the involvement of
independent directors affects firm performance in 30 companies listed on the
Tunisian Stock Exchange. Quttainah (2015) equally used multiple regression
analysis to examine the impact of internal and external mechanisms on firm
performance during the financial crisis of 2007 to 2008.
Based on the literature review, multiple regression analysis method is suitable as
the research design to examine the relationships between the variables that I have
chosen in this study. The generic equation is Y = a + b1X1 +b2X2 +..….+ bnXn +
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ε. Where Y is the dependent variable, X1…..Xn are the independent variables, a
is the intercept of the model, b1 to bn are the beta coefficients of the regression
model, and ε is the random error (Pedhazur, 1973). The five model specifications
for the multiple regression equations are as follows:
ROA = α1 + β1BodInd + β2AuditCommInd + β3BodSize + β4BdMtgs +
Β5Execomp + β6FirmAge + β7FirmSize + ε
ROCE = α2 + β8BodInd + β9AuditCommInd + β10BodSize + β11BodMtgs +
Β12Execomp + β13FirmAge + β14FirmSize + ε
Tobin’s Q = α3 + β15BodInd + β16AuditCommInd + β17BodSize + β18BodMtgs +
Β19Execomp + β20FirmAge + β21FirmSize + ε
FirmSize = α4 + β22BodInd + β23AuditCommInd + β24BodSize + β25BodMtgs +
Β26Execomp + β27FirmAge + β28FirmSize + ε
FirmAge = α5 + β29BodInd + β30AuditCommInd + β31BodSize + β32BodMtgs +
Β33Execomp + β34FirmAge + β35FirmSize + ε
Where a1 to a5 = the intercept of the model, BodInd = board independence,
AuditCommInd = audit committee independence, BodSize = board size, BodMgts
= number of board meetings, Execomp = executive compensation, FirmSize =
firm size, and FirmAge = firm age; β1 to β35 are the beta coefficients of the
regression model; ROA and ROCE are the return on assets and return on capital
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employed respectively; Tobin’s Q is ratio of the firm’s market value to the value
of the replacement cost of its assets; and ε is the random error in the model.
Threats to Validity
The research project must be logical, accurate, and credible to be useful to those
interested in answers to the research questions. The conclusion arrived at by the
researcher must be logically derived from the data, and the result should be
generalizable beyond the specific situations and conditions of the research.
Internal validity is the degree to which accurate results can be drawn on the
relationship between the variables, while external validity is the extent to which
the result can be generalized to other populations, geographic areas, or situations
(Leedy & Ormrod, 2010).
External Validity
The identified threat to external validity in this research is an unrepresentative
sample. To ensure that the research is generalizable, I took precautions to describe
the basis of the convenience sample I drew, and why some firms were removed
from the sample. The sampling strategy was based on convenience sampling, and
it involved including all the nonfinancial firms listed on the NSE that met the
predetermined criteria, such as availability of data, number of years since listed,
and market capitalization. All the companies that met the criteria of inclusion
were included in the study.
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Internal Validity
To prevent threats to internal validity in this research study, I took precaution to
eliminate all other possible explanations for the relationships that I examined. The
secondary data was collected from two sources. In the first case, data were
collected from published financial statements where information on corporate
governance and financial performance was obtained from the websites of the
firms. The same data was verified with the data available on the website of the
NSE. I paid particular attention to the computation of ratios, indexes, and
averages. I ensured there were no errors in aggregating the data of the sampled
firms over the 5-year period the study covered. To prevent errors of coding, I did
the coding personally and meticulously. I also handled every aspect of the data
analysis personally. In interpreting the result of my findings, I took account of all
the factors that may affect the internal validity of the result and I was careful not
to make exaggerated claims.
Construct Validity
According to Donovan and Hoover (2014), construct validity is probably the most
important way to consider the issue of validity in research. Construct validity is
the extent to which the variables measure what they are supposed to measure. The
measure must be logically compatible and in agreement with the underlying
concept. In this research study, the constructs measured were the independence of
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the board, the independence of the audit committee, executive compensation,
number of board meetings, and the size of the board. I also examined the
mediating role of firm size and age on the relationship between corporate
governance mechanisms and organizational performance. This study relied on
secondary data, and the data sheets were the instruments that reflected the values
of the variables measured. I constructed indices and ratios as needed, being
careful to ensure that the ratios and indices were accurate. According to Donovan
and Hoover, construct validity is probably the most important way to consider the
issue of validity in research. Construct validity is the extent to which the variables
measure what they are supposed to measure. The measure must be logically
compatible and in agreement with the underlying concept. In this research study,
the constructs measured were the independence of the board, the independence of
the audit committee, executive compensation, number of board meetings, and the
size of the board. I also examined the mediating role of firm size and age on the
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and organizational
performance. This study relied on secondary data, and the data sheets were the
instruments that reflected the values of the variables measured. I constructed
indices and ratios as needed, being careful to ensure that the ratios and indices
were accurate.
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Ethical Procedures
The following ethical procedures were adopted in this dissertation study:
Protection from harm. Secondary data was used throughout this study. No
human intervention was involved. Collection of secondary data would have
necessitated a more stringent measure on how to protect human subject. The most
vulnerable of the human subjects were children, drug addicts, prisoners, people
with mental health, pregnant woment, the elderly, the disabled, and many others.
Informed consent. The data used for construction of the indices was obtained
from publicly available documents. There was no need for informed consent. An
informed consent would be necessary if primary data were collected. In a survey
or questionnaire, participants’ consents must be obtained. Participants must also
be told that thgey are free to withdraw from the survey or participation in the
questionnaire at any time and stage they desire.
Right to privacy. I ensured that the raw data were kept in a fire-proofed, locked drawer,
and the information processed on SPSS is password-protected on the computer
and external disks and flash drives. No information will be released to any person,
and the sampled firms will not be identified by name. The data will be retained for
a minimum of 5 years.
Institutional Review Board (IRB). I collected data for this dissertation research study
after I received the approval from IRB. The IRB ensured that I fulfilled all
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conditions precedent to collecting the data before I was given the permission to
proceed. IRB did this to protect the integrity of my research.
Hypothesis Formulation
To answer the questions concerning the primary focus of this study, that is, whether there
is a linear relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and the three
dependent variables comprising ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s Q, I conducted many
statistical tests. The statistical tests were to examine whether there were linear
relationships between the outcome and predictor variables, and the statistical
significance or strength of the relationships, measured by the beta coefficients of
the independent variables. The hypotheses were as follows:
Null Hypothesis 1, H01: β1 = β2= β3 = β4 = β5 = β6 = β7 = 0
Alternative Hypothesis 1, H1: β1 ≠ β2≠ β3 ≠ β4 ≠ β5 ≠ β6 ≠ β7 ≠ 0
Null Hypothesis 2, H02: β8 = β9= β10 = β11 = β12 = β13 = β14 = 0
Alternative Hypothesis 2, H2: β8 ≠ β9 ≠ β10 ≠ β11 ≠ β12 ≠ β13 ≠ β14 ≠ 0
Null Hypothesis 3, H03: β15 = β16= β17 = β18 = β19 = β20 = β21 = 0
Alternative Hypothesis 3, H3: β15 ≠ β16 ≠ β17 ≠ β18 ≠ β19 ≠ β20 ≠ β21 ≠ 0
Null Hypothesis 4, H04: β22 = β23= 24 = β25 = β26 = β27 = β28 = 0
Alternative Hypothesis 4, H4: β22 ≠ β23 ≠ β24 ≠ β25 ≠ β26 ≠ β27≠ β28 ≠ 0
Null Hypothesis 5, H05: β29 = β30= β31 = β32 = β33 = β34 = β35 = 0
Alternative Hypothesis 5, H5: β29 ≠ β30 ≠ β31 ≠ β32 ≠ β33 ≠ β34≠ β35 ≠ 0

215

Null Hypothesis 6, H06: β36 = β37 = β38 = β39 = β40 = β41 = β42 = 0
Alternative Hypothesis 6, H6: β36 ≠ β37 ≠ β38 ≠ β39 ≠ β40 ≠ β41≠ β42 ≠ 0
Null Hypothesis 7, H07: β43 = β44 = β45 = β46 = β47 = β48 = β49 = 0
Alternative Hypothesis 7, H7: β43 ≠ β44 ≠ β45 ≠ β46 ≠ β47 ≠ β48≠ β49 ≠ 0
Null Hypothesis 8, H08: β50 = β51 = β52 = β53 = β54 = β55 = β56 = 0
Alternative Hypothesis 8, H8: β50 ≠ β51 ≠ β52 ≠ β53 ≠ β54 ≠ β55≠ β56 ≠ 0
A linear relationship exists between an independent and a dependent variable if the null
hypothesis is not correct. In other words, a linear relationship does not exist
between the outcome and the predictor variables if the null hypothesis, H0, is
correct. If the null hypothesis is rejected, it follows that the alternative hypothesis,
H1, should be accepted, meaning that a linear relationship exists between the
variables of interest. According to Field (2013), the assumption is that if the null
hypothesis is true, there is no effect. One of the best ways to establish whether or
not a linear relationship exists between the independent and dependent variable is
by generating a scatterplot, and physically examining whether the data points fall
on a straight line, even before running the analysis and testing for significance of
the relationship within the confidence interval initially assumed.
The Null Hypothesis Statistical Testing (NHST) fits the model to the data and then tests
the probability that there are no effects (Field, 2013, p.62). Once a linear
relationship between the independent and the dependent variables has been
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established, further tests will be conducted to determine the beta coefficients (β,
μ, λ, η, σ, δ, and π), and evaluate which of them are not equal to zero. I carried out
several statistical tests to determine the extent to which the variations in the
outcome variables were explained by the independent and mediating variables. A
stepwise regression model was used, where independent variables that do not
have explanatory power were dropped from the model in subsequent analyzes in
SPSS.
I have set the significance level at 5% in this study. This means that I will reject the null
hypothesis if the computed p-value is less than .05 (Field, 2013). In other words,
the probability of committing a Type 1 error is 5% (Hill & Lewicki, 2006). By
rejecting the null hypothesis, H0, I will be supporting what I actually believe is the
real-world situation, which is called a reject-support testing in many fields of
research (Hill & Lewicki, 2006, p. 408). To determine the strength of the
relationship between the variables, I ran multiple regression procedures on SPSS,
where the unadjusted and the adjusted R2 were displayed in the SPSS output.
While there are no benchmarks against which an effect size would be interpreted,
Vacha-Haase and Thompson (2004) stated that effect sizes should be interpreted
in the light of the relationship being studied and by comparing the effect sizes in
related prior studies rather than a rigid adherence to Cohen’s benchmarks of
small, medium, and large effect sizes. Cohen’s benchmarks may be more
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appropriate in new and important studies where there is little or no prior literature
(Vacha-Haase & Thompson, 2004, p.478).
Summary
Chapter 3 outlined the research method used to examine the relationship
between corporate governance mechanisms and organizational performance in the
39 sampled nonfinancial companies listed on the NSE. The research design was
quantitative, using multiple regression analysis to examine the relationship
between the variables. SPSS software was used to analyze the data. The
overarching research objective was to determine whether there was a statistically
significant association between corporate governance mechanisms and
organizational financial performance. Corporate governance mechanisms used in
the study were board independence, audit committee independence, board size,
number of board meetings, and executive compensation. Financial performance
was measured by ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s Q. The mediating variables were
firm size and firm age.
In chapter 4, I presented the result of my findings. First, I presented the
descriptive statistical analysis of the sampled firms using mean, median, mode,
range, and standard deviation. Secondly, I presented detailed statistical descriptive
analysis of the sampled companies by subsectors. Next, I presented inferential
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statistical analysis of the sampled companies and the result of the null hypothesis
statistical testing. Finally, I summarized the results of my findings.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
In this chapter of the dissertation study, I presented the research
findings. Descriptive and inferential statistics techniques were used to analyze the
data. Descriptive statistics were used to simplify, organize, summarize, and group
together the numerical data of all the sampled companies. The descriptive
statistics I used included measures of central tendency, comprising the mean,
median, sum, and mode of the distribution. To have an idea of how the data were
spread out or clustered, I used the measure of dispersion provided by the SPSS,
including the range, standard deviation, variance, minimum, and maximum. I
used inferential statistics, including ANOVA and NHST, to generalize about the
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and organizational
performance in nonfinancial firms quoted on the NSE. In Chapter 5, which is the
last chapter of the study, I will examine a correlation matrix of the predictor
variables and the presence of any multicollinearity and unusual cases problems. I
will also summarize my findings and make recommendations on how corporate
governance practices could be strengthened in Nigerian companies.
In this study, the 39 sampled companies were distributed across
various market subsectors as follows: agriculture (5.13%), conglomerates
(7.69%), consumer goods (30.78%), construction/real estate (5.13%), healthcare
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(7.69%), information and communication technology (2.56%), industrial goods
(12.82%), natural resources (2.56%), oil and gas (7.69%), and services (17.95%).
The data for the study were collected for a span of 5 years, from January 1, 2011
to December 31, 2015, and covered 39 of the 116 nonfinancial companies listed
on the NSE that met the study’s specified criteria. The data were retrieved from
the websites of the NSE, Nigerian SEC, and the sampled companies’
websites.The search sources, keywords used in the study, and the processes
adopted for the search are fully explained in Appendix A to this study. Also, the
search sources included peer-reviewed journals that were retrieved from academic
research database systems. The scoring methodology is listed in Appendix B. In
Appendix C, I listed the 39 firms that were sampled for this dissertation study.
This chapter of the study is divided into seven sections. In the first
section, I focused on descriptive analysis of the 39 sampled firms. In the second
section, I presented how I used inferential statistical analysis methods to examine
the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and ROA. The third
section of the study focused on inferential statistical analysis between corporate
governance mechanisms and ROCE, while in the fourth section I will presented
inferential statistical analysis between corporate governance mechanisms and
Tobin’s Q. The fifth section contained the results of my inferential statistical
analysis that examined whether the age and size of the firms mediates the
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relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and organizational
financial performance. In the sixth section, I will presented the result of my
examination of correlation matrix and multicollinearity and other problems of the
independent corporate governance variables. In the seventh and last section, I
presented the conclusion of the chapter.
Descriptive Statistical Analysis of the Sampled Firms by Variables
In the first section of this chapter, I presented the descriptive
statistics of all the sampled companies using the mean, median, mode, range, and
standard deviation of ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s Q in all the 10 subsectors of the
39 sampled nonfinancial firms quoted on the NSE between 2011 and 2015. The
descriptive statistics also covered the five corporate governance variables,
including board independence, audit committee independence, board size, number
of board meetings, and executive compensation as well as the two mediating
variables of age and size of the firm.
The largest firm in the sample in terms of market capitalization,
using the average rate of foreign exchange during the 5 years from 2011 to 2015
of 158 naira to one U.S. dollar, had a mean market value of $6.7 billion. The
smallest firm in the sample had an average market capitalization of $2.3 million.
The average market capitalization of all the 39 sampled firms between 2011 and
2015 was $521 million, with a median of $78 million and standard deviation of
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$1.3 billion. The average capitalization of all firms in the sample in 2011, 2012,
2013, 2014, and 2015 was $348 million, $511 million, $691 million, $598
million, and $458 million respectively.
Return on Assets (ROA)
In 2011, the mean ROA for all the 39 sampled firms was 16%, the
highest was 47%, and the lowest was 2%. The median ROA for 2011 was 12%
and the standard deviation was 11%. In 2012, the average ROA was 17% for all
the 39 sampled firms, the highest was 60% and the lowest 3%. The median ROA
in 2012 was 11% and standard deviation was 12%. The average ROA in 2013 was
17% for all the sampled companies while the median was 13% with a standard
deviation of 12%. The highest and lowest ROA in 2013 were 71% and 6%
respectively. In 2014, the mean return on assets for all the sampled firms was
15%, with a median of 13% and a standard deviation of 13%. The highest ROA
for 2014 was 82% and the lowest was 6%. In 2015, the mean return on assets was
15% for all the sampled companies, the highest being 78% and the lowest 1%. In
2015, the median ROA for all the sampled corporations was 12%, and the
standard deviation was 12%.
Return on Capital Employed (ROCE)
The mean ROCE for all the 39 sampled firms was 37% in 2011,
37% in 2012, 35% in 2013, 34% in 2014, and 36% in 2015. For the 5 years
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covered by this study, the mean ROCE was 36%, the median was 24%, and the
standard deviation 32%. The highest ROCE among the 39 sampled firms in 2011
was 123%, the lowest was 3%, and the median and standard deviation were 26%
and 29% respectively. In 2012, the highest ROCE was 155% and the lowest was
8%. The median return on capital employed was 21% and the standard deviation
was 32%. The highest and lowest ROCE in 2013 were 171% and 10%
respectively, the median was 22% and the standard deviation was 33%. In 2014,
the mean return on assets was 34%, the median was 24%, and the standard
deviation was 32%. In 2015, the highest ROCE was 230% and the lowest was
3%, with a median of 24% and standard deviation of 32%.
Tobin’s Q
The mean Tobin’s Q for all the 39 sampled firms between 2011
and 2015 was 1.65, while in 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 the average
Tobin’s Q was 1.51, 1.68, 2.07, 1.76, and 1.23 respectively. The median Tobin’s
Q between 2011 and 2015 for all the 39 sampled firms was 1.04 and the standard
deviation was 1.72. The highest Tobin’s Q in 2011 was 12.13 and the lowest -.24,
with median of 1.02 and standard deviation of 2.07. In 2012, the highest Tobin’s
Q was 5.42 and the lowest -.74; the median was .89 and the standard deviation
was 1.82. In 2014 and 2015, the mean Tobin’s Q was 1.76 and 1.23 respectively,
the highest was 8.12 and 7.8, and the lowest -.28 and -.44 respectively for the 2

224

years. In 2015, the median Tobin’s Q was 1.04 and the standard deviation was
1.72.
Board Independence
The highest score for board independence was 5, measured on a 5point Likert scale where 5 indicates a completely independent board and 1 a
complete lack of independence. The mean score for board independence for the 5
years from 2011 to 2015 for all the 39 sampled firms listed on the NSE was 4.97.
In 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015, the average score of board independence for
each of these years was 4.97 as well. The highest score in each of the 5 years from
2011 to 2015 for board independence for the 39 sampled companies was 5 and the
lowest 4.The median for each of the 5 years was 5, the mode was 5, and the
standard deviation was also 5.
Audit Committee Independence
The independence of a firm’s audit committee in this study is
measured on a 5-point Likert scale, where 5 indicates a completely independent
audit committee and 1 a complete absence of independence. The mean score for
audit committee independence for all the 39 sampled firms for the 5 years
between 2011 and 2015 was 4.03. The average score in each of the 5 years was
also 4.03. The highest score in each of the 5 years was 5 and the lowest score was
3. The median and mode in all the 5 years was 4 with a standard deviation of .28.
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Board Size
The mean board size in all the 39 sampled corporations listed on
the NSE between 2011 and 2015 was nine, the median was nine, the mode was
seven, with a standard deviation of two. In each of the 5 years from 2011 to 2015,
the average board size was nine in the 39 sampled corporations. The highest board
size between 2011 and 2015 was 15. The lowest board size in 2011 and 2012 was
five, and in 2013, 2014, and 2015, it was four. The median board size between
2011 and 2015 was nine; the mode was nine in 2011 and 2012, seven in 2013, and
seven and nine in 2014 and 2015 respectively. The standard deviation in the size
of the board was 2.16 in 2011, 2.35 in 2012, 2.22 in 2013, 2.46 in 2014, and 2.75
in 2015.
Number of Board Meetings
The mean number of board meetings for the 5 years from 2011 to
2015 was five, the median was five, and the standard deviation was one. For the
individual years, all the 39 sampled companies had five board meetings on
average during 2011 and 2015; a mean of four in 2011 and 2012, and an average
of five in 2013 and 2015. The mode was four in all the 5 years from 2011 to 2015.
The highest number of board meetings in 2011 was seven and the lowest two. In
2012, the highest was number of board meetings was seven in 2012 and the
lowest was three. In 2013 and 2014, the highest number of board meetings was
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seven and the lowest was three and four respectively. In 2015, the highest number
of board meetings in all the 39 sampled firms listed on the NSE was seven and the
lowest was four.
Executive Compensation
The mean executive compensation in all the 39 sampled firms
between 2011 and 2015 was $214,378; the median was $144,304; and the mode
was $31,646 with a standard deviation of $200,583. The mean executive
compensation in 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 was $181,110; $195,067;
$196,527; $265,985; and $233,204 respectively. In 2011, the highest executive
compensation was $917,722 and the lowest was $31,646. The median executive
compensation in 2011 was $120,253; the mode was $94,937; with a standard
deviation of $192,666. The highest executive compensation in 2012 was $886,076
and the lowest was $31,646. The highest executive compensation in 2013 was
$917,722; the lowest was $31,646; the median was $126,582; and the mode was
$31,646 with a standard deviation of $203,947. In 2014 and 2015, the highest
executive compensation was $949,367 and $974,684 respectively; the median was
$126,582 in 2014 and $151,899 in 2015; and the mode in 2014 and 2015 was
$211,519 and $63,291 respectively. The standard deviation of executive
compensation in the sampled companies in 2014 and 2015 was $319,527 and
$235,888 respectively.
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Firm Age
The mean age of the 39 sampled firms listed on the NSE between
2011 and 2015 was 46 years, the median was 48 years, the mode was 54 years
with a standard deviation of 25 years. In 2011, the mean age of the firms was 44
years, the median age was 46 years, and the mode was 52 years with a standard
deviation 25 years. In 2012 and 2013, the mean age of the companies was 45 and
46 years and the highest age was 133 years and 134 years respectively. The
lowest firm age in 2012 and 2013 was 7 years and 8 years respectively. In 2014
and 2015, the average age of the firms was 47 and 48 years and the median was
49 and 50 years respectively, while the mode was 55 years and 56 years
respectively, with a standard deviation of 25 years.
Firm Size
The average size of the firms in the 5 years between 2011 and
2015 was 10 natural logarithms, the mean and mode was 10, and the standard
deviation was one. The mean size in 2011 was nine natural logarithms and 10
between 2012 and 2015. The standard deviation in all the 5 years was two, the
median was nine in 2011 and 10 during 2012 to 2015. The highest and lowest
sizes of the firms, measured in natural logarithms, in 2011 to 2013 was 12 and six
respectively. In 2014 and 2015, the highest firm size was 13 and the lowest seven,
measured in natural logarithms.
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Descriptive Analysis of the Firms by Sector
The 39 sampled companies listed on the NSE were in 10 sectors of
the economy. Two were in agriculture, three were listed as conglomerates, two
were in construction and real estate, 12 firms were into the manufacturing of
consumer goods, three were in healthcare services, one company was in
information and communications technology, five companies produced industrial
goods, one produced natural resources, three companies were in the oil and gas
business, and seven corporations provided various services to their clients. The
largest subsector was consumer goods with 12 companies, followed by the
services subsector that had seven companies. The smallest subsectors, that had
only one company representing the subsector, were information and
communication technology and natural resource subsectors.
Agricultural Subsector
Two companies were represented in the agricultural subsector out
of the 39 sampled nonfinancial firms listed on the NSE between 2011 and 2015.
The companies were grouped into livestock feeds, poultry, and palm oil
processing and marketing. The larger company in this subsector had a mean
market value of $173.63 million and the smaller firm had an average market value
of $25.6 million. The mean market value in this subsector was $99.6 million with
a standard deviation of $104.70 and a range of $148.03 million. The average ROA
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for this subsector was 15% with a median of 15% and a standard deviation of 2%.
The higher ROA was 17% and the smaller ROA was 14% with a range of 3%.
The mean ROCE for the agricultural subsector was 33%, with a
median of 33% and a standard deviation of 18%. The higher ROCE was 46% and
the smaller was 21%, with a range of 25%. The average Tobin’s Q for this
subsector was 1.52, the higher Tobin’s Q was 2.22, and the smaller was .81. The
range of Tobin’s Q for this sub-sector was 1.41 with a standard deviation of 1.
The average board size for the sub-sector was 9 members. Both companies in this
subsector had a chairperson different from the CEO, and nonexecutive members
of the board constituted, on average, 80% of the members in the larger company
and 71% of the members in the smaller company. The average number of board
committees in this subsector was three, and these were remuneration, risk and
governance, and audit committees. The annual report and accounts included
sections on corporate governance report, statement of directors’ responsibilities,
report of the directors, and report of the audit committee. The average number of
statutory audit committee members in this subsector was six; three were
composed of company executives while the other three were nonexecutive or
independent directors.
The highest paid executive in this subsector received on average
$97,468 per annum and the least paid received $31,646. The mean total
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compensation was $64,557 with a standard deviation of $46,544 and a range of
$65,822. The average age of the firm in the subsector was 36 years with a
standard deviation of 36 years; the older firm had a mean age of 50 years since
incorporation and the younger had a mean age of 21 years, with a range of 29
years. The mean size of firms in this subsector was 9.28, measured with the
natural logarithm of total assets. The larger firm in the subsector had an average
size of 10.50, and the smaller firm had a size of 8.06, with a range of 2.44 and a
standard deviation of 1.73.
Conglomerates Subsector
The conglomerates subsector was represented by three firms. The
subsector was classified as corporations engaged in various businesses such as
transportation, consumer goods, industrial machinery and goods, hotels and
tourism, and manufacturing of consumer staples. The 5-year average market
capitalization of the companies in the sub-sector was $336 million with standard
deviation of $271 million. The largest company in this subsector had a mean
market capitalization of $494 million and the smallest company had an average
market value of $23.3 million with a range of $470.70 million.
The 5-year average ROA for this subsector was 15%, a median of
14%, with a standard deviation of 8%. The average ROCE for the subsector was
22% with a median of 22% and a standard deviation of 10%. The 5-year average
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Tobin’s Q for the subsector was 1.64, the median was 1.65 and the standard
deviation was 1.3. The largest firm in the subsector had a mean Tobin’s Q of 2.95
and the smallest a Tobin’s Q of .34, given a range of 2.61. Nonexecutive directors
in the firms constituted on average 72% of the members of the board of directors.
The average board size in this subsector was eight directors, and the largest
company had a mean of nine directors during 2011 to 2015, while the smallest
had eight as the as the average number of directors during the same period. The
average number of audit committee members was 6 with a zero standard
deviation. All the companies in this subsector had on average six members of the
audit committee, composed of three executive and three nonexecutive directors.
The average number of board meetings in this subsector was five
with a median of four meetings and a standard deviation of 1.6 meetings. The 5year average executive compensation was $307,173; the median compensation
was $202,532 with a standard deviation of $274,862. The highest paid executive
received on average $618,987 and the lowest received $100,000 with a range of
$518,987.The average age of the firms in the sub-sector was 73 years. The highest
age of the oldest firm since incorporation was 134 years and the average age of
the youngest firm was 9 years old since incorporation. The median age was 73
years and the standard deviation was 76 years. The average firm size in the
subsector, measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, was 9.93 with a
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median age of 9.83 natural logarithms and a standard deviation of .17 natural
logarithms.
Construction/Real Estate Subsector
The construction/real estate subsector was represented by two
companies. The subsector had a 5-year average market value of $268.76 million
with a standard deviation of $185.13 million. The larger firm in this subsector had
an average market value of $399.69 million and the smaller firm had a mean
market value of $137.85 million, giving a range of $261.84 million. The mean
ROA for this subsector was 7%; the median ROA was 7% with a standard
deviation of 3%. The company with the higher ROA had 9% and the smaller
company had 5% with a standard deviation of 3%. The 5-year averageROCE was
58%, the median ROCE was 58% with a standard deviation of 69%. The firm
with the higher average ROCE had 107% and the one with the lower average
ROCE had 9%, giving a range of 98%. The mean Tobin’s Q for this sub-sector
was .46, the median Tobin’s Q was .46, and the standard deviation was .22. The
company with the higher average Tobin’s Q had .61 and the firm with lower
average Tobin’s Q had .30.
The average size of the board in the subsector was nine members
with a standard deviation of two members. The larger board had on average 10
members and the smaller company had seven members. The average proportion
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of nonexecutive directors on the board of directors was 72% with a standard
deviation of 1%. The company with the higher proportion of nonexecutives
directors on the board had an average of 73% of all directors as nonexecutives and
the other company had 71% of directors as nonexecutives. The average number of
audit committee members in the subsector was six; three members are executive
directors while three are nonexecutive or independent directors.
The average number of board meetings in the subsector was 5.3
meetings in a year with a standard deviation of .99 meetings and a median of 5.3
meetings. The bigger company had on average six meetings in a year while the
smaller firm had 4.6 meetings on average. The mean executive compensation in
this subsector was $241,139 with a standard deviation of $147,687 and a median
of $241,139. The higher paid executive in this sub-sector received on average
$345,570 in a year while the lower paid executive received $136,709, giving a
range of $208,861.The average age of the firm since incorporation in the subsector was 32 years with a standard deviation of 22 years. The older firm had a
mean age of 47 years and the younger company had a mean age of 16 years, with
a range of 31 years. In this subsector, the mean size of the firms was 11.69,
measured in natural logarithm of total assets, with a median of 11.69, and a
standard deviation of .77.
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Consumer Goods Subsector
Twelve companies represented the consumer goods subsector. The
firms in this subsector engage in the manufacturing, marketing, and distribution of
fast moving goods such as toiletries, baby foods, chocolates, full cream milk,
toothpaste, sugar, and foams and mattresses. Others engage in beer and cold
beverage production, flour, pasta, and cornflakes. The subsector is not the only
the largest in terms of the number of the companies, it also represented the most
profitable sector amongst the sampled sectors. The 5-year mean market value of
this sub-sector was $1.43 billion; the median market value was $673.14 million
with a standard deviation of $2.045 billion. The mean ROA for the sub-sector was
19%; the median ROA was 19% with the standard deviation of 10%. The
company with the highest ROA had 35% and the firm with the smallest ROA
recorded 9%. The range of ROA in the subsector was 26%. The 5-year average
return on capital employed (ROCE) was 42%, the median ROA was 35% with a
standard deviation of 24%. The company with the highest ROCE posted 94% on
average while the company with the smallest ROCE recorded 16% on average.
The range of ROCE in the subsector was 78%.
The 5-year mean Tobin’s Q for the sub-sector was 2.57 with a
median of 2.58 and a standard deviation of 1.85. The firm with the highest
average Tobin’s Q had 6.85 and the one with the lowest had .74, giving a range of
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6.11. The average size of the board in this sub-sector was 10 members with a
standard deviation of two members. The company with the largest board had 14
members on average and the one with the smallest had seven members, giving a
range of seven members. In this subsector, the proportion of nonexecutive
directors on the board of directors was on average 69%, with a standard deviation
of 12%. This means that over two-third of the members of the board of directors
were nonexecutives. The company with the highest proportion of non-executive
directors to the total number of directors had 90% of the members as nonexecutive directors, while the one with the smallest proportion of nonexecutive
directors had equal number of executive and nonexecutive directors, giving a
range of 40%.
The average number of audit committee members in this sector
was 5.87 members with a standard deviation of .30. The firm with the highest
number of members had six and the one with the lowest number of members had
on average 5.6; the range was .4. The 5-year mean number of meetings was 4.8
meetings in a year with a median of 4.8 meetings and a standard deviation of .77.
The firm that held the highest number of meetings in a year on average had six
meetings and the company with the lowest number of meetings held four
meetings on average. The average executive compensation in the 5-year period
was $322,046; the median executive compensation was $268,354 with a standard
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deviation of $269,729. The company with the highest paid executive paid
$929,114 on average and the firm with the lowest paid executive paid on average
$31,646. The mean age of the firm in this subsector was 49 years with a standard
deviation of 20 years. The oldest company had a mean age of 63 years since
incorporation and the youngest firm had a mean age of 8 years, with a range of 55
years. The 5-year mean firm size, measured with the natural logarithm of total
assets was 10.78 and the median size was 10.85 with a standard deviation of 1.33.
The biggest firm in terms of total assets in natural logarithms had 12.54 and the
smallest firm had 7.91, with a range of 4.63.
Healthcare Subsector
Three firms represented the healthcare sector among the 39
sampled companies listed on the NSE between 2011 and 2015. The corporations
are in the business of manufacturing prescription and over-the-counter drugs,
health drinks, oral hygiene products, intravenous fluids, and table water. The 5year mean market value of the sub-sector was $110.55 million with a standard
deviation of $165.29 million. The biggest firm in the subsector had a mean market
value of $301.36 million and the smallest company had a mean market
capitalization of $11.28 million, giving a range of $290.08 million. The 5-year
mean return on assets (ROA) for the sector was 14% with a standard deviation of
4% and a median ROA of 14%. The company with the highest mean ROA had
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18% and the firm while the smallest had average ROA of 10%, with a range of
8%. The average ROCE for this subsector was 26% with a standard deviation of
23%. The firm with the highest ROCE had 38% on average and the company with
the smallest ROCE had 16%, making the range 22%.
The 5-year average Tobin’s Q for the sub-sector was 1.06, the
median was .54 with a standard deviation was 1.06. The company with the highest
average ROCE had 2.28 and the firm with the average lowest ROCE had .35,
giving a range of 1.93. The average board size in this subsector was nine
members, with a standard deviation of one. The highest average board size was
9.8 and the lowest average board size was 8.60 with a range of 1.20. The 5-year
average of the proportion of nonexecutive directors to the total board size was
64% with a standard deviation of 13%. The highest proportion of non-executive
directors to the total board size was 80% and the smallest proportion was 56%
with a range of 24%.
The 5-year average number of members of the audit committee
was six with a standard deviation of zero. The largest and smallest number of
audit committee was six during 2011 to 2015. Executive directors constituted
50% of the member while nonexecutive and independent directors constituted the
other half. Different individuals served as chair of the board and company CEO
during the period; there was a complete absence of CEO duality in the subsector.
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The average number of meetings held in a year was 4.8 meetings, with a median
of 4.2 and standard deviation of 1.22. The company with the highest average
number of meetings held six meetings in a year and the company with the
smallest number of meetings held four meetings, giving a range of two meetings.
The highest paid executive in this subsector received on average a compensation
of $230,380, with the median compensation being $221,519 with a standard
deviation $15,347. The company with the highest paid executive paid $248,101
and the least paid executive received $221,519, giving a range $26,582. The mean
age of the firms in this subsector was 44 years; the median age was 47 years with
a standard deviation was 27 years. The average age of the oldest firm in the
subsector was 69 years and the average age of the youngest was 15 years old,
giving a range of 54 years. The 5-year average firm size, measured in natural
logarithms of total assets, was 9.51 with a standard deviation of .56. The biggest
firm size had a total of 10.10 in natural logarithms of total assets and the smallest
had 8.98 with a range of 1.12.
Information and Communications Technology Subsector
This subsector was represented by only one company. The
company offers alternative payment channels, mobile banking applications,
international money transfer, and telephone billing and collection services. The
average market capitalization for this company and the sector it represented was
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$88.78 million with a standard deviation of $28.35 million. The highest market
value in the five years from 2011 to 2015 was $131.32 million and the lowest was
$61.67 million, giving a range of $69.65 million. The mean ROA for the five
years was 10% with a standard deviation of 17%. The highest ROA was 18% and
the lowest was 5% with a range of 13%. The average ROCE was 19% with a
standard deviation of 12%. The highest ROCE in the period was 31% and the
lowest was 3% with a range of 28%. The 5-year mean for Tobin’s Q was 3.81
with a standard deviation of 4.76. The highest Tobin’s Q for this subsector was
12.13 and the lowest was .11 with a range of 11.92.
The average board size for this sector was seven members with a
standard deviation of two members. The highest number of the members of the
board during the period was nine and the lowest was five, giving a range of four
members. In this sector, nonexecutive directors constituted 77% of the members
of the board on a 5-year average; the highest percentage of non-executive
directors to the total board size during the period was 86% and the lowest was
67%, giving a range of 19%. There was no CEO duality in this sector, as different
individuals served as chair of the board and the company’s CEO. The average size
of the audit committee was six members with a standard deviation of .89. The
highest average number of audit committee members during the period was six
and the lowest was four members with a range of two members. During the
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period, the average number of board meetings held in the firm was five with a
standard deviation of .84. The highest number of meetings was six and the lowest
four.
The highest paid director in this subsector earned an average
compensation of $126,582. The highest and lowest compensation paid was
$126,582. The average age of the firm in the subsector was 10 years with a
standard deviation of 2 years. The highest number of years since incorporation
was 12 years and the lowest 8 years. The mean firm size, measured in the natural
logarithm of total assets was 8.62 with a standard deviation of 1.11. The largest
size was 10.41 and smallest size was 7.39.
Industrial Goods Subsector
The industrial goods subsector was represented by five companies
and it the third largest sub-sector in the 10 subsectors of the 39 sampled
nonfinancial firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange between 2011 and 2015.
The companies are into the manufacturing of aluminum doors and windows;
industrial, household, and marine paints and coatings; industrial packaging; and
other materials. The average market value for the subsector was $34.19 million
with a standard deviation of $60.65 million. The largest company in the subsector had an average market capitalization of $142.37 million and the smallest
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company had a mean market value of $2.34 million, giving a range of $140.03
million.
The 5-year average ROA for this subsector was 21% with a
median ROA of 9% and a standard deviation of 27%. The highest average ROA
was 68% and the smallest was 4%, giving a range of 64%. The mean ROCE for
the sub-sector was 48% with a standard deviation of 78% and a median of 18%.
The highest average ROCE was 169% and the lowest was 10%, giving a range of
159%. The 5-year average Tobin’s Q for this subsector was 2.06 with a standard
deviation of 2.99 and a mean of .78. The highest average Tobin’s Q was 7.37 and
the smallest was .6 with a range of 6.77.
The 5-year average board size was seven with a standard deviation
of two. The company with the largest average board size had 10 members and the
smallest had five members. All the companies had the positions of the chair of the
board and CEO held by different directors, meaning that there was absence of
CEO duality in all the firms. Non-executive directors constituted on average 75%
of the total number of board members with a standard deviation of 145. The
highest proportion of non-executive directors was 85% and the lowest was 55%.
The average number of audit committee members was 6 with a standard deviation
of .27. The members were equally divided among the executive and nonexecutive directors. The highest and lowest number of audit committee members
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was 6. The average number of board meetings held in the subsector was six with a
standard deviation of 1.51. The highest number of meetings held was seven and
the lowest was three, giving a range of four meetings.
The 5-year average executive compensation for the subsector was
$59,494 with a standard deviation of $15,163. The highest paid executive in this
subsector received $83,544 and the lowest paid executive received $51,899,
giving a range of $31,645. The average age of the firms in this sub-sector was 63
years with a standard deviation of 12 years. The oldest firm was 80 years old
since incorporation and the youngest firm was 54 years old, with a range of 26
years. The average size of the companies in this sub-sector, measured by the
natural logarithm of total assets, was 8.02 with a standard deviation of .94 and a
median of 8.20. The largest firm had a total of 9.07 on average while the smallest
firm had a total of 6.05 on average with a range of 3.02, measured in natural
logarithms of total assets.
Natural Resources Subsector
The natural resources subsector was represented by only one
company. The firm manufactures industrial gases, gas mixtures, and liquefied
petroleum gas. The 5-year average market value for this sector was $15.74 million
with a standard deviation of $3.24 million. The highest market value was $17.55
million and the lowest was $9.99 million with a range of $7.56 million. The
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average ROA was 21% with a standard deviation of 8%. The highest ROA was
32% and the lowest was 13%, with a range of 19%. The average ROCE was 34%
with a standard deviation of 14%. The highest ROCE was 54% and the lowest
was 19%. The 5-year average Tobin’s Q was .81 with a standard deviation of .31.
The highest Tobin’s Q was 1.25 and the lowest was .48.
The average board size for this subsector was six members with a
standard deviation of zero; the size of the board was maintained at six members
throughout 2011 to 2015. The chairperson of the board was different from the
CEO, indicating absence of CEO duality in the subsector. More than two thirds of
the board was composed of nonexecutive directors; and this proportion was
maintained throughout 2011 and 2015. The average number of the members of
the audit committee was four between 2011 and 2015 with a standard deviation of
zero; half of the members of the committee were composed of executive directors
and the other half were made up of nonexecutive or independent directors.
The average number of board meetings held in the subsector was
five with a standard deviation of one; the highest number of meetings was six and
the lowest four. The 5-year average executive compensation was $206,329 with a
standard deviation of $97.497. The highest executive pay was $215,190 and the
lowest was $126,582 with a range of $88,608. The average age of the firm was 54
years with a standard deviation of 2 years. The average firm size, measured in the
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natural logarithm of total assets, was 7.95 with a standard deviation of .17. The
largest average size was 8.14 and the smallest average size was 7.71; making the
range .43.
Oil and Gas subsector
The oil and gas sub-sector was represented by three companies.
Two of the companies are in downstream oil sector where they engage in the
marketing and sale of premium motor spirits and vehicle lubricants. The other
company combines downstream operations with the manufacture and sale of
lubricants and upstream activities. The 5-year average market value for the subsector was $154.42 million with a standard deviation of $164.45 million. The
largest company in this sector had an average market capitalization of $142.37
million and the smallest had an average market capitalization of $42.46 million
with a range of $99.91 million. The average ROA was 10% with a standard
deviation of 4%. The company with the highest average ROA had a return on
assets of 14% and the company with the smallest ROA had 6%; giving a range of
8%. The 5-year average ROCE was 43% with a standard deviation of 37%. The
largest average ROCE was 85% and the smallest was 20% giving a range of 60%.
The 5-year average Tobin’s Q for this subsector was .94 with a
standard deviation of .53. The highest average Tobin’s Q was 1.26 and the
smallest was .33 with a range of .93. The average board size for the sector was
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seven directors with a standard deviation of three directors. The highest average
board size was 10 directors and the smallest was three directors with a range of
five directors. Seventy-seven percent of the total number of directors in this
subsector was composed of non-executive directors with a standard deviation of
.05. The highest proportion of nonexecutive directors to the total board size was
80% and the smallest was 71% with a range of 9%. None of the companies in this
sub-sector had a chairperson who was also the CEO: There was an absence of
CEO duality in the subsector.
The average number of audit committee members in the subsector
was five with a standard deviation of .92. The highest average number of audit
committee members was six and the smallest was four with a range of 2.The 5year average number of board meetings was four with a standard deviation of .42.
The highest average number of meetings was five and the smallest was four. The
5-year average executive compensation in the sub-sector was $186,076 with a
standard deviation of $197,468. The highest paid executive received on average
$325,316 and the least paid received $35,443. The average firm age was 42 years
with a standard deviation of 17 years. The oldest firm was on average 57 years
and the youngest was 24 years with a range of 33 years. The average size of the
firms, measured with the natural logarithm of total assets was 10.61 with a
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standard deviation of .97. The largest firm had a size of 11.26 and the smallest
had a size of 9.5 with a range of 1.76.
The Services Subsector
The services subsector was represented by seven firms and it was
the second largest sector among the 10 sectors of the 39 sampled nonfinancial
companies listed on the NSE. The firms in this sector represented businesses in
airline services and logistics, vehicle and heavy equipment leasing, hotel and
tourism services, courier and mail delivery services, and aviation logistics
provision. Others are in the business of large format printing and advertisement
services. The 5-year average market value in this sector was $54.51 million with a
standard deviation of $84.89 million. The largest firm had a mean market
capitalization of $242.21 million and the smallest company had an average market
capitalization of $5.38 million with a range of $236.83 million.
The average ROA for this sub-sector was 12% with a standard
deviation of 4% and a median of 11%. The firm with the highest average ROA
had 19% and the company with the smallest ROA had 6% with a range of 13%.
The average ROCE was 21% with a standard deviation of 7% and a median of
20%. The highest average ROCE was 33% and the smallest ROCE was 13%,
giving a range of 20%. The 5-year mean Tobin’s Q for the subsector was .53 with
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a standard deviation of .46. The firm with the average highest Tobin’s Q had 1.04
and the smallest was .35, giving a range of .69. The median Tobin’s Q was .53.
The average size of the board of directors in this subsector was
nine with a standard deviation of two. The biggest size was 12 members of the
board on average and the smallest size was six members, giving a range of six
members. All the firms in this subsector had separate chair of the board and CEO.
On average, 80% of the members of the board were composed of nonexecutive
directors with a standard deviation of .07. The highest proportion of nonexecutive
directors to the total board size averaged .89 and the lowest was .71, giving a
range of .18.
The average number of audit committee members was six with a
standard deviation of .76. The highest number of audit committee was six and the
smallest was four with a range of two. The audit committee was composed of
equal number of executive and nonexecutive directors. The average number of
board meetings was five with a standard deviation of four. The highest number of
board meetings held was five and the smallest was four with a range of one. The
average executive compensation for the subsector was $152,260 with a standard
deviation of $154,672 and a median of $69,620. The highest paid executive in the
subsector received $462,025 on average and the least paid executive received
average compensation of $31,646 with a range of $430,379. The average age of
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the firms in this subsector was 29 years with a standard deviation of 10.46 years
and a median of 29 years. The oldest firm was 48 years old and the youngest was
aged 17 years, giving a range of 31 years. The average firm size, measured as the
natural logarithm of total assets, was 8.64 with a standard deviation of .93 and a
median of 8.83. The biggest firm had a size of 9.83 and the smallest had 7.27,
measured in natural logarithm of total assets, with a range of 2.56.
In Table 1, I summarized the descriptive statistics of the sampled subsectors and their performance. The performance indicators were the average
ROA, average ROCE, and average Tobin’s Q values. The performances of firms
in the sub-sectors were classified as followed: For ROA, 15% was classified as
below average performance, 15% to 20% was classified as average, and above
20% was classified as above average. For ROCE, below 20% was classified as
below average performance, 20% to 25% was classified as average performance,
and above 25% was classified as above average performance. Tobin’s Q below 1
was classified as below average performance, between 1 and 1.50 was classified
as average performance, and above 1.50 was classified as above average
performance.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of Samples Sub-sectors Descriptive Statistics of Samples Subsectors
Sub-sector

Mean ROA (%)

Mean ROCE (%)

Mean Tobin’s Q

Performance

Agriculture

15

33

1.52

Above average

Conglomerates

15

22

1.64

Above average

7

58

.46

Below average

Consumer goods

19

42

2.57

Above average

Healthcare

14

26

1.06

Above average

Info. Technology

10

19

3.81

Average

Industrial goods

21

48

2.06

Above average

Natural resources

21

34

.81

Average

Oil and gas

10

43

.94

Average

Services

12

21

.53

Average

Construction

Note. The higher the ROA, the more efficient is the firm in utilizing its resources and the better its financial performance.
A higher ROCE means a firm performs better than the one with a lower ROCE, and a Tobin’s Q > 1.00 indicates the
company has better growth prospects than one with Tobin’s Q ratio < 1.00.

Info. Technology refers to the information and communications technology subsector and construction refers to the
companies in the construction/real estate sub-sector.

During 2011 to 2015, the industrial goods and natural resources subsectors
had the highest ROA of 21%, followed by the consumer goods subsector with
average ROA of 19%, and the agriculture and conglomerates sub-sector that had
an average ROA of 15%. The healthcare sub-sector had an average ROA of 14%,
followed by the services sub-sector with ROA of 12%, and the information and
communications technology and oil and gas sub-sectors that had ROA of 10%
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each. The construction/real estate sub-sector had the smallest ROA of 7%. It is
clear from the study that the companies with the highest ROA did not necessarily
have the highest ROCE or highest Tobin’s Q. Return on assets (ROA) indicates a
high profit margin, efficient and effective use of the corporations’ assets, and
efficient management of liquidity.
The construction/real estate sub-sector had the highest return on
capital employed (ROCE) of 58% followed by the industrial goods sub-sector that
had a ROCE of 48%. The oil and gas sub-sector had ROCE of 43% and consumer
goods sub-sector had a ROCE of 42% followed by the natural resources subsector with ROCE of 34%. The average ROCE of the agriculture sub-sector was
33%, that of the healthcare sub-sector was 26%, and the conglomerates and
services sub-sectors had a ROCE of 22% and 21% respectively. The information
and communications sub-sector had the least ROCE of 19%. Return on capital
employed indicates how effective a firm is in using its shareholders’ funds and
long-term debt to make profit. If the corporate governance of a firm is weak, it is
unlikely that it will be able to borrow at the most advantageous terms and hence
its cost of funds will be high and profitability lower.
The highest Tobin’s Q of 3.81 was had by the company in the
information and communications technology sub-sector followed by the consumer
goods subsector with 2.57 and 2.06 for the industrial goods subsector. The
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conglomerates subsector had a Tobin’s Q of 1.64 while the agricultural and the
healthcare sub-sector had a Tobin’s Q of 1.52 and 1.06 respectively. The
companies that had a Tobin’s Q less than one were four in number. The oil and
gas subsector had a Tobin’s Q of .94 followed by the natural resources sub-sector
with a Tobin’s Q of .81 and the services subsector had a Tobin’s Q of .53. The
least average Tobin’s Q of .46 belonged to the construction subsector. A Tobin’s
Q greater than 1 indicates that the company is overvalued and that it is earning a
rate that is higher than the replacement cost of its assets. Overvaluation of a
company’s stock will attract other competitors to the market and reduce the firm’s
profit and its market value; which will eventually lead to a lower Tobin’s Q. A
Tobin’s Q ratio less than 1 indicates undervaluation of a company’s stock. An
undervaluation will attract corporate raiders and other purchasers to the company.
Increased interest in the company may increase its market value, thereby
increasing its Tobin’s Q. From the result, it seemed either that many companies
are overvalued or that the market is not efficient in pricing the stocks.
In Table 2, I tabulated the summary descriptive statistics of the
sampled firms by using the mean, median, mode, and standard deviation of the
variables. The mean, median, and mode are measures of central tendency, they
measure the same things, and are thus related; the relationship depends, to some
extent, on the shape of the frequency distribution. The standard deviation, on the
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other hand, measures the variability of the data points from the mean by using the
mean of the distribution as a reference point.
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics of Organizational Financial Performance and Corporate
Governance (n=39)
Mean

Median

Mode

Standard deviation

ROA

20.19%

15.40%

n/a

16.03%

ROCE

35.83%

23.69%

n/a

31.92%

Tobin’s Q`

8.27

5.24

n/a

8.6

Board Ind.

4.97

5.00

5.00

Audit Comm Ind.

4.03

4.00

4.00

.28

Board Size

9

9

7

2.19

Number of Meetings

4.86

4.60

4.00

Executive Comp.

$214,378.45

Firm age
Firm Size

144,303.80

45.72 years
9.68

48
9.50

.16

.92

31,645.47

200,583.25

54
n/a

25.31
1.48

Note: ROA is the return on assets and ROE is the return on capital employed. Audit comm. Ind. Is the score on the
independence of audit committee and executive comp is the dollar amount of the highest paid executive. The mean
represents the sum of all the observations divided by the number of observations. The median is the middle score that
divides the distribution in half while the mode is the score that has the greatest frequency. The standard deviation is a
measure of the variation of the observations it is an indication of the variability of the sets of scores (Kerlinger &
Pedhazur, 1973).

.
The mean ROA for the 39 sampled nonfinancial firms listed on the
NSE between 2011 and 2015 was 20.19% and the median was 15.40%n with a
standard deviation of 16.03%. There was no mode for this distribution. The mean,
median, and mode of a perfectly symmetrical distribution are the same. But an
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imperfect and roughly symmetrical distribution will have the mean and median at
the center of the distribution in close proximity to each other. A highly skewed
distribution tends to have different values for the mean, median, and the mode. In
a positively-skewed distribution, the mode has the smallest value, followed by the
median, and the mean has the largest value. In a negatively-skewed distribution,
however, the mean is the smallest, followed by the median, and the mode takes
the largest value. The ROA in this study is thus positively skewed, with a few
corporations earning very high returns and many others earning extremely low
returns. A high ROA is an indication of the efficiency and effectiveness with
which the firm utilizes its assets, both physical, financial, and human. An
extremely low ROA in many firms indicates the inefficiency with which assets
are deployed. It may also be as sign of a conservative investment culture and risk
taking, where firms prefer to hold on to what is sure and known, with reluctance
to venture into new and more risky, but much more profitable business.
The mean ROA was 35.83%; the median was 23.69% with a
standard deviation of 31.92%. There was no mode for ROCE. The ROCE is
positively skewed, with many firms having lower value than the market average.
A high ROCE indicates that the firm gets a high return on capital it has invested
into the business while a low return on capital indicates the company is not
getting enough returns on shareholders’ funds and long-term borrowing.
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Particularly in Nigeria where the cost of funds exceeds 25% per annum on
borrowings, a low ROCE indicates inability of the funds to make enough profit to
cover the cost of borrowing.
The mean Tobin’s Q ratio for the 39 sampled firms quoted on the
NSE was 8.27; the median was 5.24 with a standard deviation of 8.60. There was
no mode for the Tobin’s Q ratio. The ratio was positively skewed indicating that a
few firms had high values while many companies had low ratios. A high Tobin’s
Q indicates that a firm’s stock is overvalued and the company is profitable. High
profitability would attract other competitors to the business, thus lowering
average profitability and Tobin’s Q ratio. A low Tobin’s Q ratio indicates that a
firm is undervalued. Undervaluation would attract corporate raiders and other
purchasers to the business, thereby improving the fortunes of the business and
raising its Tobin’s Q. A Tobin’s Q ratio of 1 is a state of equilibrium, indicating
neither over- nor undervaluation, but market forces may take it above or below 1.
In a perfectly competitive market, any over- or undervaluation will be eliminated
quickly by market forces. The Nigerian capital market, it seemed from the result
of the findings, is not as efficient as it should be as many companies’ Tobin’s Q
ratio remained below or above 1 for considerable periods of time.
The mean market capitalization of equity was $520.98 million and
the median was $77.58 million with a standard deviation of $1.27 billion. There
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was no mode for market value. The market value appeared to be positively
skewed with many firms in the sample having extremely low market values and
few companies having very large market capitalization. For example, eight firms,
all in the consumer goods sub-sector had an average market capitalization of $2.1
billion and the biggest company had a market value of $6.75 billion. Board
independence had a mean of 4.97, a median of 5, and a mode of 5 with a standard
deviation of .16. The distribution is almost a perfect normal symmetrical. This is
because in the Nigerian SEC codes of corporate governance, companies are
required to separate the positions of the chair from those of the CEO and all the
39 sampled companies complied with this minimum standard. Audit
independence also had an almost perfect normal symmetrical distribution with a
mean of 4.97, median of 5, and a mode of 5 with standard deviation of .16. Again,
like the board independence where the SEC’s corporate governance codes require
the separation of CEO from the board’s chair, the Nigeria’s Companies and Allied
Matter Act, 1990 made mandatory a minimum of six members in the audit
committee, three executive directors and three non-executive or independent
directors.
The board size had a mean of 8.83, a median of 9.0, and a mode of
7 with a standard deviation of 7.0. The distribution is positively skewed. The
number of board meetings had a mean of 4.86, a median of 4.6, and a mode of
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four with a standard deviation of .92. The distribution was positively skewed with
few extreme scores to the right. The Nigerian SEC code of corporate governance
requires a minimum of four board meetings in a year. Most companies complied
strictly with this minimum standard, sometimes regardless of the firm’s business
circumstances demanding more or less board meetings. Executive compensation
had a positive distribution with some extreme scores to the right; the mean was
$214,378.45, the median was $144,303.80, and the mode was $31,645.47 with a
standard deviation of $200,583.25. The result for executive compensation
suggested that some companies paid excessive compensation to their employees
far above the average in the market, especially among the foreign-owned
businesses who had to align executive compensation with global standards.
Compensation in the form of bonuses and stock options are not common in
Nigeria. The company size had a mean of 9.68 and a median of 9.50; there was no
mode and the standard deviation was 1.48. The age of firm had a mean of 45.75
years, a median of 48 years, and a mode of 54 years with a standard deviation of
25.31 years. The distribution is positively skewed and there were few extreme
scores to the right.
I also used descriptive statistics to summarize the corporate
governance mechanisms of the 39 sampled non-financial companies listed on the
NSE between 2011 and 2015. Table 3 tabulated these statistics using frequency
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distribution to summarize the percentage of firms that exhibited the specified
corporate governance characteristics selected for the study.
Table 3
Frequency distribution Table Showing the Characteristics of Corporate Governance (CG) of Sampled Firms (n=39)
Corporate Governance (CG)
Mechanisms

Board Size ≥ 4

Percentage (%) of
Companies exhibiting
Specified Corporate
Governance Features
100%

≥ 50% of the members of the board
were composed of non-executive directors

100%

Strict compliance with SEC’s code
of corporate governance practices

92%

Audit committees ≥ 6 members

79%

At least 50% or more of audit committee
members were non-executive directors

100%

CEO-Chair separation

100%

Number of board meetings ≥ 4

100%

Executive compensation ≥ $100,000

61.54%

Note. CG means corporate governance, SEC refers to the Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission,
CEO refers to the firms’ chief executive officers

Although section 246 of the Nigerian CAMA, the main company
legislation in Nigeria, requires a limited liability company to have at least two
directors, most listed companies invariably have more than two. The size of the
corporation depends on many factors, such as business conditions, the complexity
of the firm’s operations, and the firm’s performance. All the sampled companies
had more than four directors on the board. Another feature of the board that

258

emerged from the study was that non-executive directors constituted more than
50% of the of the board size. This is largely in compliance with the SEC’s code of
corporate governance that requires the majority of the board of directors be
composed of nonexecutive and independent directors. Similarly, almost all the
sampled firms comply with SEC’s code of corporate governance especially as
regards board composition, audit committee composition, and absence of CEO
duality.
The 92% compliance with corporate governance principles and
codes enables the firms to have independent board, independent audit committees,
regular board meetings, and financial statements that are true and fair and comply
with IFRS. The compliance has been aided by company legislations in Nigeria,
the NSE listing requirements, the SEC’s compliance enforcement activities, the
appointment of internationally-reputed accounting firms as external auditors by
most of the companies, and the recent establishment of the FRC of Nigeria with
special enforcement powers in relation to accounts and audit of public companies.
An independent director is one who has no material relationship with the
company, either directly or indirectly, as officer of the firm, stockholder, debt
holder, supplier, or consultant. Also, an independent director will not be a former
employee, auditor, or consultant to the company. An independent director will
also not be related with a director or a major shareholder or present or past auditor
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of the firm. In Nigeria, virtually all the companies quoted on the NSE avoids CEO
duality, as both the SEC, the FRC, and the listing requirements of the NSE
discourage companies from combining the positions of the CEO and chair. The
compliance with CEO duality rule meant that all the sampled companies had the
same score on this mechanism of corporate governance.
Another corporate governance characteristic that emerged from the study was that
most of the sampled companies had six members in the audit committee, divided equally
between executive directors (three members) and nonexecutive directors (three
members). Seventy-nine percent of the sampled firmed had an average of six members of
the audit committee. This is also a reflection of legislation in Nigeria. Section 359
Subsection 3 of the CAMA established the audit committee for public companies. In
Subsection 4 of section 359, the Act stipulated a maximum number of six members for
audit committee. Most public companies in Nigeria just adopted the maximum number. It
seemed the Act was not concerned with the committee’s independence, as it requires
equal number of company executives and shareholders’ representatives to be on the
committee. A bill for an Act to repeal CAMA of 1990 and enact the CAMA of 2016 is
currently going through the Nigerian National Assembly, and the expectation is that
when the bill becomes law, the National Assembly will have repealed this provision.
The number of board meetings indicates the level of board activity and members’
involvement in the firm. In all the sampled companies, the average number of board

260

meeting was four during 2011 and 2015. Again, the minimum number of board meetings
in a listed company is put at four by the SEC’s corporate governance code. Most
companies strictly complied with this stipulation although some held more than four
meetings during this period. Meetings above the stipulated minimum became necessary
either because of business exigencies or because there was an urgent matter that could not
wait for the next quarter, although most companies stuck to the quarterly meetings
regardless of the circumstances. Of the 39 sampled companies, 61.54% paid their
executives an average of $100,000 per year. Stock options and bonuses as compensation
to executives are not common in Nigeria. But what are common are provisions of car and
driver for the executive, generous and expensive paid holidays, private security,
telephone and other utility bills, and subsidized children education for the top executives.
These benefits-in-kind are difficult to monetize and are not disclosed in the financial
statements.
Inferential Statistics of Sampled Companies
In this section of the dissertation study, I present inferential statistics of the 39
sampled firms using multiple regression techniques. This section starts with the analysis
of the linear relationship between ROA and corporate governance mechanisms and then
the presentation of regression results and ANOVA tables.
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The Relationship between Corporate Governance and ROA
The multiple regression equation for the model with ROA as the corporate
governance mechanisms as the independent or predictor variables is as follows:
ROA = α0 + β1BodInd + β2AuditCommInd + β3BodSize + β4BodMtgs +
β5ExecComp + β6FirmAge + β7FirmSize + ε
Where
ROA = return on assets
α0 = the intercept of the regression equation,
BodInd = board independence,
AuditCommInd = audit committee independence,
BodSize = board size,
BodMtgs = number of board meetings,
ExecComp = executive compensation,
FirmAge = firm age,
FirmSize = firm size,
β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, β6, and β7 are the beta coefficients of the regression model, and ε =
random error
The ability of the corporate governance mechanisms to explain
ROA was tested using t distribution test and ANOVA at the alpha level of .05 or
5%. The null and alternative hypotheses are as follows:
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H0: β1 = β2, β3 = β4 = β5 = β6 = β7 = 0
H1: Not all the βi (i=1….7) are zero
I performed the analysis using SPSS. The multiple regression analysis
results and ANOVA table for the test are presented in Table 4 and Table 5. The
overall multiple regression equation with return on assets (ROA) as the dependent
variables is presented as follows:
ROA = -.473 + .051*BodInd + .052*AuditCommInd + .003*BodSize +
.03*BodMgts + .000000016*ExecComp + .00*FirmAge + .002*FirmSize + ε
A multiple regression analysis was conducted to predict ROA
(outcome variable) from board independence, audit committee independence,
board size, number of board meetings, executive compensation (independent
variables), and the firms’ size and age (mediating variables). The result of the
regression analysis showed that board independence, audit committee
independence, board size, number of board meetings, executive compensation,
and the firms’ size and age did not account for a significant amount of the
variability in ROA, R2 = .077, F(7, 31) =.368, p = .91. The adjusted R2 of
-.132 indicated that about 13.2 % of the variability in ROA was explained
by the selected corporate governance mechanisms. The decision is, therefore, to
accept the null hypothesis that all the coefficients are zero and reject the
alternative hypothesis that not all the coefficients are zero. There is thus little
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evidence to support the statement that there exists a statistically significant
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and ROA. The results of
the regression were tabulated in Table 4 below. The ANOVA result was displayed
in Table 5 below.
Table 4
Multiple Regression Results for Independent Variables (n = 39), y = Return on
Assets (ROA)
Intercept BodInd AuditCommInd BodSize

BodMtgs

ExecComp

FirmAge

FirmSize

b

-.473

.051

.052

.003

.030

.00000001632

.000

-.002

s(b)

.736

.128

.074

.012

.022

.000

.003

.017

t

-.642

.401

.695

.229

1.371

.049

.108

-

.820

.180

.961

.915

.916

.106
p-value .526

.691

.492

Table 5
ANOVA Table for the Multiple Regression of Independent Variables (n = 39), y
=ROA
Source

Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

F

FCritical

p-value

Regression

.038

7

.005

.368

2.32

.914

264

Error

.462

31

Total

.501

38

.015

R2 .077

Adjusted R2 -.132

Predictors: (Constant). Board independence, Audit committee independence, Board size, Board meetings,
Executive compensation, Firm size, Firm age
Dependent Variable: ROA

By testing the hypothesis for each variable of the regression model, I was
able to determine if any of the coefficients was different from zero. A t test will
explain the variation in ROA and the variable that has no explanatory power will
be eliminated from the regression model.
In regard to board independence, the hypothesis to be tested is:
H0: β1 = 0
H1:

β1≠ 0

The regression results in Table 4 showed the p value for board
independence (BodInd) was .691, which is greater than 5% alpha level of
significance. Using a two-tailed test, the critical points of t distribution with 31
degrees of freedom at α =.05 is 2.021. The rejected area at 95% confidence
interval indicates that the calculated t statistic value of absolute 0.401 is < the
critical value of t of 2.04; I cannot reject the null hypothesis that β1 = 0. I conclude
that board independence is statistically not significant and cannot be a predictor of
or used to explain the variations in ROA.
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An independent audit committee is one of the systems of controls
that the agency theory predicts is expected to improve financial performance.
Independence is assured by having knowledgeable and independent external and
independent directors on the committee. In Nigeria, the composition of audit
committee is legislated by the CAMA, stipulating six members divided equally
between executive and nonexecutive directors. For independence of audit
committee, the hypothesis is:
H0: β2 = 0
H1: β2 ≠ 0
Using a two-tailed test, the critical points of t distribution with 31 degrees
of freedom at α =.05 is 2.021. The rejected area at 95% confidence interval
indicates that the calculated t statistic value of absolute 0.695 is < the critical
value of t of 2.04, so the null hypothesis that β1= 0 cannot be rejected. I conclude
that audit committee independence is statistically not significant and cannot be
used to explain and predict the variations in ROA.
The size of the board could give a firm a competitive edge,
especially when the members are experienced, devote time and resources to the
company, and use their industry and business connections to further the objective
of the corporation. When the size of the board is too big, critical decisions may be
delayed, infighting may become the norm rather than the exception, and the cost
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of maintaining a large board may be financially unjustifiable. If the size of the
board is too small on the other hand, the firm may miss many business
opportunities or make poor business and strategic decision that have not been
well-considered because of the absence of high-caliber business leaders on the
board of directors. It is expected that a fairly large board will improve
organizational financial performance. For the board size, the hypothesis is:
H0: β3 = 0
H1: β3 < 0
Using a one-tailed test, the critical points of t distribution with 31 degrees
of freedom at α = .05 is 1.684. The computed t statistic in Table 4 is .229, which
is less than the value of the t distribution of 1.684. The p value of .820 is > the .05
significance level and for this reason I cannot reject the null hypothesis, H0, that
the beta coefficient is zero. The coefficient of board size is statistically not
significant, and cannot be used to explain and predict the variations in the value of
ROA.
It is during board meetings that critical financial and other
decisions and policies are made. The number of board meetings indicates the level
of involvement of directors in the business and the attention paid to critical
elements of controls and monitoring, such as financial and credit controls, risk
management, executive compensation, personnel issues, and legal and regulatory
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matters. The number of board meetings, all things being equal, ought to improve
organizational financial performance, especially if the members of the board
devote quality time and attention to critical issues affecting the corporation. The
number of board meetings, like the composition of audit committee, is legislated
in Nigeria, as the Company Acts stipulate at least four meetings in a year, on a
quarterly basis. Most companies just hold four meetings whether the business
exigencies demand it or not. I believe the number of board meetings should
improve corporate financial performance. For the number of board meetings, the
hypothesis is as follows:
H0: β4 = 0
H1: β4 < 0
Using a one-tailed test, the critical point of t distribution with 31 degrees of freedom at α
= .05 is 1.684. The computed t statistic in Table 4 of absolute 1.371 is less than the
critical value of t of 1.684, and the p-value of .180 is > than the .05 alpha level of
significance. Thus the number of board meetings is statistically not significant and cannot
be used to explain or predict the values of ROA. I accept the null hypothesis, H0 and
reject the alternative hypothesis, H1.
Researchers have extensively studied the impact of executive
compensation on the financial performance of organizations in many economies,
but the impact in the Nigerian economic landscape is not clearly known.
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Adequate executive compensation ought to attract the best talent to the
organization and improve organizational financial performance. Some other
researchers believe that the greater the executive compensation the lower the
firm’s financial performance. I take the view that higher executive compensation
lead to better performance. The hypothesis to test the impact of executive
compensation on organizational performance is as follows:
H0: β5 = 0
H1: β5 ≠ 0
Using a two-tailed test, the critical points of t distribution with 31 degrees
of freedom at α =.05 is 2.021. The rejected area at 95% confidence interval
indicates that the calculated t statistic value of absolute 0.049 is < the critical
value of t of 2.04, and the computer alpha value is .961, so the null hypothesis that
β5= 0 cannot be rejected. I conclude that, among Nigerian nonfinancial firms,
executive compensation is not statistically significant and cannot be used to
explain and predict ROA.
The age of the firm may set limits to the changes that it can make to its operations
in confronting competition, economic shocks, and technological disruptions in its
industry. The age of the corporation may be an asset or a constraint on the actions of the
firm. I take the view that age and experience are critical for a robust implementation of
corporate governance practices and improvement in organizational performance. The
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hypothesis to test the age of the firm as a component of corporate governance
mechanisms are as follows:
H0: β6 = 0
H1: β6 < 0
Using a one-tailed test, the critical point of t distribution with 31 degrees
of freedom at α = .05 is 1.684. The computed t statistic in Table 4 of absolute .108
is less than the critical value of t of 1.684; and the p-value of .915 is > than the .05
alpha level of significance. Thus, the coefficient of executive compensation is
statistically not significant and cannot be used to explain or predict the values of
ROA. I accept the null hypothesis, H0, and reject the alternative hypothesis, H1.
The size of a firm affords it many opportunities in the market
place: Research and development opportunities, ability to attract the best talents to
the firm, and capacity to benefit from the advantages conferred when companies
are large enough to dictate to suppliers and finance providers. For the size of the
firm, the hypothesis is:
H0: β7 = 0
H1: β7 < 0
Using a one-tailed test, the critical points of t distribution with 31 degrees
of freedom at α = .05 is 1.684. The computed t statistic in Table 4 is -.106. The p
value of .916 is greater than the .05 significance level; and for this reason I cannot
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reject the null hypothesis, H0, that the beta coefficient is zero. Firm size is
statistically not significant, and cannot be used to explain and predict the
variations in the value of ROA.
Return on Assets (ROA) and Corporate Governance Mechanisms. Past
research indicated that board and audit committee independence has a statistically
significant association with organizational performance (Al-Najjar, 2014; Ioana &
Mariana, 2014; Malthotra, Poteau, & Fritz, 2013). The BRT and the Cadbury
Committee recommended an independent board and audit committee as good
corporate governance practices. The SOX made the independence of the board
and audit committees as the main goal of a desirable corporate governance
practice. The independence of audit and board committees has thus been
recognized as significant predictors of organizational performance. To determine
the relationship between ROA and the chosen corporate governance mechanisms,
I used a hierarchical regression in SPSS and entered the variables in three blocks,
each block representing a step in the hierarchy.
Based on past research, I selected and entered board independence
and audit committee independence in the first model as most significant
predictors of organizational performance. In the second model, I selected board
size, board meetings, and executive compensation as the next most significant
predictors of company financial performance. I used forced entry as the method of
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entering the variables in the models. Finally, in the third model, I entered the age
and size of the firm as the mediating variables. The results of the hierarchical
regression was displayed in Table 6 below, indicating that the model was
improved when all the five predictor and two mediating variables were included
in the model (Model 3).. Board independence had a positive but not significant
relationship with return on assets ROA and audit committee independence also
has a positive but not significant association with ROA. In Model 2, board size,
the number of board meetings, and executive compensation were shown to have
positive but not significant association with ROA. The summary results displayed
in Table 6 show that the adjusted R2 in model 1 with board independence and
audit committee independence as the independent variables was -.043. In Model
2, the addition of board size, number of board meetings, and executive
compensation increased the adjusted R2 to -.064, showing that board size, number
of board meetings, and executive compensation improved the model by -.021. The
adjusted R2 in Model 3 was -.132 when the age and size of the firm were added to
the model; an addition of -.068. The improvement in the model when the
mediating variables of age and size of the firm were added was over 100%. The
improvement in the model brought by adding age and size of the firm to the
model indicated an improvement to the model over and above the predictive
power of the five corporate governance mechanisms, indicating that the age and
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size of the firm did improve the model and are mediators in the relationship
between corporate governance mechanisms and organizational performance
measured by ROA. R2
increased with each addition of independent and mediating variables, and
the adjusted R2 was maximized at -.132 (Model 3 in Table 6) when all the
variables were included in the model.
Board independence and audit committee independence accounted
for 4.3% of the variations in ROA but board independence, audit committee
independence, board size, number of board meetings, and executive compensation
accounted for 6.4%, an improvement of 49% between Model 1 and Model 2. The
change in R 2 between Model 2 and Model 3 was .068, showing that the age and
size of the firm significantly mediate the relationship between corporate
governance mechanisms and ROA. The two mediating variables accounted for
6.8% of the variations in ROA with the minimum standard error estimate of
.12212, whereas the five corporate governance mechanisms were only able to
explain 6.4% of the variations in ROA.
These findings were unexpected because board independence is
supposed to enable the board to control, monitor, and advice the managers to
efficiently organize the firm’s resources. Board and audit committee
independence have been conceptualized by both the regulators and researchers as
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important components of corporate governance practice that enhance corporate
performance (Arora & Sharma, 2015; Sahu & Manna, 2014; Zona, 2016).
Although both the board and audit committee independence are positively related
to ROA, the association is not significant and the power of explanation of the
variables is extremely weak. It seems that the Nigerian corporation is a victim of
overregulation. The number and composition of audit committee members are
dictated by Nigerian company law and corporate governance codes. What many
firms do is follow the letter of the law and not what the law is trying to achieve;
and this is why the scoring on the independence of audit committee was virtually
the same for all firms. Also in all firms, there was absence of CEO duality. This is
because the Nigerian SEC corporate governance codes stipulate that the chair of
the board cannot be the CEO at the same time. All companies complied with this
directive from the SEC regardless of the different circumstances of the
organizations.
Similarly, the number of directors on the board should be the right
size for the complexity of the organization and its operations. But what is
important is the mix of expertise among the members not the absolute size per se.
I found a positive but not significant association between the size of the board and
ROA but its explanatory power is weak. The number of meetings shows the level
of board involvement in the affairs of the firm, so it is expected that the number of
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board meetings should be positively associated with organizational performance.
Again, as in audit committee and board composition, the number of board
meetings is a subject that legislation affects in part in Nigeria. Public companies
are required to hold a minimum of four board meetings in a year. Most companies
comply with the numbers of meetings dictated by the regulators regardless of
specific circumstances of their firm. I found a positive but not significant
relationship between the number of meetings and ROA.
Adequate executive compensation ought to motivate executives to
perform better. Appropriate executive compensation should also attract competent
workers to the firm. I found the beta coefficient of executive compensation was
near zero; indicating that executive compensation was not associated with ROA.
Firm age had no relationship with ROA and it cannot predict any variations in the
outcome variable. The age of the firm could be an impediment to growth in an era
when businesses must innovate and be swift to market. However, the size of the
firm could be equally of a tremendous advantage and a liability. The result of the
regression showed a negative but statistically not significant association between
firm size and ROA.
Table 6
Model Summary of Hierarchical Regression Results
Model

R

R Square

1

.108

.012

Adjusted R
Square
-.043

Std. Error of
the Estimate
.11724
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2

.276

.076

-.064

.11840

3

.277

.077

-.132

.12212

Model 1: Predictors: (Constant), Audit Committee Independence, Board Independence
Model 2: Predictors: (Constant), Audit Committee Independence, Board Independence, Board Size,
Board Meetings, Executive Compensation
Model 3: Predictors: (Constant), Audit Committee Independence, Board Independence, Board Size,
Board Meetings, Executive Compensation, Firm Age, Firm Size

In Table 7 and Table 8, I presented the regression and ANOVA Tables of
the results respectively. The regression equation for the hierarchical regression
model with the highest predictive power (Model 3) and ROA as the dependent
variable is as follows:
ROA = -.473 + .051β1 + .052β2 + .003β3 + .030 β4 -.002 β7 + ε. Executive
compensation and firm age were removed from the equation because the result of
the hierarchical regression indicated that there was no relationship between
executive compensation and firm age and ROA.

Table 7
Hierarchical Regression Result for Independent Variables vs. ROA (n = 39)
Intercept

BOD

AUDIT

BOD

BOD

EXEC

FIRM

IND

COMMIND

SIZE

MGTS

COMP

AGE

FIRM
SIZE

b

-.473

.051

.052

.003

.030

.00000001632

.000

std. Error .736

.128

.074

.012

.022

.000

.003

.002

.017

-
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s(b)

.0000

.072

.126

.052

.241

.029

.063

-

-.642

.401

.695

.229

1.371

.049

.108

-

.526

.691

.492

.820

.180

.961

.915

.916

.024
t
.106
p-value

Table 8
ANOVA Table for Hierarchical Regression Results- Independent Variable vs.
ROA (n =39)
Sum of
Squares

p-value

df

Mean
squares

F

Source

Regn.

.038

7

.005

.368

.914

Error

.462

31

.015

Total

.501

38

s .12212
Adjusted

R2 .077

R2

-.132

With the hierarchical regression method, I developed a parsimonious
regression equation with board independence (BODIND), audit committee
independence (AUDCOMMIND), board size (BODSIZE), number of board
meetings (BODMGTS), and firm size (FIRMSIZE) as the predictor variables. The
results of the hierarchical regression showed that board independent, audit
committee independence, board size, number of board meetings, and firm size
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were the explanatory variables, but executive compensation and the age of the
firm have no relationship with ROA and have been removed from the equation.
All the five explanatory variables used in the equation, except firm size
(FIRMSIZE), were positively associated with ROA. Firm size was found to be
negatively related to ROA. The regression results showed that there was no
relationship between ROA and executive compensation and there was also no
relationship between the age of a firm and organizational performance measured
by return on assets (ROA).
Relationship between Corporate Governance and ROCE
The multiple regression equation for the model with ROCE as the
explanatory variable and corporate governance as the independent variable is:
ROCE = α0 + β8BdInd + β9AuditCommInd + β10BodSize + β11BodMtgs +
Β12ExecComp + β13FirmAge + β14FirmSize + ε
Where
ROCE = return on capital employed
α0 = the intercept of the regression equation,
BodInd = board independence,
AuditCommInd = audit committee independence,
BodSize = board size,
BodMtgs = number of board meetings,
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ExecComp = executive compensation,
FirmAge = firm age,
FirmSize = firm size,
Β8, β9, β10, β11, β12, β13, and β14 are the beta coefficients of the regression model, and ε =
random error
The null and alternative hypotheses to test for the existence of a linear
relationship between ROE and any of the independent variables are stated as
follows:
H0: β8 = β9 = β10 = β11 = β12 = β13 = β14= 0
H1: Not all the βi (i= 8….14) are zero
To test the null hypothesis that the regression beta coefficients are all zero,
I used the t distribution test and ANOVA at the 5% confidence level of statistical
significance. In Table 9, I present the overall multiple regression results with
ROCE as the predictor variable and in Table 10 I tabulated the ANOVA
computed with SPSS. To find a linear relationship between ROCE and corporate
governance mechanisms, I used the hierarchical regression with forced entry. The
multiple regression equation for the relationship between ROCE and corporate
governance mechanisms is as follows:
ROCE = -2.245 + .188β8 + .269β9 - .009β10 + .033β11 + .0000005671β12
+.005β13 +.044β14 + ε
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Table 9
Multiple Regression Results of Independent Variables and Return on Capital Employed
(ROCE) (n=39)
Intercept

BOD

AUDIT

BOD

BOD

EXEC

FIRM

IND

COMMIND

SIZE

MGTS

COMP

AGE

FIRM
SIZE

b

-2.245

.188

.269

-.009

.033

.0000005671

.005

.044

std. Error 2.004

.350

.202

.032

.059

.000

.007

.047

s(b)

.0000

.094

.236

-.065

.095

-.357

.374

.204

t

-1.120

538

1.333

-.292

.550

-.624

.653

.519

.271

.595

.192

.772

.586

.537

.519

.358

VIF

1.079

1.096

1.729

1.034

11.418

11.504

1.668

p-value

Table 10
ANOVA Table for the Multiple Regression (n= 39), y = ROCE

Source
value
Regression
Error

Sum of
Squares

df

Mean of
Squares

F

FCritical

.568

2.32

.439

7

.063

3.427

31

.111

p-

.776
Adjusted
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Total

3.867

38

R2 .114

R2 -.086

Predictors: (Constant), Audit Committee Independence, Board Independence, Board Size, Board Meetings,
Executive
Compensation, Firm Age, Firm Size
Dependent Variable: ROCE

The ƒ statistic of .568, p value of .776, and adjusted R2 of -.086 were
indications of a weak association between corporate governance and ROCE. I
conducted statistical hypothesis tests for the individual predictor variables to
determine the beta coefficients that are different from zero. I also conducted t test
to provide explanation of the variations in ROE and to identify the variables that
had weak or no explanatory power so as to remove them from the regression
model.
The impact of board independence on ROCE as the metric of
financial performance is positive but not significant. The hypothesis for board
independence is as follows:
Ho: β8 = 0
H1: β8 ≠ 0

The multiple regression results in Table 9 show that board independence
has a p value of .595, which is > the .05 significance level. Using a two-tailed test,
the critical point of t distribution with 31 degrees of freedom at α = .05 is 2.021.
At 95% level of confidence, the rejection region indicates that the computed t test
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statistics of absolute 0.538 is less than the critical t of 2.021. I cannot reject the
null hypothesis that β8 is 0. The independence of the board is not statistically
significant and cannot predict and explain the variations in ROCE.
It is expected that if the audit committee is independent, it will
increase the financial performance of the firm through an effective control on
reporting and the quality of financial statement of the firm. For audit committee
independence, the hypothesis is:
H0: β9 = 0
H1:β9 > 1

Using one-tailed test, the critical points of t distribution with 31 degrees of
freedom at α = .05 is 1.684. The computed t statistic of 1.333 is < the critical t of
1.684. The p value of .192 is also > the .05 significance level, I cannot reject the
null hypothesis, H0, that the beta coefficient is zero in favor of H1. The coefficient
of audit committee independence is statistically not significant and cannot be used
to explain or predict ROCE.
I hypothesized that the larger the board size, the more expertise
and value are brought to the firm and the better the financial performance. For
board size, the hypothesis is:
H0:β10 = 0
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H1: β10 > 0
Using one-tailed test, the critical points of t distribution with 31 degrees of
freedom at α = .05 is 1.684. The computed t statistic of -.292 is < the critical t of
1.684. The p value of .772 is also > the .05 significance level, so I cannot reject
the null hypothesis, H0, that the beta coefficient is zero in favor of H1 that the beta
coefficient is greater than zero . I conclude that the coefficient of board size is
statistically not significant and cannot be used to explain the variations or changes
in ROCE.
The impact of the number of board meetings on a firm’s
performance is not clearly known, but can be either positive or negative. When
meetings are well-organized and purposeful, the impact can be high and vice
versa. The hypothesis for the number of board meetings is:
H0: β11 = 0
H1: β11 ≠ 0

Using two-tailed test, the critical points of t distribution with 31 degrees of
freedom at α = .05 is 2.021. The computed t statistic of .550 is < the critical t of
2.021. The p value of .586 is > the .05 significance level, so I cannot reject the
null hypothesis, H0, that the beta coefficient is zero in favor of H1 that the beta
coefficient is greater than zero . Thus the coefficient of the number of meetings is
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statistically not significant and cannot be used to explain the variations or changes
in ROCE.
I believe executive compensation serves as motivations to
executives and other staff to improve corporate financial performance, especially
if part of executive compensation is linked to firm performance. For executive
compensation, the hypothesis is as follows:
H0: β12 = 0
H1:: β12 > 0
Using one-tailed test, the critical points of t distribution with 31 degrees of
freedom at α = .05 is 1.684. The computed t statistic of -.624 is < the critical t of
1.684. The p value of .537 is > the .05 significance level, so I cannot reject the
null hypothesis, H0, that the beta coefficient is zero in favor of H12 that the beta
coefficient is greater than zero. I conclude that the coefficient of executive
compensation is statistically not significant and cannot be used to explain the
variations or changes in ROCE.
I believe that the age of the firm can be equated to experience.
With experience comes the ability to avoid costly mistakes. I hypothesized that
the age of the firm improves financial performance. The hypothesis is:
H0: β13 = 0
H1: β13 ≠ 0
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Using two-tailed test, the critical point of t distribution with 31 degrees of
freedom at α = .05 is 2.021. The computed t statistic of .653 is < the critical t of
2.021. The p value of .519 is > the .05 significance level, so I cannot reject the
null hypothesis, H0, that the beta coefficient is zero in favor of H1 that the beta
coefficient is greater than zero. Thus the coefficient of firm age is statistically not
significant and cannot be used to explain the variations or changes in ROCE.
My hypothesis is that the size of the firm confers certain benefits
on it such as buying in bulk, ability to negotiate contracts with suppliers and get a
fairer deal than smaller firms get, and obtaining cheaper funding rates from
financial institutions. For the size of the firm, the hypothesis is:
H0: β14 = 0
H1: β14 > 0
Using one-tailed test, the critical point of t distribution with 31 degrees of
freedom at α = .05 is 1.684. The computed t statistic of .933 is < the critical t of
1.684, and the p value of .358 is > the .05 significance level. So I cannot reject the
null hypothesis, H0, that the beta coefficient is zero in favor of H14 that the beta
coefficient is greater than zero. I conclude that the coefficient of firm age is
statistically not significant and cannot be used to explain the variations or changes
in ROCE.
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The statistical results showed that all the independent variables
except board size and executive compensation were positively but not
significantly associated with ROCE. Board size was negative and not statistically
and significantly related to ROCE. On the other hand, executive compensation
was found to be not related to ROCE. In other words, none of the independent
variables can be used to explain the variations in the outcome variable, ROCE.
The model summary in Table 11 shows the result of the
hierarchical regression that displays the change in R2 as more variables were
added to the model. The first model (Model 1) used board independence and audit
committee independence as the most important predictors of ROCE. The adjusted
R2 in Model 1 was .002. In Model 2, I added board size, number of board
meetings, and executive compensation to the model. In Model 2, R2 increased to
.076 from .054 in the previous model, a change of .022. The adjusted R2 increased
to -.064 from .002 in Model 1, a change of .086. This means that adding board
size, number of board meetings, and executive compensation improved the model
but in the other direction.
The R2 in Model 3 was .114 and the adjusted R2 was -.086. Firm
age and firm size were added to the model in Model 3 and the improvement
(change) in R2 and adjusted R2 was .038 and .022 respectively. The adjusted R2
was maximized at -.086 when all the five independent and two mediating
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variables were added to the model in a hierarchical regression using the forced
entry method. Board independence (BODIND), audit committee independence
(AUDCOMMIND), board size (BODSIZE), number of board meetings
(BOGMGTS), executive compensation (EXECOMP), firm age (FIRMAGE), and
firm size (FIRM SIZE) were the variables with the most explanatory power with
adjusted R2 of -.086. Together, the five corporate governance mechanisms and
two mediating variables in the multiple regression model explained 8.6% of the
variations in ROCE.
The multiple regression results tabulated in Table 12 showed that
board independence was positively but not significantly associated with ROCE.
Similarly, audit committee independence, number of board meetings, firm age,
and firm size were all positively related to ROCE. Board size and executive
compensation were negatively related to ROCE but the coefficient of executive
compensation was very close to zero, indicating that this variable was not related
to ROCE. These findings were, again, not expected because these independent
variables were expected to be good predictors of ROCE, but the evidence did not
support my expectation. One of the reasons may be because of the over legislation
and firms’ wholesale and uncritical implementation of corporate governance
codes that was referred to earlier. The other reason may be because of so many
imperfections is this market, such as pricing of shares, inadequate disclosure in
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financial statements, and problems of the macro-economic situation in the
country.
Table 11
Model Summary of Hierarchical Regression Results Dependent Variable ROCE
(n = 39)
Model
1

R
.233

R Square
.054

Adjusted R
Square
.002

Std. Error of the
Estimate
.31869

2

.276

.076

-.064

.32905

3

.337

.114

-.086

.33250

Model 1: Predictors: (Constant), Audit Committee Independence, Board Independence
Model 2: Predictors: (Constant): Audit Committee Independence, Board Independence, Board Size, Board
Meetings,
Executive Compensation
Model 3: Predictors: (Constant): Audit Committee Independence, Board Independence, Board Size, Board
Meetings
Executive Compensation, Firm Age, Firm Size
Independent Variable: ROCE

The multiple regression results and ANOVA Table of the hierarchical
method are displayed in Table 12 and Table 13 respectively. The hierarchical
multiple regression equation, which was parsimoniously determined from the
results of the regression conducted is:
ROCE = -2.245 + .188*BODIND + .269*AUDCOMMIND .009*BODSIZE + .033*BODMTGS + .005*FIRMAGE + .044*FIRMSIZE

Table 12
Multiple Regression Results of Independent Variables and Return on Capital Employed
(ROCE) (n=39)
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Intercept

BOD

AUDIT

BOD

BOD

EXEC

FIRM

IND

COMMIND

SIZE

MGTS

COMP

AGE

.188

.269

-.009

.033

.350

.202

.032

FIRM
SIZE

b

-2.245

std. Error 2.004

.0000005671

.005

.044

.059

.000

.007

.047

.095

-.357

.374

.204

.653

.519

s(b)

.0000

.094

.236

-.065

t

-1.120

.538

1.333

-.292

.550

-.624

.271

.595

.192

.772

.586

.537

p-value

.519

.358

Table 13
ANOVA Table for Multiple Regression Results- Independent Variables vs. ROCE
Sum of
Squares

Source
value

df

Regression

.439

7

Error

3.427

31

Total

3.867

38

Mean of
Squares

.063

F

.568

FCritical

2.32

.111

p-

.776
Adjusted

R2 .114

R2 -.086

With the hierarchical regression, the most parsimonious regression
equation includes all the variables except executive compensation, which are
board independence (BODIND), audit committee independence
(AUDCOMMIND), board size (BODSIZE), number of meetings (BODMGTGS),
firm age (FIRMAGE), and firm size (FIRSIZE). The multiple regression results
showed that three independent (board independence, audit committee
independence, and number of board meetings) and two mediating variables (firm
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age and firm size) were positively related to ROCE, one independent variable
(board size) was negatively but not significantly associated with the ROCE.
Executive compensation was not related to ROCE.
The Relationship between Corporate Governance and Tobin’s Q
The multiple regression equation for the model with Tobin’s Q as
the outcome variable and the corporate governance mechanisms as the predictor
variables is:
Tobin’s Q = α0 + β15BdInd + β16AuditCommInd + β17BodSize + β18BodMtgs +
Β19ExecComp + β20FirmAge + β21FirmSize + ε
Where
Tobin’s Q = ratio of the firm’s value to the replacement of its assets
α0 = the intercept of the regression equation,
BodInd = board independence,
AuditCommInd = audit committee independence,
BodSize = board size,
BodMtgs = number of board meetings,
ExecComp = executive compensation,
FirmAge = firm age,
FirmSize = firm size,
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Β15, β16, β17, β18, β19, β20, and β21 are the beta coefficients of the regression model, and ε
= random error
The hypothesis to test the linear relationship between Tobin’s Q ratio and the
independent variables is stated as:
H0: Β15 = β16 = β17 = β18 = β19 = β20 = β21 = 0
H1: Not

all the βi (i=15…21) are zero

The multiple regression results and computed ANOVA Table to test the relationship is
presented in Table 14 and Table 15. The overall multiple regression equation with
Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable and corporate governance mechanisms as the
independent variables is:
Tobin’s Q = -8.538 - 3.699*BODIND + 5.745*AUDCOMMIND - .332*BODSIZE +
1.434*BODMTGS - .000009859*EXECOMP + .039*FIRMAGE +
.866*FIRMSIZE + ε

Table 14
Multiple Regression Results of Independent Variables and Tobin’s Q (n=39)
Intercept

BOD

AUDIT

BOD

BOD

EXEC

FIRM

IND

COMMIND

SIZE

MGTS

COMP

AGE

1.434

FIRM
SIZE

b

-8.538

-3.699

5.745

-.332

std. Error 54.237

9.469

5.463

.876

1.273

1.609

-.000009859
.000

.039
.191

.866
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s(b)

.0000

.149

t

.205

.681

p-value

-.069

.187

-.085

-.157

.876

-.391

.154

-2.30

1.052

-.379

.118
.891

-.401

.699

.301

.708

.380

.691

.839

1.079

1.096

1.729

1.034

11.418

11.504

.501
VIF
1.668

Table 15
ANOVA Table for Multiple Regression Results for the Independent Variables and
Tobin’s Q (n = 39)
Source
value
Regression
Error
Total

Sum of
Squares

299.343
2510.953
2810.296

df

7

Mean of
Squares

42.763
31
38

F

.528

2.32

80.998

FCritical

p-

.807
Adjusted

R2 .107

R2 -.095

Predictors: (Constant), Audit Committee Independence, Board Independence, Board Size, Board
Meetings,
Executive Compensation, Firm Age, Firm Size
Dependent Variables: Tobin’s Q

Table 15 displays the ƒ value (7, 31) of .528 which is < than ƒ critical of 2.32, the p value
of .807 is > than the alpha level of significance 0f .05 with R2 of .107 and the
adjusted R2 of -.095. The adjusted R2 of .095 indicated that only 9.5% of the
variation in Tobin’s Q was explained by the corporate governance mechanisms.
With the p value of .807, the decision is to accept the null hypothesis that all the
coefficients are zero and to reject the alternative hypothesis that some of the
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coefficients are different from zero. There is not enough statistical evidence to
support a statistically significant relationship between at least one of the corporate
governance mechanisms and Tobin’s Q.
I used statistical hypothesis test to examine which of the individual variable’s
slopes are different from zero. A t test was conducted to determine the variables
that can help predict the variations in Tobin’s Q.
The influence of board independence on Tobin’s Q was negative. The hypothesis
is:
H0: β15 = 0
H1: β15 ≠ 0
The multiple regression result in Table 14 showed the p value for board independence
(BOIDIND) is .699, which is greater than the alpha level of significance of .05.
Using two-tailed test, the critical point of t distribution with 31 degrees of
freedom at α = .05 is 2.021. The rejection region at 95% significance level
indicated that the computed t test statistic of absolute value of -.391 was less than
the critical t of 2.021 so I cannot reject the null hypothesis that β15 was 0. Thus,
board size is statistically not significant and cannot be used as a predictor of
Tobin’s Q.
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It is expected that an independent audit committee will increase
organizational value. The hypothesis to test the relationship between Tobin’s Q
and audit committee independence is:
H0: β16 = 0 H1: β16 ≠ 0
The multiple regression result in Table 14 shows the p value for audit committee
independence (AUDCOMMIND) is .301, which is greater than the alpha level of
significance of .05. Using a two-tailed test, the critical point of t distribution with
31 degrees of freedom at α = .05 is 2.021. The rejection region at 95%
significance level indicated that the computed t test statistic of absolute value of
1.052 was less than the critical t of 2.021 so I cannot reject the null hypothesis
that β16 was 0. Thus, the independence of audit committee was statistically not
significant and cannot be used to explain and predict variations of Tobin’s Q.
I believe that the size of the board can positively contribute to the
company’s value by increasing the level of board members’ deliberation and
diversity of opinion in the business of the firm. For board size, the hypothesis is:

H0: β17 = 0
H1: β17 > 0
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Using one-tailed test, the critical point of t distribution with 31 degrees of
freedom at α = .05 is 1.684. The computed t statistic of -.379 is < the critical t of
1.684. The p value of .708 is > the .05 significance level, so I cannot reject the
null hypothesis, H0, that the beta coefficient of β17 was zero. I conclude that the
coefficient of board size was statistically not significant and cannot be used to
explain the variations or changes in Tobin’s Q.
It is expected that the number of board meetings will increase
board involvement and through this the firm’s value. The hypothesis for the
number of board meetings is:
H0: β18 = 0
H1: β18 > 0

Using one-tailed test, the critical point of t distribution with 31 degrees of
freedom at α = .05 is 1.684. The computed t statistic of .891 is < the critical t of
1.684. The p value of .380 is > the .05 significance level, so I cannot reject the
null hypothesis, H0, that the beta coefficient of β18 is zero. I conclude that the
coefficient of the number of board meetings was statistically not significant and
cannot be used to explain variations in Tobin’s Q.
Adequate financial compensation to executives will motive them to
perform better and increase the firm’s value, especially if the total emolument
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includes a portion that is linked to the company’s performance. The hypothesis
for executive compensation is:
H0: β19 = 0
H1:

β19 > 0
Using one-tailed test, the critical point of t distribution with 31 degrees of
freedom at α = .05 is 1.684. The computed t statistic of -.401 was < the critical t
of 1.684. The p value of .691 was > the .05 significance level, so I cannot reject
the null hypothesis, H0, that the beta coefficient of β19 is zero. I conclude that the
coefficient of the number of executive compensation is statistically not significant
and cannot be used to explain Tobin’s Q.
The age of the firm is a proxy for experience, which insulates a
company from costly strategic mistakes and errors that could easily cause
problems for an inexperienced company. I hypothesized that firm age was
positive and statistically associated with Tobin’s Q. The hypothesis for the age of
the firm is:

H0: β20 = 0
H1: β20 ≠ 0

296

The multiple regression result in Table 14 shows the p value for the age of the firm was
.839, which was greater than the alpha level of significance of .05. Using a twotailed test, the critical point of t distribution with 31 degrees of freedom at α = .05
was 2.021. The rejection region at 95% significance level indicated that the
computed t test statistic of absolute value of .205 was less than the critical t of
2.021, so I cannot reject the null hypothesis that β20 was 0. Thus, the age of the
firm was statistically not significant and cannot be used to explain and predict
Tobin’s Q.
The size of a company indicates the volume of the transaction it can do, its
negotiating power, and the level and amount of business risks it can assume.
Because risks and returns are closely related, the size of a company should
increase its financial performance. The hypothesis for firm size is:
H0: β21 = 0
H1: β21 ≠ 0

The multiple regression result in Table 14 shows that the p value for the size of the firm
was .501, which was greater than the alpha level of significance of .05. Using a
two-tailed test, the critical point of t distribution with 31 degrees of freedom at α
= .05 was 2.021. The rejection region at 95% significance level indicated that the
computed t test statistic of absolute value of .681 is less than the critical t of
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2.021, so I cannot reject the null hypothesis that β21 is 0. Thus, the size of the firm
was statistically not significant and cannot be used to explain and predict Tobin’s
Q.
In Table 16, I provide a summary of the result of a hierarchical regression
conducted to show which of the variables have the most explanatory power. In
Model 1, board independence and audit committee independence were forced into
the model as the two most powerful corporate governance mechanisms that
predict and explain variations in Tobin’s Q from the review of the literature. The
adjusted R2 with board independence and audit committee independence as the
only two independent variables was -.008 while R2 was .045. Thus board
independence and audit committee independence explained .8% of the variations
in Tobin’s Q. When board size, the number of board meetings, and executive
compensation were added to board independence and audit committee
independence in the model, R2 and adjusted R2 increased to .092 and -.046
respectively (Model 2). This indicates that board size, the number of board
meetings, and executive compensation improved the model and increased its
explanatory power by .038.
In Model 3, I added firm age and firm size to the hierarchical model by
forced entry. The R2 increased to .107 and adjusted R2 increased to -.095. This
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indicates that firm age and firm size increased the explanatory power of the model
by .049, which was over and above Model 2 by more than 100%.
This indicated that the age and size of the firm moderated the
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and organizational
performance measured by Tobin’s Q. The result of the multiple regression
showed that both R2 and adjusted R2 increased with each subsequent addition of
independent variables and the adjusted R2 was maximized in Model 3 at -.095
when board independence (BODIND), audit committee independence
(AUDCOMMIND), board size (BODSIZE), number of board meetings
(BODMGTS), executive compensation (EXECOMP), age of the firm
(FIRMAGE), and the size of the firm (FIRMSIZE) were all added to and retained
in the model. The combination of all these variables explains 9.5% of the
variations in Tobin’s Q. It can be inferred from these results that the combination
of board independence and audit committee independence explained .8% of the
variation in Tobin’s Q, the independent variables of board size, number of board
meetings, and executive compensation explained 3.8% of the variation in Tobin’s
Q, and firm age and firm size explain 4.9% of the variations in Tobin’s Q. I
conclude that the age and size of the firm mediated the relationship between the
five corporate governance mechanisms and Tobin’s Q.
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Table 16
Model Summary of Hierarchical Regression Results
Adjusted

Std. Error

Model

R

R Square

R Square

of the Mean

1

.212

.045

-.008

8.63530

2

.303

.092

-.046

8.79448

3

.326

.107

-.095

8.99992

Model 1 : Predictors: (Constant), Audit Committee Independence, Board Independence
Model 2: Predictors: (Constant), Audit Committee Independence, Board Independence, Board Size, Board
Meetings,
Executive Compensation
Model 3: Predictors: (Constant), Audit Committee Independence, Board Independence, Board Size, Board
Meetings,
Executive Compensation, Firm Age, Firm Size
Dependent Variable: Tobin’s Q

The parsimonious hierarchical regression model with the highest explanatory power with
Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable is:
Tobin’s Q = -8.538 – 3.699*BODIND + 5.745*AUDCOMMIND - .332*BODSIZE +
1.434*BODMTGS +.039*FIRMAGE + .866*FIRMSIZE + ε

Table 17
Hierarchical Regression Results of Independent Variables vs. Tobin’s Q (n=39)
Intercept
FIRM

BOD

AUDIT

BOD

BOD

EXEC

FIRM

300

IND

COMMIND

SIZE

MGTS

COMP

AGE

5.745

-.332

1.434

-.000009859

.187

-.085

.154

-2.30

SIZE

b

-8.538

-3.699

s(b)

.0000

.149

t

.205

.681

p-value

-.069

-.157

.876

-.391

1.052

-.379

.039

.866

.118
.891

-.401

.699

.301

.708

.380

.691

.839

1.079

1.096

1.729

1.034

11.418

11.504

.501
VIF
1.668

Table 18
ANOVA Table for Hierarchical Regression Results
Sum of
Squares

Source
value
Regression
Error

299.343

2510.953

df

7

42.763

31

80.998

Mean of
Squares

F

.528

2.32

FCritical

p-

.807

Adjusted
Total

2810.296

38

R2 .107

R2 -.095

The results showed that board independence (BODIND) and board size
(BODSIZE) have a negative but not significant association with Tobin’s Q while
audit committee independence (AUDCOMMIND), number of board meetings
(BODMTGS). Firm age (FIRMAGE), and firm size (FIRMSIZE) were positively
but not significantly related to Tobin’s Q. Executive compensation was not related
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to Tobin’s Q. These findings were not expected. It was expected that board and
audit committee independence would be a good predictor of corporate
performance and value. Also, the frequency of board meetings should indicate the
level of involvement of the directors in both strategy and operations and should
improve organizational performance.
Similarly, a large board size would include diversity of opinions
and many experts that will positively contribute to the firm’s prestige and
financial performance. I also expected executive compensation to attract the
smartest people to the organization and improve its performance. The age of the
firm should signal stability and dependability to investors and I expected this to
increase the firm’s value, which was not so in this case. The relationship between
the size of the firm and Tobin’s Q was also not expected. Size ought to give
certain financial advantage to the firm, from the ability to buy raw materials in
bulk, get lower interest rate from the financial institutions, win concessions from
the government, and leverage on locations in countries where labor and raw
materials are cheapest. It seems these advantages do not have a great influence on
the non-financial companies listed on the NSE.
The weak relationship between organizational financial
performance and corporate governance mechanisms as indicated by the adjusted
R-squares suggested that there are other significant independent variables with
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more explanatory power not considered in the present study. Executive
compensation has the least explanatory power as the beta coefficient was too
small to indicate any relationship between it and organizational performance.
Also, executive compensation may be less useful in corporate governance studies
although a lot of research attention is devoted to its relationship with
organizational financial performance in the literature.
Dealing with Multicollinearity and Other Regression Problems
Multicollinearity
In Table 19, I displayed the correlation matrix of all the predictor
variables for the multiple regression models to check for multicollinearity among
them. The correlation matrix showed that there may be collinearity problem in the
study. The highest pairwise correlation was 95.2% between executive
compensation and firm age and the next highest pairwise correlation was 61.3%
between firm size and board size. The pairwise correlations among the other
variables were less than 25%. For example, the pairwise correlation between
board independence and board size was 23.8%, the pairwise correlation between
firm age and audit committee independence was 23.1%, and the pairwise
correlation between board meetings and board independence was 23.0%.
Similarly, the pairwise correlation between executive compensation and firm size
was 22%. The pairwise correlation among the remaining independent variables
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ranged between .3% and 20%. The correlation matrix indicates the presence of
multicollinearity in the model.
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Table 19
Correlation Matrix of Corporate Governance Mechanisms
BOD

AUDCO

BOD

BOD

EXEC

FIRM

FIRM

IND

MMIND

SIZE

MTGS

COMP

AGE

SIZE

BODIND

1.00

AUDCOMMIND

.015

1.00

BODSIZE

-.238

-.044

1.00

BODMTGS

-.023

-.089

-.003

1.00

EXECCOMP

.119

-.177

-.204

.008

1.00

FIRMAGE

.131

-.231

-.154

.033

.952

1.00

.103

-.220

FIRMSIZE

-.127

.036

.613

-.182

1.00

I also considered the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) values of the
regression result to check for the presence of multicollinearity problem in the
models. According to Field (2014), if the largest VIF value is greater than 10,
there is a cause for concern; and if the average VIF is substantially greater than 1,
the regression may be biased. The highest VIF value in the model was 11.504 for
firm age and 11.418 for executive compensation. The average VIF for the
independent variables was 4.2171, which was substantially greater than 1. Thus
the model seems to be biased. Field (2014) also recommended that the offending
variables could be removed, one at a time and compared with the main model.
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The offending variables in this case are executive compensation and firm age,
which had VIF values greater than 10.
Table 20 shows the model summary for ROA and corporate
governance when the first two offending variables (executive compensation and
firm age) were removed from the model. R2 was .069 and the adjusted R2 was .072. The Model summary when all the variables were present in Table 6 had R2
and adjusted R2 of .077 and -.132 respectively. With the two variables removed,
there was no improvement in the model. When executive compensation was the
only variable removed from the model, R2 and adjusted R2 were .077 and -.097
respectively, and removing firm age only, the R2 and adjusted R2 were .076 and .097 respectively. These results were the same. I conclude that removing
executive compensation and firm age or both from the model does not increase
the combined explanatory power of the independent variables.

Table 20
Model Summary of Regression Results of Independent Variables vs. ROA (n=39) when
Executive Compensation and Firm Age were Removed from the Model
Model
1

R
Estimation
.263

.069

R Square
-.072

Std. Error of
Adjusted R Square
.11883
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Table 21
Model Summary of Regression Results of Independent Variables vs. ROA (n=39) when only Executive
Compensation was Removed from the Model

Model
1

.277

R
Estimation
.077

R Square
-.097

Std. Error of
Adjusted R Square
.12020

Table 22
Model Summary of Regression Results of Independent Variables vs. ROA (n=39) when Firm Age
was Removed from the Model

Model

1

R
Estimation

.276

.076

R Square

Std. Error of
Adjusted R Square

-.097

.12022

To further examine whether removing executive compensation and the age of the firm
from the model will improve the predictive power of the model in explaining the
variations in ROCE. I performed three regression analyzes. First, I removed both
variables from the model and compared it with the main model. Secondly I
removed each of the two models one after the other and compared the resulting R2
and adjusted R2 with the main analysis.
In Table 23, I removed both the age of the firm (FIRMAGE) and executive
compensation (EXECOMP) from the model. The model summary shows that R2
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was .101 and adjusted R2 was -.035. Compared with the regression results in
Table 10 when all the independent variable were included in the model and R2
and adjusted R2 were .114 and -.086 respectively, there was no improvement in
the model and the power of the independent variables without executive
compensation and firm age to explain the variations in ROCE was less.
Table 24 showed the model summary of the regression results when executive
compensation (EXECOMP) alone was removed from the model. The R2 and
adjusted R2 R2 in the new model were .103 and -.066 respectively and it can be
concluded that the power of the new model to predict the variations in ROCE was
less than when all the independent variables were included.
Table 25 shows the model summary when only firm age
(FIRMAGE) was removed from the model. R2 and adjusted R 2 were .101 and .067 respectively in the new model. This model has less power to predict
variations in ROCE than the model that included all the independent variables.
Table 23
Model Summary of Regression Results of Independent Variables vs. ROCE (n=39) when Executive
Compensation and Firm Age was Removed from the Model

Model

1

R
Estimation

.319

.101

R Square

Std. Error of
Adjusted R Square

-.035

.32447
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Table 24
Model Summary of Regression Results of Independent Variables vs. ROCE (n=39) when Executive
Compensation only was Removed from the Model

Model

1

R
Estimation

.320

.103

R Square

Std. Error of
Adjusted R Square

-.066

.32931

Table 25
Model Summary of Regression Results of Independent Variables vs. ROCE (n=39) when Firm Age
Only was Removed from the Model

Model

1

R
Estimation

.319

.101

R Square

-.067

Std. Error of
Adjusted R Square

.32950

With regards to Tobin’s Q, I conducted the same multiple
regression tests. When executive compensation (EXECOMP) and firm age
(FIRMAGE) were removed from the model, the result of the regression in Table
26 shows that R2 and adjusted R2 were .093 and -.045 respectively. Compared
with the original model with all the variables included where adjusted R2 was .086, the model with the firm age removed had less power to predict and explain
the variations in Tobin’s Q.
By removing executive compensation from the original model that
included all the independent variables, the regression result in Table 26 shows
that the adjusted R2 decreased to -.067 from -.086. This result indicated that the
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explanatory power of the model without executive compensation was less than the
predictive power of the variables when executive compensation was included.
Firm age was also removed from the model to assess whether there
will be an improvement in the model’s predictive power in relation to Tobin’s Q.
Table 27 displays the regression result without firm age (FIRMAGE) in the
model. The R2 and adjusted R2 were .105 and -.062 respectively. Compared with
the original model with R2 of -.086, the model without the firm age included in it
had a weaker explanatory power of Tobin’s Q.
In addition to the fact that the removal of executive compensation
and firm age did not improve the explanatory power of the models, it was
observed that when either of the variables was removed, the VIF values for all the
other six independent variables became less than absolute value of 2. For
example, when executive compensation was removed from the model, the highest
VIF values were 1.664, 1.668, and 1.664 when ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s Q were
the outcome variables respectively. Also when firm age was removed from the
model, the highest VIF values were 1.669, 1.668, and 1.668 respectively for
ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s Q as dependent variables. This indicates that executive
compensation and firm age were measuring the same things and removal of any
of the variables will remove the problem of multicollinerarity.
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From the results of the multiple regressions, it was concluded that
executive compensation had no relationship with ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s Q.
The conclusion is that since executive compensation was not related to
organizational performance in non-financial companies listed on the Nigerian
Stock Exchange, it should not be added to the model and the problem of
multicollinearity will be solved. In none of the three equations for ROA, ROCE,
and Tobin’s Q computed above was executive compensation one of the
explanatory variables as it had no relationship with any of the organizational
performance measures. Multicollineraity problem in the models has thus been
resolved as executive compensation was not one of the explanatory variables.

Table 26
Model Summary of Regression Results of Independent Variables vs. Tobin’s (n=39) when
Executive Compensation and Firm Age was Removed from the Model

Model

1

R
Estimation

.304

.093

R Square

-.045

Std. Error of
Adjusted R Square

8.79021

Table 27
Model Summary of Regression Results of Independent Variables vs. Tobin’s (n=39) when
Executive Compensation only was Removed from the Model

Model

1

R
Estimation

.319

.102

R Square

-.067

Std. Error of
Adjusted R Square

8.88111
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Table 28
Model Summary of Regression Results of Independent Variables vs. Tobin’s (n=39) when Firm
Age only was Removed from the Model

Model

R
Estimation

1

.324

.105

R Square

-.067

Std. Error of
Adjusted R Square

8.86420

Unusual Cases
I also examined whether unusual cases biased the regression
model. I ran three regression models with ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s Q as
independent variables, using Cook’s distance to examine the effect of an unusual
case on the model. For ROA, the minimum Cook’s distance was .000, the
maximum was .341, and the average was .028. For ROCE, the minimum Cook’s
distance was .000, the maximum was .343, and the mean was .028. Tobin’s Q had
a minimum Cook’s distance of .000, the maximum was .246, and the average was
.028. According to Field (2014), values of Cook’s distance
greater than 1 may be cause for concern. None of the values was close to
1. I thus conclude that there was not a single case that exerted undue influence on
the model.
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Summary of Findings
The summary of the findings of the study in respect of the impact of
corporate governance mechanisms on ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s Q are displayed
in Tables 29, 30, and 31 respectively.
Table 29
Regression Summary: ROA and Corporate Governance
Regression results

Computed values

F value
F critical
Significance level
P value
R2
Adjusted R2

.368
2.320
.05
.914
.077
.132

The relationship between ROA and corporate governance was weak as
evidenced by the adjusted R2 of .132. Because the hierarchical regression results
showed a less ƒ value of .368 than ƒ critical value of 2.320, I cannot reject the null
hypothesis that there is no significant statistical association between corporate
governance and return on assets (ROA). The p value of .914, which was greater
than the significance level of .05, confirmed this conclusion. Thus, the
relationship between ROA and corporate governance in non-financial companies
listed on the NSE was found to be statistically not significant. The relationships
found in the study between ROA and corporate governance mechanisms were as
follows:

313

There was a positive but statistically not significant relationship between
board independence and ROA.
The relationship between audit committee independence and ROA was
found to be positive but not statistically significant.
There was a positive and statistically not significant association between
board size and ROA.
A not statistically significant positive relationship was found between the
number of board meetings and ROA.
There was no relationship between executive compensation and ROA.
No significant relationship was found to exist between firm age and ROA.
A negative relationship was found to exist between firm size and ROA but
the relationship was statistically not significant.
Table 30
Regression Summary: ROCE and Corporate Governance
Regression results

Computed values

F value
F critical
Significance level
P value
R2
Adjusted R2

.568
2.320
.05
.776
.114
- .086

The association between ROCE and corporate governance was weak as
the adjusted R2 was -.086. The computed ƒ value of the hierarchical regression
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was .568, which was less than the ƒ critical point of 2.320 and the p-value of .776
was greater than the significance level of .05. I cannot reject the null hypothesis
that there was no significant statistical relationship between all the corporate
governance mechanisms and ROCE. I found the following relationships in the
study:
The relationship between board independence and ROCE was found to be
positive but not statistically significant.
The association between audit committee independence and ROCE was
positive but not statistically significantly.
Board size was found to be negatively related to ROCE but the association
was not statistically significant.
The relationship between the number of board meetings and ROCE was
found to be positive but not statistically significant.
There was no relationship between executive compensation and ROCE.
There was a positive but not statistically significant relationship between
firm age and ROCE.
The relationship between firm size and ROCE was positive but not
statistically significant.
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Table 31
Regression Summary: Tobin’s Q and Corporate Governance
Regression results

Computed values

F value
F critical
Significance level
P value
R2
Adjusted R2

.528
2.320
.05
.807
.107
- .095

The .107 value of R2 indicated a weak relationship between
corporate governance and Tobin’s Q in non-financial companies quoted on the
Nigerian Stock Exchange. The ƒ value of .528 was less than ƒ critical of 2.320
and the p-value of .807 was greater α, the significance level of .05. The null
hypothesis that the beta coefficients of all the independent variables were not
significantly different from zero cannot be rejected. I conclude that there was no
statistically significant relationship between corporate governance mechanisms
and Tobin’s Q. I found the following relationships in the study:
The relationship between board independence and Tobin’s Q was found to
be negative but not significant.
The association between audit committee independence was positive but
not statistically significant.

316

The relationship between board size and Tobin’s Q was found negative
but not statistically significant.
There was a positive relationship between the number of board meetings
and Tobin’s Q but the association was not statistically significant.
No relationship was found to exist between executive compensation and
Tobin’s Q.
The association between firm age and Tobin’s Q was found to be positive
but not statistically significant.
The size of the firm was found to be positively associated with Tobin’s Q
but the relationship was not statistically significant.
The results of the study showed that corporate governance
mechanisms have an impact on ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s, but none of the
relationships was found statistically significant. The reasons for the unexpected
results, as explained above, may be because corporate governance codes in
Nigeria prescribe strict rules for companies to follow and most corporations
follow the letter of the rules superficially, without realizing that a strict adherence
to the rules brings tremendous benefits and improvement to corporate
performance. I hope this study will go a long way to convince managers of the
need to overhaul their firms’ corporate governance practice. Another reason may
be that there are many imperfections in the pricing of the stocks on the stock
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exchange and the share price may not reflect the business and economic
fundamentals in the firms and the macro-economic environment in the country.
This will affect the relationship between organizational performance and Tobin’s
Q.
I have presented the results of the research findings in this chapter.
The summary of the findings was that corporate governance mechanisms such as
board independence, independence of the audit committee, board size, and the
frequency of board meetings were found to be associated with firm performance,
but the relationship was not statistically significant, Executive compensation was
found to be unrelated to organizational performance using all the three measures
of performance in this study, i.e. ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s Q. Firm age and firm
size were found to be mediators in the relationship between corporate governance
mechanisms and organizational performance.
In the next and final chapter of the study, I summarized the
conclusion of the research findings and offered recommendations to corporate
managers and regulators alike. Also, I mentioned some of the limitations of the
study, which included challenges arising from the use of secondary data and
modeling problems. The chapter also included recommendations for further
research and potential contribution to positive social change.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
The theory of agency holds that the separation of ownership from
control in large, public corporations causes agency problems where managers are
more likely to pursue self-interest more than the long-term interest of the
stockholders (Appuchami & Bhuyan, 2015; Liu et al., 2016). Agency theory
predicts a conflict of interest between the managers and shareholders, which is a
result of their different interests (Berle & Means, 1932). A conflict of interest
between managers and shareholders prevents the stockholders from maximizing
their wealth as managers use their knowledge in the firm to appropriate value to
themselves (Palmrose, 2013). A number of corporate scandals and financial
distress in recent times seem to confirm the theory of agency. Researchers have
proposed that the best tool against shareholder-manager conflict of interest,
immoral corporate management behavior, irresponsible risk-taking, and financial
underperformance is a good system of corporate governance practices (Conyon &
He, 2013).
The agency theory focuses its attention on the wealth
maximization objective of the shareholder as the main and primary objective that
the corporation ought to pursue (El-Faitouri, 2014). In contrast to the agency
theory, the stakeholders’ theory posits that the firm should pursue an objective
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that takes account of the interests of all the stakeholders in the firm (Miletkov et
al.,2014). The stakeholders are numerous, but the key ones that the organization
should take into consideration in formulating strategies and policies include
employees, suppliers, customers, finance providers, the host community, the
government, and members of the general public (Haβ et al., 2016). By considering
and maximizing the interests of all stakeholders, the stakeholder’s theory argues
that conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders and its adverse
consequences, like immoral corporate management behavior and financial
underperformance, will be reduced if not completely eliminated (Arenas &
Rodrigo, 2016).
The stewardship theory is an antithesis of the agency theory. While
the agency theory assumes that managers are motivated to pursue self-interest, the
stewardship theory sees managers as essentially responsible and motivated to
pursue the shareholders’ interest of profit maximization (Hiebl, 2013). When
managers focus on establishing good relationships within the organization, they
foster collaboration among corporate actors (Dah, 2016). The stewardship theory
predicts that pro-organizational trustworthy behavior in managers allows them to
act in the long-term interest of the stockholders instead of the short-term selfinterest behavior the agency theory assumes (Fama, 1980).
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In this study I examined the impact of corporate governance on
organizational financial performance. I compared and contrasted three theories of
corporate governance and explored corporate governance practices in
nonfinancial firms listed on the NSE. The corporate governance structure in
Nigeria is based on the Nigeria’s SEC code of corporate governance adopted in
2003 (SEC, 2003). The code requires separation of the chairperson’s position
from that of the CEO, an independent board, an independent audit committee, a
minimum number of directors on the board, the presence of other committees of
the board, disclosure of executive compensation, and the minimum number of
board meetings in a year (SEC, 2003). The adoption of these corporate
governance mechanisms could help monitor managers’ activities in the firm and
align their interests to those of the stockholders, promote disciple in the
organization, and enhance organizational performance.
I adopted a two-stage sampling process to select 39 nonfinancial
companies listed on the NSE between 2011 and 2015 for the study. In the first
process, I separated financial companies from nonfinancial companies. Out of the
171 companies listed on the exchange as at December 31, 2015, 116 were
nonfinancial companies and the remaining 54 firms were in the financial services
industry. In the second stage of the two-stage sampling process, I used
convenience sampling strategy to select the 39 firms based on certain criteria,
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including a minimum of $1 million market value, minimum of at least four
directors, no financial losses in all the 5 years under consideration, a minimum of
3 years trading history prior to 2011, and availability of financial statements that
provided information on corporate governance mechanisms and financial
performance. The 39 companies comprised firms in different sectors of the
economy: agriculture, conglomerates, construction/real estate, consumer goods,
healthcare, information and communications technology, industrial goods, natural
resources, oil and gas, and services. I constructed a series of indices and ratios on
a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet to measure corporate governance mechanisms
because there is yet to be a generally accepted corporate governance models.
I used the equal-waiting approach of assigning scores to the
corporate governance variables following Bebchuck et al. (2003), Brown and
Caylor (2004), and Gompers et al. (2003). For example, I assigned four points to a
company having four directors and five points for five directors. Similarly, four
points were assigned to a firm that had four meetings in a year and five points if
the company had five meetings. I measured board independence using a 5-point
Likert scale where 1 denoted minimum board independence and 5 indicated
maximum board independence. Also, audit committee independence was
measured using a 5-point Likert scale of 1 to 5, where 1 indicated minimum
independence and 5 denoted maximum independence. The size of the board was
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also measured by assigning one point to each member of the board of directors in
a firm. The number of board meetings was similarly measured by assigning one
point to each meeting the firm had in a year. Executive compensation was
measured by the dollar amount the highest paid executive received in the firm.
The age of the firm was measured as the number of years since incorporation, and
the size of the company was measured by the natural logarithm of total assets.
Financial performance was measured by three ratios. The first was
the ROA, which is the ratio of EBITDA and total assets. The second measure of
financial performance was ROCE, which is the ratio of EBITDA and capital
employed; capital employed is the total sum of equity and long-term debt. The
third measure of financial performance was Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of
the firm’s market value to the cost of replacement of its assets.
The results of the study showed that the relationship between ROA
and board independence, audit committee independence, board size, number of
board meetings, and firm age was positive but not statistically significant. There
was no relationship between ROA and executive compensation. As concerning
the relationship between ROA and firm size, the study indicated that the
association between firm size and ROA was negative but not significant.
Concerning the relationship between corporate governance
mechanisms and ROCE, the results of the study showed there was no significant
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relationship between executive compensation and ROCE. The result also showed
that there was a positive but not statistically significant relationship between
board independence, audit committee independence, and the number of board
meetings and ROCE. The relationship between firm age and firm size was also
positive but statistically not significant.
Board independence and board size were negatively related to
Tobin’s Q, but the association was not statistically significant. The relationship
between audit committee independence, the number of board meetings, firm age,
and firm size and Tobin’s Q were positive but not statistically significant. There
was no relationship between executive compensation and Tobin’s Q.
Interpretation of Findings
The purpose of this study was to find answers to the eight RQs I
developed. The RQs were as follows:
RQ1: Is there a statistically significant association between corporate governance and
financial performance of publicly quoted companies in Nigeria?
RQ2: Is there a statistically significant association between board
independence and financial performance of publicly quoted companies in Nigeria?
RQ3: Is there a statistically significant association between audit committee
independence and financial performance of publicly quoted companies in
Nigeria?
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RQ4: Is there a statistically significant association between executive compensation and
financial performance of publicly quoted companies in Nigeria?
RQ5: Is there a statistically significant association between the number of board meetings
and financial performance of publicly quoted companies in Nigeria?
RQ6: Is there a statistically significant association between board size and financial
performance of publicly quoted companies in Nigeria?
RQ7: Does the size of the firm mediate the relationship between corporate governance
and financial performance of publicly quoted companies in Nigeria?
RQ8: Does the age of the firm mediate the relationship between corporate governance
and financial performance of publicly quoted companies in
Nigeria?
To test these relationships, I used a theoretical framework based on agency, stakeholder,
and stewardship theories to link the five mechanisms of corporate governance
with the three measures of financial performance: ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s Q. I
performed several global ƒ tests to establish a linear relationship between the
financial performance dependent variables and corporate governance mechanisms
independent variables. I also performed individual t tests to examine the
relationship between individual corporate governance mechanisms and financial
performance metrics. To test for the presence of multicollinearity problem in the
model, I used correlation matrix of the individual variables and VIF values. The
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results of the tests showed that multicollinearity was present in the model, caused
by either firm age or executive compensation. When any of the two independent
variables was removed; however, multicollinearity problem disappeared. When
executive compensation was removed from all the equations, since it had no
relationship with any of the three measures of organizational financial
performance, the multicollinearity problem in the regression model was resolved.
In the next section, I explained the research findings of the study.
Corporate Governance and Organizational Performance
RQ1 asked whether there was a statistically significant association between
corporate governance and organizational performance. The statistical results in
Chapter 4 indicated there was a relationship between corporate governance
mechanisms and organizational performance, measured by ROA, ROCE, and
Tobin’s Q. The ƒ test, and p values, R2, and adjusted R2 tabulated in Table 10
provided some support of a relationship, but not all the associations were positive
and none was statistically significant. Board independence was measured by the
proportion of directors that was nonexecutive and whether there was the presence
of CEO duality in the firm. The BRT’s principles of corporate governance, the
SOX, and findings from my review of the literature suggested that an independent
board and absence of CEO duality ensure a good corporate governance practice
and strong organizational performance. The assumption is that better economic
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and financial decisions are made in a firm with an independent board, which leads
to improved financial performance (Al-Matar et al.,2014).
Of all the corporate governance mechanisms, only firm size was negatively
related to ROA. Executive compensation and firm age had no association with
ROA and all the others, although positively associated with the outcome variable,
were statistically not significant. Board independence, audit committee
independence, board size, and the number of board meetings were positively
related to ROA but the relationship was not statistically significant. Board
independence, audit committee independence, number of board meetings, firm
age, and firm size had a positive but not statistically significant relationship with
ROCE while the relationship between board size and ROCE was negative but not
statistically significant. Executive compensation was not associated with ROCE.
The relationship between Tobin’s Q and corporate governance mechanisms was
negative but statistically not significant. Board independence and board size were
negatively related to Tobin’s Q but the association was statistically not
significant. The relationship between audit committee independence, number of
board meetings, firm age, and firm size and Tobin’s Q was positive but
statistically not significant. There was no relationship between executive
compensation and Tobin’s Q.
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Corporate Governance and Return on Assets (ROA)
RQ 2 was whether there was a statistically significant relationship between board
independence and organizational performance, measured by ROA. The impact of
board independence on organizational performance in the literature was mixed.
For example, Wu and Li (2014) found board independence reduces fraud in
Chinese companies. On the other hand, Benjamin and Zain (2015) found the
relationship between board independence and dividend payout negative and
statistically significant. Greater board independence and absence of CEO duality
will guarantee a much more fruitful discussion on the board and an objective
assessment of CEO performance. But when CEO duality is present and there is no
lead director to serve as a bulwark on the power of the CEO, the tendency of the
CEO to seek self-interest is greater. According to the agency theory, the pursuit of
managers’ self-interest leads to organizational underperformance.
Thus, a positive relationship between board independence and ROA was expected; what
was not expected was a statistically not significant association. One possible
explanation is that in Nigeria, the Nigerian SEC code of corporate governance
prescribes that no company should have CEO duality and the majority of the
members of the board of directors must be composed of nonexecutive and
independent directors. Inevitably, all companies have nonexecutive chair and the
majority of the board is composed, seemingly, of independent directors. This
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uniformity may have contributed to the result. Another reason may be that most of
those directors identified as independent may not be without some remote ties
with the company in actual practice. The directors may just be putting their
cronies on the board just to satisfy the requirements of SEC’s code of corporate
governance.
RQ 3 was: Is there a statistically significant relationship between audit committee
independence and organizational performance measured by ROA? The SOX
made independence audit committee mandatory, following the financial collapse
of Enron, Inc. together with its external auditors, Arthur Andersen. The close
relationship between the directors of Enron and the partners of Arthur Andersen
and due the significant amount of other services rendered to the company by the
auditor was blamed for the unhealthy cooperation between auditor and client. To
prevent a situation where an auditor is less than objective because of the
relationship with his or her client’s directors, an audit committee is required to be
composed of independent directors with knowledge of finance and accounting.
SOX also set up the PCAOB to supervise and discipline errant auditors. In the
present study, the association between audit committee independence and ROA
was positive but not statistically significance. I expected a statistically significant
association because the independence of the members engenders objective and
professional atmosphere in the firm’s accounting and control systems. One
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possible explanation for the not significant relationship is likely to be that
directors put their cronies on the committee to satisfy Nigerian SEC’s codes, who
have the appearance of independent persons, but who are in fact stooges of the
executive directors. Another reason is that the code was not specific as to the
qualifications of members of the audit committee. The requirement should be that
at least the chairman and another member should have expertise in accounting or
finance.
The audit committee offers advisory and support services to the management and the
board. The committee looks at the audit report, calls for clarifications of certain
figures and balances, and also examines the work of the chief internal auditor to
offer ensure the financial and operational controls are strong and working
properly. A system where a strong and independent committee is in operation,
composed by experienced and knowledgeable individuals with integrity, ought to
improve financial and risk management controls and organizational performance.
Although the relationship between audit committee and organizational
performance is yet to be exhaustively dealt with in the literature, Hassan and
Ahmed (2014) found a positive and significant relationship between audit
committee and ROA. In the present study, the association between audit
committee independence and ROA was found positive but not statistically
significant. In Nigeria, the CAMA requires that all public have at least six
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members of the audit committee, three members are to be composed of the
members of the executive directors and three members from shareholders’
representatives. What all companies do is to strictly abide by this provision, which
is less than ideal as corporate governance principles require all members of the
audit committee to be, ideally, independent. Of all the 39 companies that were
sampled, only one had an audit committee structure that is more independent. The
uniformity with which the law’s provision is being applied may also have
accounted for the statistically not significant association between audit committee
independence and ROA.
RQ 4 was whether there is a significant association between board size and
organizational performance measured by ROA. There is disagreement in the
literature whether the size of the board is good or bad for company performance.
Cao, Leung, Feroz, and Davalos (2015) and Adewuyi and Olowookere (2013)
reported a positive and significant relationship between smaller board and
corporate performance. On the other hand, Xie and Fukumoto (2013) and Kouki
and Gani (2015) found that the bigger the board the better is organizational
performance. Board size can be a source of competitive advantage especially if
the board is diverse in terms of the competencies of the members, their
connections in the industry, and the synergy of their skills-set. But bigger boards
could also cause rivalry among members and bureaucracy that lead to poor
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organizational performance. I expected board size to be significantly association
with ROA. The result of the study showed that although board size was positive,
it was not significantly related to ROA. The CAMA stipulated a minimum of two
board members and the SEC code of corporate governance made provision for a
minimum of four members. The result of the study may be because many boards
in Nigeria are composed of friends and family members and appointment to the
board are seen by many as a big favor to reward loyalty; merit is rarely considered
in many cases.
For RQ 5 was whether there is a significant association between organizational
performance, measured by ROA, and the number of board meetings. According to
Alves, Couto, and Francisco (2016) and Jermias and Gani (2014) the board
meetings is where board power is exercised. The frequency of meetings also
indicates board involvement in the organization’s affairs and ought to positively
impact organizational financial performance (Mishra & Mihanty, 2013). The
frequency of board meetings have been found by some researchers to be
negatively and significantly related to firm performance. In this research study,
the number of meetings was positive but not significantly related to financial
performance.
RQ 6 was whether executive compensation has a significant association with
organizational performance measured by ROA. Although the result showed that
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there was no relationship as the beta coefficient of executive compensation was
closer to zero, some researchers have found that the higher the executive pay, the
higher the book value of assets and the lower the ROA (Alves et al., 2016). The
result of the present study was surprising as I had expected executive pay to be a
great motivator to employees to do more for the organization and increase its
profitability and value. One reason for the lack of relationship between ROA and
executive compensation may be because organizations in Nigeria rarely disclose
the true executive compensation on the face of financial statements and there are
as yet no oversight regulators that enforce the disclosure. Again, the practice of
giving benefits-in-kind to executives instead of cash is common in Nigeria and
monitoring and monetizing these benefits may be near impossible.
RQ 7 asked whether the relationship between firm age and organizational performance,
measured by ROA is statistically significant. The age of the firm, measured by the
number of years since incorporation, could be an asset or liability. Age is a proxy
for experience and may guide a company from making costly strategic error. On
the other hand, old companies tend to be complacent, the last to discover that their
customers’ taste and lifestyles have changed for them to adapt their products and
services accordingly, and the last to change their business model in an age where
mobility is everything. I expected a significant relationship between the age of the
firm and organizational performance. The surprising thing here is that there was
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no relationship at all. The result may be because many of the sampled companies
were very old. The mean age was 45 years and the maximum exceeded 100 years.
Only one company is in information technology and one also in natural resources,
the business sector of now and the future. All these points considered, companies
in Nigeria are very old and new ventures are not being set up, not in the sectors
and size that matter. This may be why age does not have any association with
ROA.
In RQ 8, I asked whether the size of the firm and organizational performance, measured
by ROA, was statistically significant. Size confers many advantages on the firm:
Much better ability to negotiate contracts than smaller firms, better able to
withstand economic shocks, and ability to buy in bulk to gain substantial
discounts. All things considered, the size of the firm should be positively and
significantly related to organizational performance. The result of this study
showed that the relationship between the size of the firm, measured by natural
logarithm of total assets, and ROA was negative and not significant. This is
surprising. Again, the result may be because most firms get by in Nigeria through
crony capitalism, not because of efficiency, innovation, merit, or superior
management skill.
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Corporate Governance and Return on Capital Employed (ROCE)
RQ 1examined the relationship between corporate governance and
organizational performance, measured by ROCE. The findings in Table 13
showed that there was some relationship between corporate governance and
ROCE. Board independence (BODIND), audit committee independence
(AUDCOMMIND), number of board meetings (BODMTGS), firm age
(FIRMAGE), and firm size (FIRMSIZE) were all positively related to ROCE. The
relationship is weak giving that the adjusted R2 was
-.086. There was no relationship between executive compensation and
ROCE because the beta coefficient is very close to zero. Board size was
negatively associated with ROCE.
RQ 2 the relationship between board independence and ROCE,
whether there was a statistically significant relationship between the two
variables. Board independence was measured by the proportion of independent
directors to the number of directors and whether there was separation between the
chair and the CEO. ROCE was measured by the ratio of EBITDA and capital
employed. Capital employed is the total sum of equity and long-term debt. There
was some evidence in the literature that ROCE is positively and significantly
associated with board independence (Kouki & Gani, 2015; Sun et al. 2014). I
expected a positive and significant relationship between board independence and
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ROCE, but the result showed that the relationship was not statistically significant;
the association between board independence and ROCE was found positive but
not significant. The beta coefficient of .188 showed that board independence
could explain 19% of the variations in ROCE.
The RQ 3 was whether the relationship between audit committee
independence and organizational performance, measured by ROCE, was
statistically significant. Audit committee independence was measured by the
proportion of independent members on the committee to the total number of
members and whether the members can communicate directly with the chief
internal auditor. Generally, the committee has access to the internal auditors who
may be asked to appear to explain certain issues as the case may be. Whether the
committee’s chair and other members know what questions to ask and whether
they are equipped to understand the answers is a different matter, which depends
on the competence of the committee. I expected a positive and significant
relationship between audit committee independence and ROCE. Audit committee
monitors the work of the external and internal auditors and if it does its work well,
management’s tendency to misstate accounting information or give out false
reports will be minimized, and financial statements will be more accurate and
firm value enhanced. The result was unexpected as the relationship between audit
committee independence and ROCE was positive but not significant. The reason,
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as stated when the relationship between ROA and audit committee independence
was examined may be because company legislation in Nigeria assigns equal
numbers of members to the committee comprising representatives of the
shareholders and the company. Most companies follow this practice which does
not give the committee real independence as defined in the BRT principles of
corporate governance.
The RQ 4 in relation to ROCE was whether there was a significant
relationship between board size and organizational performance, measured by
ROCE. The size of the board is the absolute number of the members on the board.
A large board will have room for diversity, a complement of skills, and other
board directorships that may benefit the firm. Thus I expected board size to be
positive and significantly related to ROCE. The result was unexpected. The
relationship between board size and ROCE was negative and not statistically
significant. The result may be because appointments to the boards of corporations
in Nigeria are not without the old practice of using family connections where
merit and skill take a second place. The complementary skills-set that should help
a firm achieve superior performance may be absence even in a large board in
corporations in Nigeria.
RQ 5 was in relation to the association between the number of
board meetings and organizational performance measured by ROCE and whether
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a statistical and significant relationship existed between the two variables. The
board exercises board and corporate power at the board meetings where important
and far reaching decisions that affect the present and future performance of the
firm are taken. The number of board meetings has been found in the literature to
be negative and significantly associated with dividend payout policy (Benjamin &
Zain, 2015). Dividend payout policy is a proxy for performance as dividend
relates to profitability. In the present study, the relationship between the number
of board meetings and ROCE was positive but not significant. The positive
relationship is also weak, with beta coefficient of 0.033. The reason for this
unexpected result may be because, as stated above, board appointments in Nigeria
are not based on merit, and knowledgeable and objective discussion of strategy
and policy in meetings may be generally absent at the meetings, and could be
more of re-echoing the position of a powerful chairperson. This may be more so if
the directors have been hand-picked by the CEO or a powerful chair.
As regards RQ 6 whether the relationship between executive
compensation and corporate governance is statistically significant, the result
indicated that there was no relationship between ROCE and executive
compensation. The beta coefficient is nearly zero, at .0000005671. The result was
unexpected. Executive compensation was measured by the dollar amount paid to
the highest paid executive as disclosed in the financial statements. Some research
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findings have found positive and significant association between executive pay
and corporate performance (Basory, Gleason, & Kannan, 2014). Other research
findings showed a negative relationship between executive compensation and
corporate performance (Alves et al., 2016). Although the research findings are not
conclusive, I expected a positive and significant relationship between executive
compensation and ROCE. Higher pay signals to the executives that hard work and
innovation are recognized in the firm and it also serves as an attraction to
qualified professionals to seek employment in the company. The result was
unexpected; the negative relationship between executive compensation and ROCE
was extremely weak as the beta coefficient was virtually zero. I conclude that
there was no relationship between executive compensation and ROCE. The
reason for this result may be because firms in Nigeria may not be disclosing all
the executives’ emoluments, and what is not disclosed is different from one firm
to the other. Another reason may be that the compensation to executives is far and
above the value they give to the companies, in other words, the executives are
seriously overpaid.
RQ 7 in relation to organizational performance measured by
ROCE is whether the age of the firm mediated or explained the relationship
between corporate governance and financial performance. A mediating variable
affects the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. In the
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main model, R2 was .114 and adjusted R2 was -.086. When firm age was removed
from the model, R2 reduced to .101 and adjusted R2 became -.067. The difference
in the adjusted R2 was 22.09%. From this result, I conclude that the age of the
firm mediated the relationship between corporate governance and ROCE. The age
of the firm can be an impediment to growth and profitability due to reluctance to
change with changes in the business landscape and lack of motivation to stick to
the tried and tested way of doing things.
As to RQ 8 whether the size of the firm mediated the relationship
between corporate governance and ROCE, the adjusted R2 computed without the
size of the firm in the main model was -.082 and the adjusted R2 with all the
variables included was -.086. Firm age caused the R2 to change by .004 or 4.65%,
which seems to suggest that the size of the firm does not affect or mediate the
relationship between corporate governance and ROCE. Although I started by
assuming that size mattered in corporate governance, the power of the size of the
firm to explain the relationship between corporate governance and firm
performance measured by ROCE was limited.
Corporate Governance and Tobin’s Q
In relation to RQ 2 and Tobin’s Q, the question was whether the
relationship between board independence and financial performance, measured by
Tobin’s Q, was statistically significant. The statistical results in Chapter 4
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indicated that there was some relationship between corporate governance
mechanisms and organizational performance, measured by Tobin’s Q. In Table
14, the relationship between board independence and Tobin’s Q was negative but
not statistically significant. Tobin’s Q measures the market value of the firm and
board independence is valued by investors and financial analysts and should
enhance the value of the firm. The result was not expected as research in the
literature seemed to suggest that board effectiveness leads to enhanced market
value (Baulkaran, 2014; Bhagat & Bolton, 2013; Mishra & Mohanty, 2013). The
reason may be the many imperfections in the pricing of equities in the market. For
example, insider trading in firms’ stocks is rarely detected and punished, and it is
not unknown for companies to buy their own shares through covert purchases
contracts with brokers to increase their share price, especially prior to a rights
issue or public offering.
RQ 3 was whether the relationship between audit independence
and company financial performance, measured by Tobin’s Q, was statistically
significant. The statistical regression results showed that audit committee
independence was positively associated with Tobin’s Q, but the relationship was
statistically not significant, as the p value of .301 was greater than the .05 level of
significance. Like board independence, audit committee independence should
signal to the investment community the accuracy of financial information in the
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company’s accounts. The reliance on the report of the audit committee by the
investment community should enhance the firm’s share price and market value.
The result was not expected. Like appointment to the board, members of the
committee are rarely selected on merit and appropriate qualifications. Also the
requirement of law in the country that half of the members of the committee
should be composed of executive directors is a serious cause for concern and may
have caused the near irrelevancy of audit committee work in Nigeria.
RQ 4 was whether the relationship between board size and corporate performance,
measured by Tobin’s Q was statistically significant. The board of directors is the
organ of the firm. The quality and size of the board matter because the board
represents the shareholders and its members’ vision, competence, and the quality
of its decisions affect the company’s financial fortunes. While there is no single
metric to determine the appropriate board size as it depends on the organizational
context, the complexity of the company’s operations, the number of subsidiaries,
and the need for proper coordination and control (Lucas-Perez et al., 2014;
Knockeart et al., 2015).. Although, board size may not be sensitive to the benefits
and costs of monitoring and advising the management of the firm, I expected a
large board size (beyond the minimum of two directors prescribed by law) to
positively and significantly affect firm value, measured by Tobin’s Q. The result
indicated that the relationship was not statistically significant. As mentioned
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above, the reason may be the way board appointments are made in Nigeria: More
through family connections and friendship networks, and less by merit, skills, and
verifiable and cognate experience (Adewuyi & Olowookere, 2013).
RQ 5 in relation to Tobin’s Q was whether the relationship
between organizational performance, measured by Tobin’s Q, and the number of
board meetings was statistically significant. Board meetings take place in the
boardroom. The board room is where corporate power is exercised. Issues
affecting the firm’s business, strategy, competition, research and development,
risk management, foreign subsidiary, mergers and acquisitions, divestment,
personnel issues, and other matters are discussed during board meetings. The
frequency of board meetings is therefore crucial to the growth and progress of the
firm (Benjamin & Zain, 2015). I expected a positive and statistically significant
association between Tobin’s Q and the number of board meetings. Even though
the relationship between the frequency of meetings and Tobin’s Q was positive, it
was not statistically significant as the p value of .380 exceeded the alpha criterion
of .05. The reason may be that most meetings do not address the critical issues
affecting the business of the corporation as the recruitment of directors to the
board was faulty from the onset. In this situation, the powerful CEO sets the
agenda and directs the procedures at the meetings. The chair and other members
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merely commend the CEO for a job well done without any attempt at a critical
and objective appraisal of the CEO’s and other executives’ presentations.
RQ 6 concerned the association between corporate governance,
measured by executive compensation, and organizational performance, measured
by Tobin’s Q was statistically significant. The result of the regression showed that
there was no relationship between executive compensation and Tobin’s Q, as the
beta coefficient was virtually zero. The result was not what I expected. The
information effect of executive compensation can be a very powerful motivator of
employee loyalty, commitment, and dedication (Basory et al., 2014). The result
could also be that not all emoluments are disclosed in the financial statements. It
could also be that executive compensation does not serve as a motivator, either
because they are too low or badly packaged. For example, stock options and payfor-performance are rarely part of executive compensation in Nigeria. Nigerian
companies may have been overpaying its managers because rarely is executives’
pay linked to company performance.
RQ 7 asked whether firm age mediated the relationship between
corporate governance mechanisms and organizational performance, measured by
Tobin’s Q. The result of the regression showed that the adjusted R2 was -.046
when none of the two mediating variables was in the regression model. Including
the age of the firm in the model improved the model as the adjusted R2 became -
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.077. Before the mediating variable, firm age, was added into the model, the
independent variables were able to explain 4.6% of the variations in Tobin’s Q,
by adding firm age, the independent variables were able to explain 7.7% of the
variations in Tobin’s Q. I conclude that the age of the firm mediates the
relationship between Tobin’s Q and board independence, audit committee
independence, number of board meetings, and board size.
RQ 8 asked whether the size of the firm mediated the relationship
between corporate governance and organizational performance, measured by
Tobin’s Q. The size of the firm was measured by the natural logarithm of total
assets. The size of the firm should confer some positive advantages on the
company and enhance its market value, measured by Tobin’s Q. The power to
negotiate a contract, lobby the government for favorable treatment, get cheap
finance from the financial institutions, and trade credit from suppliers more often
than not is a function of corporate size. The size of the firm, all things equal,
should enhance its market value, measured by Tobin’s Q. The result of the
regression showed that when the regression model contained only the corporate
governance variables, the adjusted R2 was -.046. When the size of the firm was
added to the model as the only mediating variable, the adjusted R2 increased to .097. The addition of firm size to the model increased the explanatory power of
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the independent variables by more than 100%. The conclusion is that size is a
mediator between corporate governance mechanisms and Tobin’s Q.
Recommendations
The UNDP and the BRT principles of corporate governance
advocated an independent board, independent audit committee, and a
nonexecutive chair for the board of directors of publicly listed companies. The
United Kingdom’s Cadbury Committee on the financial aspects of corporate
governance (The Cadbury Committee) recommended the presence of a lead
director when the chair of the board is also the CEO of the firm. Some researchers
in corporate governance have stated that an independent board, smaller board
sizes, a non-executive chair, adequate compensation to executives, and more
frequent board meetings were the means to ensure efficiency in business
organizations and to minimize conflict of interests in large public corporations.
The regulators in many countries have also recommended an
independent board, independent audit and other committees, and regular
attendance at board meetings as a way to increase the directors’ involvement in
public companies and eliminate self-interests of executives to enhance
organizational performance and shareholders’ wealth. Many of these
recommendations are in line with corporate governance principles advocated by
the UNDP, the Cadbury Committee, and the BRT. The research findings of this
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study have shown evidence that was contrary to these principles and codes of
corporate governance practice.
The results of this study indicated that executive compensation and
age of the firm have little direct relationship with ROA in nonfinancial companies
listed on the NSE. Board independence, audit committee independence, board
size, and the number of board meetings have a direct positive association with
ROA in the sampled companies but the relationship was found to be statistically
not significant.
Executive compensation serves to motivate employees to be loyal
and dedicated to the objectives of the organization, and also to aspire to positions
of authority and therefore stay with the firm for a long time. The results of the
study showed that the disclosure of executive compensation in the financial
statements was not uniform. While some companies disclosed only basic salaries,
others disclosed allowances, benefits-in-kind, and other compensation. Apart
from the loss of information effect of the disclosure that serves to motivate staff
and encourage outsiders in dealing with the firm, comparability among companies
was difficult. The result of the study also showed that executive compensation
was not related to return on capital employed. The negative beta coefficient was
almost zero. Executive compensation also had no relationship with Tobin’s Q.
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I recommend that the financial statements should contain a full
disclosure of executive compensation, including the monetary value of car and
driver, company housing provided to the executive, paid annual leave, education
allowance for the executive’s children, wardrobe and furniture allowance, security
allowance, paid utility bills, and employer’s portion of contributory pension.
Additionally, a sort of pay-for-performance should become a standard part of the
whole package of executive compensation. In Nigeria, executive pay is rarely
linked to corporate performance and the notion of stock options is foreign to
Nigerian executives. If executive compensation is to have a significant impact on
organizational performance, part of the compensation should be linked to the
firms’ performance.
The age of the firm is a proxy for experience. Experience gives the
advantage of avoiding costly mistakes and strategic error. The result of the study
showed that age had no relationship at all with organizational performance,
measured by ROA. As regards ROCE, the relationship between age and corporate
governance mechanism was weak. However, the relationship between age and
Tobin’s Q, a measure of market value was the strongest. This means that investors
value older companies more as they believe the firms provide more stability,
experience, and dependability. I recommend that companies emphasize their age
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and experience in their marketing and other corporate communication as this will
positively impact the company’s business and share price.
Board independence is seen as the most important components of
corporate governance practices that could ensure reduction in the directors’ selfinterest and prevent weak organizational performance by the SOX and the
principles of corporate governance in the Cadbury Committee, the UNDP, and the
BRT. Independence of the board makes possible a corporate environment where
merit and objectivity are valued. Independence of the majority of the board
members will also ensure that business dealings with the firms are free of insider
abuse, financial manipulation, and false reporting. The result of the study
indicated that board independence was positive but not statistically significant in
relation to ROA and ROCE. Board independent, on the other hand, was
negatively related to Tobin’s Q, which is a measure of the firm’s market value.
Both ROA and ROCE measured a firm’s profitability. It appears that in nonfinancial firms in Nigeria, boards of directors are not perceived as truly
independent. This is because the process of recruitment of members to the board
may be faulty, as many of the positions are given to family members and old
friends.
The negative relationship between the Tobin’s Q and board
independence may be because the market and the investing public see members as
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mercenaries; being on the board to further their self-interest without adding value
to the firm. My recommendations are that the recruitment of members to the
board of directors should be open and transparent. The process should be free of
bias and the selected candidates should be respected members of the society with
required qualifications and skills-set that is appropriate and can add value to the
company. Additionally, the current practice of appointing a former CEO as chair
and auditor as one of the directors should be discouraged to allow for a cooling
period of at least 10 years before making those appointments. Directors should
also be appointment after thorough investigation of both their professional and
business life to ensure only men and women of integrity are appointed to the
board.
Audit committee independence is crucial if financial statements are
to be true and fair and free of errors and manipulations. An independent
committee will be able to ensure that the external auditors are professional and
objective in their work and that internal auditors display diligence, integrity,
objectivity, and an independent attitude to their work. The SOX and many
corporate governance codes emphasize the importance of an independent audit
committee as the bulwark against corporate financial abuse. The result showed a
positive relationship between the independence of audit committee and ROCE,
but the association was not significant. It is worrisome that the CAMA prescribed
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six members of the audit committee, three executive directors and three
representatives of the shareholders. All companies followed this minimum
standard, which is less than the principles recommended. I recommend that the
structure of the audit committee should be changed. All members of the audit
committee should be independent for an objective appraisal of a firm’s accounting
policies, audit process, auditor’s assessment, and assessment of the quality of
financial information.
From the results, I discovered that many members selected for the
audit committee assignment were not qualified for the job. Many do not have
accounting, finance, and audit qualifications; neither do the majority of the
members have industry experience. What became plainly obvious was that the
recruitment to the committee follows a similar process like recruitment to the
board of directors. I recommend further that only those with requisite
qualifications should be recruited to the audit committee and the committee
should be composed entirely of independent members.
Many researchers hold the view that the smaller the size of the
board, the more the profitability and financial performance. Yet, a prescription of
the number of directors on a board is conceptually and practically difficult and
may bring about inefficiency and weak organizational financial performance.
What ought to be emphasized are the qualities and integrity of the members of the
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board, their experience, skills-set, and industry connections. A large board size
has the potential of containing several men and women with different skills and
industry experience. It is also possible for a large board to have diversity, which
researchers have linked to superior organizational performance. The result of the
research indicated that the relationship between board size and organizational
financial performance, measured by ROA, was positive but the association was
weak and not statistically significant. But board size was negatively related to
ROCE and Tobin’s Q.
Although, as stated above, a large board size can be an advantage
by introducing diversity and experience to the firm, it could also be a liability. A
large board size may increase rivalry and unhealthy competitiveness among the
directors. It may also increase red tape and bureaucracy. The optimum board size
should depend on the complexity of the organization and the need to have
different skills and experiences at the disposal of the firm. I recommend that, in
defining the optimum number of directors on the board, it must be ensured that
enough members are recruited to carry on the business of the firm and ensure that
the members can introduce diversity and be enough to form the various
committees that are essential to the business of the company.
The result of this study for the number of board meetings indicated
that the relationship between the frequency meetings and ROA was positive but
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not significant. The relationship between the number of board meetings and
ROCE and Tobin’s Q was negative but not significant. Board meetings are where
major decisions concerning the present and future performance of the firm take
place. The board meetings are also where corporate power is exercised. The
frequency and quality of the meetings, all things being equal, should have a
positive impact on organizational performance.
The reason for the negative relationship between the number of
board meetings and ROCE and Tobin’s Q in this study may be because in many
meetings, the discussions may be far from being objective, but many may be just
to rubber-stamp a powerful CEO’s propositions. Investors may not believe in the
quality of decisions in the boardroom if the directors are seen as weak and
unqualified. I recommend that the board of directors should set up meetings
where the agenda is known prior to the meetings, to seek advice from subject
experts on a technical matter before the meeting, and to ensure that members
receive early notification of the meetings. The board should also send all papers
and issues to be considered in advance to all members and encourage them to
attend all meetings and make objective contributions to the debate.
Executive compensation was found to have no relationship with
ROA, ROCE, and Tobin’s Q. In Nigeria, the only information available regarding
executive compensation is the disclosure in the financial statements of the
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emoluments of the chairperson and the highest paid director. This is a requirement
of the law and not a code of corporate governance practice. However, the
disclosure is not uniformly applied by the listed companies. Some companies only
disclose basic salaries and omit allowances and benefits-in-kind. It is thus difficult
to determine, using an objective standard, the completeness of the disclosure of
executive compensation in the non-financial companies listed on the NSE.
Another challenge is that Nigerian firms usually provide executive
with car and driver, paid annual leave, security details, housemaids and other
servants, and allowances such as wardrobe, education, furniture, and housing.
Many of these benefits-in-kind were not captured in the disclosure of executive
compensation in the financial statements. The results also indicated that in
Nigeria, many executives are not rewarded with a portion of the firms profit;
rarely do companies link executive pay to the firm’s performance. Yet researchers
have stated that it is a good policy to link part of executive compensation to the
financial fortunes of the company. I recommend that companies should fully
disclose all executive emoluments in the financial statements and for the rule to
be applied among all the listed firms on the NSE. I also recommend that efforts
should be made to link part of the executive compensation to the performance of
the company as it gives executive and staff motivation to perform better.
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I have been extremely careful in my data gathering and analysis of
the result of this study, nevertheless the study has some limitations. This study
examined the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and
organizational performance in non-financial companies listed on the NSE that met
certain predetermined criteria. The findings in the study cannot be generalized to
all listed corporations in the world. Some of the limitations of the study include
the use of secondary data, lack of information in some organizations, nonuniformity in the implementation of IFRS, and modeling problems. The use of
secondary data and the criteria set for inclusion of corporations in the sample
limited the data available for the study. First, the financial statements of all firms
were prepared under the historical cost convention. Between 2011 and 2012, all
companies adopted the Nigerian Generally Accepted Accounting Principles but a
switch was made to IFRS in 2012 which necessitated a restatement of the 2011
and 2012 balances and profit and loss figures.
Secondly, given the possibility of the presence of financial and
accounting manipulations and accounting balances misstatements that are
common in companies, I would have made appropriate adjustments to balance
sheet figures at the end of the year and the profit and loss statements for the year
to get an accurate figure to use in my analysis. Thirdly, it is impossible to
determine whether the adjustments made by the companies to the financial
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statements of 2011 and 2012 and prior period to conform to IFRS was uniformly
and correctly applied in all corporations in the sample. Lastly, account balances
and income and expenses figures are subject to accounting conventions,
accounting bases, and individual firm’s accounting policies. It is not practicable to
know whether all the firms in the sample prepared their financial statement by
adhering to the most useful conventions and accounting policies, from the
investors’ point of view, that allow the financial statements to show a true and fair
view, given that there are more than one policy a company can adopt to reflect its
financial transactions in the accounting records.
If information were available, I would have made necessary and
comprehensive adjustments to the financial statements to recalculate items in the
financial statements, such as EBITDA, book value of equity, long-term debt,
current assets, current liabilities, total assets, net working capital, book value of
preferred stock, gross and net sales, net income, capital employed, and inventory.
The recalculation to adjust the accounting figures to what is true and fair and
accurate could have produced different items in the annual reports and accounts
and may have resulted in different findings and conclusions. The consequence of
the lack of adequate information has necessitated that the accounting figures in
the financial statements were taken at face value and used as presented in the
corporations’ annual reports without any adjustment.
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Another limitation of the study is that the sampled companies were
drawn from all non-financial companies listed on the stock exchange between
2011 and 2015 that met the prescribed criteria for inclusion. These firms operated
in different sectors of the economy. A more accurate sampling method would
have been the stratified sampling method to select a significant number of
companies from each subsector to avoid over- or underrepresentation of some
subsectors. Another limitation is that the Nigerian economy has been facing
serious problems since 2012 when international oil prices dropped to an all time
low, forcing many companies to apply to the stock exchange for delisting, and
many others relocating to other countries while some are making accounting
losses. The poor macro-economic situation in the country limited the number of
non-financial companies that qualified to be included in the sample. Yet another
limitation is that some sectors are represented by only a few companies. For
example, information and communications technology subsector had six firms but
only two were not making losses out of which one had incomplete financial
statements. The other four were either not operating or making losses. The natural
resources subsector had only two companies in the sector, one of which was
making losses.
The modeling problems in the study arose from the fact that only
five corporate governance mechanisms were considered in the study. These five
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corporate governance mechanisms have been considered in the literature
generally and by the Nigerian researchers in particular and have been enshrined in
the Nigeria’s SEC code of corporate governance. Other corporate governance
mechanisms such as board diversity, dividend policy, number of members of
audit committee, frequency of audit committee meetings, auditor’s fees, directors’
shareholding, executive share ownership, quality of financial statements,
directors’ qualifications, shareholders’ rights, family share ownership, treatment
of minority shareholders, and takeover defenses were not considered in the
modeling. These other corporate governance mechanisms were not considered in
the modeling not because they are not relevant and important, but because they
have not received much attention from corporate governance. By using primary
data, stratified sampling method to ensure a more fairly representation of each
sector, making necessary adjustments to the accounting data and information, and
including many more corporate governance mechanisms may have brought out
different research findings.
Future studies can build on these research findings by collecting
primary data based on surveys and interviews. Some form of primary data can
also be used as a supplement to the secondary data. Some of the restrictions used
may also be relaxed, such as including all companies that published its financial
statements, using only financial statements from 2013 when all companies have
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published financial statements using IFRS, and using data that covered 3 years
instead of the 5 years used in the study. I used Tobin’s Q as a market-based
financial performance metric, future studies could use other measures of company
value such as economic value added, price per share to earnings per share, market
value added, ROE, and the dollar amount spent on research and development.
These measures can be used over multiperiod timeframes.
Future studies can also use longitudinal design instead of crosssectional design to study the relationship between corporate governance and
organizational financial performance over a period of time. The design is useful to
study changes that have occurred over an extended period of time using trend
analysis. Future researchers can also compare the financial performance of a
group of firms in a subsector of the economy that has adopted and applied
corporate governance practices to another group in the same subsector that has not
adopted good corporate governance practices. A study such as this will show
whether corporate governance practices are responsible for the differences in
performance if significant. Future researchers can also use repeated-measures
design to compare the differences in financial performance of companies between
one event and the other (i.e., the ROA or Tobin’s Q before and after the adoption
of corporate governance practices).
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Conclusion
I conclude this study by saying that good corporate governance
practices are crucial to the long-term financial performance of a corporation.
Corporate governance practices assure present and potential investors and other
members of the public that a firm’s affairs will be conducted in a fair and orderly
manner and that the financial statements can be relied upon in making investment
decisions. Good corporate governance practices are also good for the economy as
private companies are the main generators of employment and a source of
innovation and economic growth.
However, firms must consider and implement corporate
governance systems in areas that have the greatest impact on their financial
performance. I consider board independence, board experience and members’
qualification, adequate executive compensation, independence of audit
committee, linking executive pay to company performance, appropriate board size
that ensures diversity and with the right skills-set and experience, frequent
attendance at board and audit committee meetings, and a focus on stakeholders’
rights as essential. Poor corporate governance practices should be avoided, such
as ownership concentration, appointment of directors through family connections,
retention of auditors beyond a 10-year period, excessive leverage, concentrating
board power on the chair/CEO, excessive compensation to unproductive
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executives, poor CEO accountability, inaccurate information in the financial
statements, and self-dealing by the directors.
Based on my findings, I recommend a more independent board of
directors composed of knowledgeable and experienced individuals, a more
independent audit committee composed of independent directors only, and a more
frequent and agenda-driven board meetings. I also recommend that executives
should be paid adequately and a portion of the total payment should be a function
of the firm’s profitability. The total emoluments of highest paid executives should
be disclosed in the financial statements. All firms should avoid CEO duality, but
if it is unavoidable, a qualified and experienced leader director should be
appointed to serve as a counterweight to the chairperson/CEO. For effectiveness,
the nonexecutive chairman should be as qualified and experienced as the CEO, if
not more. The size of the board should be that which is adequate to ensure that the
board is in a position to exercise board power effectively, and what is the right
size should be based on the complexity of the company and the competitive
environment.
This study provides information that is useful to investors,
shareholders, regulators, and other researchers on how to ensure effective and
efficiency of operations in organizations, enhance firm value and profitability, and
minimize corporate failures. The findings can help investors arrange their
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portfolio of investments in corporations with strong corporate governance
practices. The findings can be useful to regulators, especially in Nigeria, by
showing why some of the provisions in the extant law and corporate governance
codes are actually hampering good corporate governance practices. Companies
that are careless and dysfunctional in their corporate governance practices are
likely to alter their practices to embrace a more proactive and beneficial system of
governing their firms. By embracing a strong corporate governance system, firms
may be able to avoid weak organizational performance, lack of investor
confidence, and the risk of financial distress. A strong corporate governance
practice benefits the company in other ways by lowering its cost of funds as the
financial markets and analysts perceive a more disciplined and professionally-run
business organization.
This study has implications for positive social change. If the
study’s recommendations are implemented, corporations and their shareholders
may benefit from improved profitability and market value. A good corporate
governance practice builds confidence in the financial markets, which could be of
a great benefit to the firms by being able to borrow from the market at the prime
rates, thus lowering the cost of funds. Present and potential shareholders may
benefit from improved firm profitability through increased dividend payouts and
capital appreciation. Employees could reap the benefits of good corporate
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governance practices through job security and enhanced emoluments that come
from increased efficiency and effectiveness of their firms. Good corporate
governance practices may also minimize company collapses, which will be of
great benefits to investors, employees, the government, and members of the
general public.
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Appendix A: Search Sources, Search Processes, and Keywords Used in the Study
In this appendix, I describe in detail the sources of information used in the
research, the keywords I used in searching for data, and the processes of search. I used
the websites of the listed companies, analysts’ websites, and the database of the Nigerian
Stock Exchange. I also made extensive use of academic research databases as key sources
of data for the research study.
Search Sources
Nigerian companies’ websites
Nigerian companies’ websites provided information on the history of the
firms, corporate governance policies and procedures, the board of directors, and
information on each director including their resumes, other directorships held, and
share ownership. The Investor Relations section on the websites contains
operational, financial, and governance information. Data obtained from the
financial statements included the frequency of board meetings held in the
financial year, the number of audit committee members and their relationship with
the company, the number of directors and their affiliation with the corporation,
the number of independent directors, executive compensation, the size of the
board, the size of the audit committee, and the age of the and the name of the
firm.
The database of the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE)
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I obtained online the data on all public companies’ filings from the
database of the NSE. The data retrieved from the website included the annual
reports and accounts of all sampled companies mandatorily filed with the
exchange and corporate actions including reports on mergers and acquisitions,
declaration of dividends, and key appointment of auditors, members of the audit
committee, and directors. The annual reports and accounts contained information
on corporate profile, corporate governance reports, complaints management
policy, and notice of the annual general meeting. The financial statements also
contained the chairperson’s statement, chief executive’s report, the report of the
directors, statement of directors’ responsibilities, audit committee report, and
external auditor’s opinion on the financial statements. The website also contained
information on stock prices, trading volume for all equities, dividend declared,
and notice of annual general meetings.
The Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) website
The Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission is the capital market
regulator. The website contained information on the corporate governance code
that guide all capital market operators. The website also contained code of
corporate governance for shareholders’ associations and code of conduct for
rating agencies operating in the country.
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Analysts’ websites
I used analysts’ websites in the study including those belonging to the
Financial Times of London, Meristem Securities, and the Bloomberg L.P.
Company. The Financial Times website provided information on the companies’
historical stock prices, income and cash flow statements, balance sheet, and
various metrics such as earnings per share (EPS), total debt to total capital, gross
margin, return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and return on investment
(ROI). Meristem Securities website contained a full appraisal of selected
companies financial performance, including computations of fundamental metrics
such as book value per share, ROA market capitalization, asset turnover, and
leverage. In the Bloomberg L.P. website, I accessed information on companies’
outstanding shares, number of directors, price quotes, share volume turnover,
market capitalization, price per earnings (P/E) ratio, and enterprise value.
Academic Databases
I obtained the description of key research variables, concepts, and
theoretical frameworks from several academic research databases. The databases
accessed for the purpose of this study were as follows:
1. Business Source Complete
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Business Source Complete database provided very useful full-text, peerreviewed academic journal in various field of management, such as business,
finance, and general management. The database contained thousands of case
studies, financial data, and SWOT analyses.
2. ABI/INFORM Collection
ABI/INFORM database provided peer-reviewed journals, reports, working
papers, management theory and practices, trends in business, and business
competition and strategy.
3. ScienceDirect
The ScienceDirect database contained several unique peerreviewed
journals with special focus on management, information technology, and
psychology. Many of the journals may not be available in any other databases.
4. Accounting & Tax
Accounting & Tax database contained scholarly journals that addressed
current issues in accounting, finance, and taxation. The database included key
resources for a quick location of news, current topics, and trends and history that
influence accounting, finance, and tax issues.
5. Academic Search Complete
Academic Search Complete database provided very useful and
comprehensive multidisciplinary peer-reviewed journals conference papers, and
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other resources. Full text research articles were available in corporate finance,
business management, accounting, and the social sciences disciplines.
6. Social Science Research Network (SSRN)
The Social Science Research Network provided very good information in
many social sciences area. I extracted information from the database using fulllength articles and abstracts.
7. ProQuest Central
The ProQuest Central database provided a large selection of scholarly and
peer-reviewed academic journals. The database has other unique materials such as
newspapers, dissertations, and information on business, management, and finance.
8. Emerald Management
Emerald Management database provided several management research for
the scholar as well as the practitioner. The peer-reviewed journals covered diverse
subject areas such as auditing, accounting, finance, economics, organizational
behavior, and general management.
9. Sage Premier
The Sage Premier database provided 56 peer-reviewed management
journals. Some of the research content are very unique to the database.
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10. Google Scholar
The Google Scholar contained peer-reviewed journals and database provided access to
some of the journals used in the study. The site was linked to Walden University library
and also provided links to other sites such as Science Direct, which is one of the largest
databases consisting of a collection of research in social, physical, and health sciences.

Keywords
The keyword search terms I used in this study were: accounting,
amortization, asset turnover, audit committee, audit committee independence,
audit committee report, auditing, agency cost, agency problems, agency theory,
bad governance change, balance sheet, board of directors, board meetings, board
secretary, board size, board structure, book values, book value per share, Business
Roundtable, capital employed, cash flow, CEO duality, chairperson’s statement,
code of ethics, code of conduct, code of corporate governance, Companies and
Allied Matters Act, conflicts of interest, corporate collapses, corporate
governance principles, corporate governance report, corporate information,
corporate misbehavior, corporate scandals, corporate social responsibility, current
assets, current liabilities depreciation, directors report, Directors’ responsibility,
dividends, dysfunctional management, earned value added, earnings, earnings per
share, economic value added, emission standards cheating, enterprise value,
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equity prices, executive compensation, external auditing, financial performance,
Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria, financial ratios, financial risks, financial
structure, firm age, firm size, fraud and irregularities, good governance change,
golden parachute, Gov.-score, governance committee, gross domestic product,
gross margin, income statement, independent director, information asymmetry,
International Financial Reporting Standards, institutional investors, internal
auditing, leverage, long-term debt, long-term financial performance, management
entrenchment, market capitalization, market value, Meristem Securities Limited,
misappropriation, moral hazard, net assets, Nigerian Securities and Exchange
Commission, Nigerian Stock Exchange, notice of annual general meeting, ,
number of directors, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, poison pill,
Ponzi scheme, Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board, Price/Earnings
ratio, price metrics, proxy statements, quality of earnings, non-executive director,
organizational performance, ownership structure, return on assets, return on
capital employed, return on equity, return on investment, risk management, sales
turnover, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, separation of ownership and control, stakeholders,
stakeholders’ theory, stewardship theory, shareholders’ association, shareholders’
wealth, stock prices, take-over defense, theory of the firm, Tobin’s Q, total assets,
transparency, United Nations Development Program, and volume of trading.
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Search Process
In this section, I will describe the process used to obtain data from
websites and academic research database systems:
The process used to obtain data from the Nigerian Stock Exchange
website was as follows:
1.

Access www.nse.com.ng
2.

Look for issuers

3.

Select listed companies

3.

Enter the company’s name and ticker symbol

4.

Select financials

5.

Select the year of interest (e.g., 12/31/2015)

6.

Select financial statement

7.

Select full and supplementary income and cash flow statements

and the statements of financial position
8.

Select market data and access trading statistics such as volume,

value, deals, and market capitalization
9.

Download Daily Trading Statistics of listed securities and obtain

closing stock prices, weekly report of equities, top gainers, and the Daily Official
List for equities
10.

Select corporate actions
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11.

Select press releases.

The following steps were used to search the companies’ websites and
extract data from the accessed financial statements and annual reports.
Access company website (e.g., www.nestle-cwa.com)
Select investors
Select download company business principles
Select download annual account and reports
Search for financial statements and supplementary data
Select Notice of Annual General Meeting
Select Company Profile
Search for Chairman’s Statement
Search for Chief Executive Report
Search for Directors’ Report, including Board Structure, Board Com
position, Number of Directors, Number of Independent/Non-executive Directors,
Board Meetings held in the year, attendance at the meetings, and directors’
resumes and company affiliation
Search for Corporate Governance Report for the year addressed to
members of the company
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Search for the composition of Audit Committee, attendance at the
committee meetings, and the signed report of the committee addressed to
shareholders
Search for Companies’ Officers, Directors, and Advisers
Search for Annual proxy statements
Search for Statement of Directors’ Responsibilities
Search for the Independent Auditors’ Report
Select the Statement of Financial Position and compute total assets,
current liabilities, current assets, inventory, book value of equity, long-term
liabilities, number of outstanding shares, and paid-up capital
Select statement of comprehensive income and compute earnings before
interest, taxation, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA).
Search for Executive Compensation.
Select Share Information and compute the number of ordinary shares in
existence at the end of the year.
Select other National Disclosures and access Five-year Financial
Summary and Value-added Statements.
The process I used to search for data on the website of the Nigerian
Securities and Exchange Commission was as follows:
Access www.sec.gov.ng
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Select regulation
Select rules and codes
Select Code of Conduct for Rating Agencies
Select Code of Corporate Governance for Shareholders’ associations
Select Code of Corporate Governance for Public Companies.
I used the same process that was employed while searching data on
companies’ websites to access data on the analysts’ websites. On the website of
Meristem Securities Limited, I accessed data as follows:
Access www.meristemng.com
Select Research Hub
Select Investor Services/Market Intelligence
Select equity market update
Select equity research reports
Select the desired listed equity
Search for market capitalization, share price, dividend per share, and
earnings per share.
On the website of Bloomberg L.P., I followed the following process to
access data:
Access www.bloomberg.com
Select Markets
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Select Stocks
Select EMEA
Select Africa
Select Nigeria
Select NGSE/INDX:IND Nigeria
Go to stock exchange Main Board
Lookup total members, day range, 52-week range, year-to-date return, and
previous close for equity prices.
The following process was used to access data on Financial Times
website:
Access www.markets.ft.com
Select Markets
Select Market data
Select equities
Type name of company in “find a company” dialog box
Search summary, price, and shares traded
Select financials and search income statement, cash flow statement, and
balance sheet
Search directors and dealings
Search historical prices.
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I used the same process to get data from various websites, even though the
details and organization of data varied from website to website. On a company’s
website, I collected information from the Investors’ Relations portion of the
website. Publicly listed companies in Nigeria upload their financial reports and
other data in the Investors’ Relations of the website. Another feature of the
investment climate in Nigeria is that the consolidated financial statements have
extensive details on the board composition, the history of the firm, audit
committee composition, number and portfolio held by executive directors, full
resume of all directors and the relationship with the firm. The financial reports
and accounts also contained sections for the Chairman’s Statement, The Report of
the Chief Executive, the Report of the Audit Committee, the Statement of
Directors’ Responsibilities, the number of board and Audit Committee meetings
held in the year, and the number of meetings each director attended.
The consolidated financial statements also included sections for various
committee reports, such as operations committee, risk management committee,
executive compensation committee, finance and general purposes committee, and
establishment committee. The number of board committees vary from company to
company, depending on the size, history, and the sector. From the financial
statements, I collected data on net sales; EBITDA; executive compensation; total
assets; current assets; current liabilities; and net working capital. I also collected
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data from the financial statement on capital employed, long-term liabilities,
shareholders’ funds, the number of shares outstanding, and long-term debt. The
Corporate Governance Report section of the financial statements and reports
provided data on corporate governance variables, such as the number of executive
and non-executive directors, whether the chair is also the chief executive, the
number of board meetings held during the year, the size of the board, number of
committees, external and independent directors, and the directors full resume. The
Audit Committee Report section of the financial statements contained the number
of the committee, the interest each of them represented, a report of their findings,
and the number of times they met during the year.
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Appendix B: Index Scoring Methodology
I entered the data collected on Microsoft Excel spreadsheet to calculate the
mean, median, mode, and standard deviation. Tobin’s Q was also calculated using
the excel spreadsheet with the following formula: Market value of equity + book
value of preference shares + inventory + current liabilities – current assets / total
assets (Dharmadasa et al., 2014). Return on Assets (ROA) was calculated using
excel spreadsheet using the following formula: Earnings before interest, taxes,
amortization, and depreciation divided by the book value of total assets. Return on
Capital Employed (ROCE) was also calculated by excel spreadsheet using the
following formula:
Earnings before interest, taxes, amortization, and depreciation divided by
book value of capital employed.
Capital employed is computed as approximately as follows:
Book value of shareholders’ funds or Net Assets + Long-term debt.
The average score for each research dependent variable was the average of
the scores for the 5 years (i.e., the total scores for 2011 to 2015 were added
together and divided by 5 to get the average score).
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Appendix C: List of Sampled Companies

Company name

Ticker Symbol

Subsector

A. G. Leventis Nigeria PLC
Airline Services & Logistics PLC
B.O.C. Gases PLC
Berger Paints PLC
C&I Leasing PLC
Cadbury Nigeria PLC
CAP PLC
Capital Hotel PLC
Dangote Refinery PLC
DN Meyer PLC
E-Tranzact Internal PLC
Eterna PLC
Fidson Healthcare PLC
First Aluminium Nigeria PLC
Flour Mills Nigeria PLC
Glaxo Smithkline Consumer PLC
Greif Nigeria PLC
Guinness Nigeria PLC
Honeywell Flour Mills PLC
Julius Berger Nigeria PLC

AGLEVENT
AIRSERVE
BOCGAS
BERGER
CILEASING
CADBURY
CAP
CAPHOTEL
DANGSUGAR
DNMEYER
ETRANZACT
ETERNA
FIDSON
FIRSTALUM
FLOURMILL
GLAXOSMITH
VANLEER
GUINESS
HONYFLOUR
JBERGR

Livestock Feeds PLC
May & Baker Nigeria PLC
MRS Oil Nigeria PLC
Nascon Allied Industries PLC
Nestle Nigeria PLC
Nigerian Aviation Handling
Company PLC
Nigerian Breweries PLC
Nigerian Enamelware PLC

LIVESTOCK
MAYBAKER
MRS
NASCON
NESTLE

Conglomerates
Services
Natural Resources
Industrial Goods
Services
Consumer Goods
Industrial Goods
Services
Consumer Goods
Industrial Goods
ICT
Oil and Gas
Healthcare
Industrial Goods
Consumer Goods
Healthcare
Industrial Goods
Consumer Goods
Consumer Goods
Construction/Real
Estate
Agriculture
Healthcare
Oil & Gas
Consumer Goods
Consumer Goods

NAHCO
NB
ENAMELWA

Services
Consumer Goods
Consumer Goods
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PZ Cussons Nigeria PLC
Presco PLC
Red Star Express PLC
Studio Press Nigeria PLC
Total Nigeria PLC
Trans-nationwide Express PLC
Transnational Corporation of
Nigeria PLC
UACN PLC
UACN Property Development
Company PLC
Unilever Nigeria PLC
Vitafoam Nigeria PLC

PZ
PRESCO
REDSTAREX
STUDPRESS
TOTAL
TRANSEXPR

Consumer Goods
Agriculture
Services
Services
Oil and Gas
Services

TRANSCORP
UACN

Conglomerates
Conglomerates

UNC-PROP

Construction/Real
Estate
Consumer Goods
Consumer Goods

UNILEVER
VITAFOAM

